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SUMMARY
His bank cusfeoraer relationship consists of a contract of mandate 
and one or more contracts of loan from time to time. I t  1s a 
naturale that cheques are fu l ly  effectual as between bank and 
customer un til the bank becomes aware o f the customer's loss of 
capacity to ac t, whether thft cheques were drawn before or a fte r the 
loss. I f  payment Is  made to the easterner himself J t  is  sim ilarly 
effectual despite the customer's loss o f capacity. The position is  
the same 1n regard to payment Instructions given otherwise than fey 
cheque.
In the case o f sequestration and wtodlng-up a concursus 
creditorus Is  established and 1 t fs  not posslbl e to contract out o f  
the consequences o f a concursus. The above naturale 1s therefore 
void In the case o f sequestration and wfmiing-up except to the 
extent the consequences of a concursus are ■nodlfi&i by s 73{c) o f 
the B i l l s  o f Exchange Act and s 22 o f  the Inse'l'-'S- ’ Act. Section 
73(c) e ffec tive ly  excludes the consequences o f the concursus In  the 
case o f cheques, and In  the case o f other payment Instructions s 22 
excludes such consequences 1n sme but not a ll  respects. Both 
sections apply nafr only on sequestration but also on w1nd1ng-up. .
Section 348 o f the Companies Act deems a winding-up to commence 
on presentation, 1e f i l in g ,  o f the winding-up application and 
$341(2) avoids a l l  dispositions by the company o f I t s  property 
thereafter unless the court otherwise orders. In the case of cheques 
s 73(£) takes precedence, excluding the e ffec t u f ss 348 and 341(2), 
but 1n the case o f other payment Instructions, and aHo o f many 
other transactions between a bank and I t s  customers, the sections 
have important consequences.
Payment to the company is  not a disposition. Payment to a th ird  
party in  accordance with the coiipany's instructions has been held by
the English Court o f Appeal to be a disposition recoverable from the 
payer, but the better view is  that I t  is  recoverable from the third 
party only. In th is country, unlike in other countries with sim ilar 
statutory provisions, the contract of loan arising from a payment 
instruction not drawn against a c red it 1s also a disposition. So too 
is  the giving of a suretyship or security.
An extensive and often unsatisfactory case law has developed 1 
other countries In regard to the circumstances in which the court 
w il l  validate a disposition. Generally, 1t is  said that a 
transaction entered fa to and completed (n good fa ith  and the 
ordinary course o f business a fte r presentation o f the winding-up 
application should be validated to avoid the paralysis o f the 
company's business, However, a 1001*6 satisfactory c r ite r io n  i s  tfcaj. 
the discharge o f  an obligation should be validated to the extent 
such discharge is  re lied  on by the other party In  good fa ith  in  
himself discharging an obligation owed to the company. Any normal, 
arm's length contract should likewise be validated.
The English Court of Appeal has furthermore held that a bank 
should freeze a customer's account as soon as the bank becomes aware 
of the winding-up application unless the bank institu tes safeguards 
to ensure that payments are only made in  the ordinary course o f the 
company's business, that preferential payments are not made to 
certain  creditors and that the company only continues to operate i t s  
account as long as I t  Is  1n the fnter’ests o f the cred itors that tne 
company does so. The imposition o f such an onus 1s, however, not 
ju s t if ie d  and overlooks the fact that the bank may be in breach o f 
contract i f  1 t  freezes the account.
Remedial legislation  Is  desirable to elim inate the uncertainties 
in regard to the position on the customer's loss o f capacity and to 
repeal ss 348 and 341(2). •
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TaTTETbarfc's duty and at/tJnority terminate cm a customer's loss of 
capacity or only on tfie bank’s beccmfng awre of the loss?
(1) The rule that mandates lapse on the mandant's 
loss of capacity:
(A) Exception htere tmndaiary Is unaware of the 
irandant’s loss of capacity
(B) The rule 1s a naturale not an essentlale of nancfete 
{If ) Tfte nj)c that offers lapse on the offeror's loss of
capacity
(111) Is f t  legally possible for a cheque 'draw1 or other 
payment Instruction 'given' after the oistcner's loss 
of capacity to function as a cheque or pajront 
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(1v> Is 1t a tern, either as a naturale or as an Implied 
term, of the bank custorer contract that the bank's 
drty and authority only terminate when the bank 
beccmss aware of the custcrer's loss of capacity?
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(c) Cheques and parent Instructions Issued on the custoner’s behalf
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(d) Rights of an offeree who 'accepts’ offer and perform his 
'cbllgatlons1 1n Ignorance of offeror's loss of capacity
Application of principles
1ST i r ^  aRK^ tly  regular cheque or payment Instruction Is fully 
effectual
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( i )  Loss of capacity occurs before cheque or payment 
instruction 1s Issued
(11) Loss of capacity occurs after cheque or parent 
instruction is issued tot before 1t is received 
by bark ;
(A) Custcmar's account in credit or overdraft 
facility available
(0) Customer's account not 1n credit and no overdraft 
facility available
( i i i )  Loss of capacity occurs after cheque or pajment 
instruction is received by bank but before 1t is 
taw e d  or dishoncuml:
(A) Customer's acca,*?5t In credit or overdraft 
facility available
(B) Custoter's account tot in credit and no overdraft 
facility available
reliance on the otter's cmttrued capacity to act fs entitled to be
Indemnified tor his negative interest?
U> iVeHminary
(b) Principal situations inwich rule wuld apply;
(1) Offers
(if ) Aceepwnce of offers
(111) Options
(iv) Perfonraree of obligations
(V) (totlces exercising risfits under contracts
(vi) Mandates
(V11) Other contracts which lapse on a party's loss of
capacity
(vi11) Representation
(c) Negligence in relation to absence of knowledge
(d) Good faith
(e) Conclusion
Wat constitutes notice of insanity, inability to manage one's
(a) preliminary
(b) Duty to make further enquiry
(c) What is the bank's position i f  it  reasonably tut wrongly 
concludes that a customer has, or does not have, capacity?
(d) Constructive notice
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
Section 73 of the B i l ls  of Exchange Act*1* provides;
'The duty and authority of a banker^) to pay a cheque drawn 
on him by his customer^) are determined by -
(a ) countermand of payment;
(]>) receipt of notice of the customer's death;
(c ) receipt of notice of the customer having become insolvent.'
This l i s t  is ,  however, not exhaustive, Cowen 4^  ^ l is t s  several 
further circumstances in which a bank's duty and authority to pay 
terminate:
H )  Notice of the customer's insanity (to  which may be added 
the customer's in a b ility  -?.u manage his a ffa irs  and 
declaration as a prodigal);*®*
(11) Closing o f  the account;
( 11f J Notice of liquidation or jud ic ia l management;
(1) 34 of 1964.
(2) The Act does not define 'banker1 beyond stating that the term 
includes a body of persons, whether incorporated or not, who 
carry on the business of banking - see generally DV Cowen & 
L Gering Cowen on the law of Negotiable Instruments in South 
Africa 4th ed (Cape Yown 1966) 357-65; f  R T^alVri^STTls^ o? 
IxcWange, Cheques and Promissory Notes In South African law 
(Durban 1983) 6* 314. '
(3) 'Customer' is  s im ilarly undefined - see generally Cowen op c it  
363-5; Malan op c i t  0 343.
(4) Op c i t  416-420.
(5) Prodigality  could also be c lass ified  under (1v).
2 .
( iv )  Order of court;
(v ) Prescription;
(v1) Dissolution of the b a n k .^
Several of these cases give rise  to considerable d iff icu lty  and 
in Part I the problems that arise in regard to loss of capacity to 
act due to insanity, In ab ility  to man?,ge one's a ffa irs , prodigality, 
sequestration and w1nd1ng-up are examined. The principal d iff icu lty  
1s to establish s legal basis, where s 73 does not apply, for the 
assertion that the bank's duty and authority terminate on notice of 
the loss of capacity to act, and not simultaneously with the loss of 
capacity*
In the case of the winding-up of a company I t  is  a’Jso necessary 
to have regard to ss 348 and 341(2) of the Companies A ct.^ "7 These 
sections backdate a winding-yp to the date of presentation of the 
wiftding-^ application and avo id .a ll dispositions by the company 
thereafter unless the court otherwise orders. This backdating has 
serious ramlflcaitions for banks both 1n relation to the continued 
operation by a company of I t s  bank account a fte r presentation of the 
winding-up application and In relation to other banking business 
generally, in Part 11 these ramifications are examined specifica lly  
In relation to the continued operation by the company of its  bank 
account but also with reference to the broader implications for a 
bank of the sections concerned.
In Part 111 remedial leg islation 1s proposed to deal with the 
problems Identified  in Parts 1 and I I .
(6) Cowen also l is t s  s 38 of the Transvaal Diamond Trade Ordinance 
63 of 19G3(T) (wrongly cited as Ordinance 64 of 1903(T)) but 
the Ordinance was repealed by the Precious Stones Act 73 of 
1964.
(? )  61 of 1973.
2 .
( iv )  Order of court;
(v ) Prescription;
{v D  D isso lu tio n  o f  the b a n k . ^
Several of these cases give rise  to considerable d iff icu lty  and 
in Part r the problems that arise in regard to loss of capacity to 
act due to insanity, in a b ility  to manage one's a ffa irs , prodigality, 
sequestration and winding-up are examined. The principal d iff icu lty  
1s to establish a legal basis, when* s 73 does not apply, for the 
assertion that the bank's duty and authority terminate on notice of 
the loss of capacity to act, and not simultaneously with the loss of 
capacity.
In the case of the winding-up of a company i t  is  also necessary 
to have regard to ss 348 and 341(2) of the Companies Act. These 
sections backdate a winding-up to the date of presentation of the 
winding-up application and avoid a ll dispositions by the company 
thereafter unless the court otherwise orders. This backdating has 
seWotfs ramifications for banks both in relation to the continued 
operation by a cosipany of its  bank account a fte r presentation of the 
winding-up application and in relation to other banking business 
generally. In Part I I  these ramifications are examined specifica lly  
in relation to the continued operation by the company of i t s  bank 
account but also with reference to the broader implications for a 
bank of the sections concerned.
In Part I I I  remedial legislation 1s proposed to deal with the 
problems identified  1n Parts I and I I .
(6) Cowen also l is t s  s 38 of the Transvaal Diamond Trade Ordinance 
63 of 1903(T) (wrongly cited as Ordinance 64 of 1903(T)) but 
the Ordinance was repealed by the Precious Stones Act 73 of 
1964.
(7) 61 of 1973.
TERMINATION OF A BANK'S DUTY AND AUTHORITY 
(EXCLUDING SS 348 AND 341(2) OF THE COMPANIES ACT)
4.
CHAPTER Z - THE BANK CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP
Synopsis
The bank customer relationship consists of a combination of a 
contract of- mandate - the underlying bank customer contract - 
and one or more contracts of loan from time to time. The 
underlying bank customer contract is  a contract of mandate in 
that the bank undertakes to render various services for the 
customer, especially to repay monies lent and advanced to f t  by 
the customer, and to advance monies lent by 1t to the customer, 
-in accordance with the customer's directions. The contract 
contains certain  unique terns and 1t Is  to this extent sui 
generis, but I t  nevertheless remains a contract of mandate. Tfie 
loans'"contemplated by the bank customer contract come Into 
existence each time the customer deposits money to his account, 
the account being 1n cred it (a loan by the customer to the 
bank), or withdraws money from the account, the account being In 
overdraft (a loan by the bank to the customer).
Cheques and other payment Instructions serve various functions 
depending on the circumstances. I f  a cheque 1s drawn or other 
payment instruction 1s given within the scope of a cred it In the 
customer's account, 1t is  a demand for r e p a in t  of a portion of 
the loan constituted by the deposits to the account and a 
direction regarding to whom payment 1s to be made. I f  1t Is 
drawn or given within the scope of an overdraft fa c il it y ,  i t  is 
the exercise of an option to borrow, a demand for the advance of 
monks lent and a direction regarding to whom payment is  to be 
made. I f  1t is  drawn or given outside the scope of such a credit 
or overdraft fa c i l i t y .  I t  1s an offer to borrow, a demand for 
the advance of monies lent i f  the offer 1s accepted and a 
direction regarding to whom payment 1s to be made.
I f  a cheque or other payment instruction 1s drawn or given 
within the scope of a cred it 1n the customer's account or of an 
overdraft f a c il it y  the bank is obliged, fe i t  is under a 'du ty ', 
to honour the cheque or payment Instruction and i t  has the 
corresponding right or 'authority' to do so. Where a cheque or 
other payment Instruction 1s drawn wholly or p a rt ia lly  outside 
the scope of such a cred it or overdraft fa c i l i t y  the bank 1s not 
under a duty to honour the cheque or payment Instruction but 1t 
does have the authority to do so.
5.
The expression 'termination of the bank's duty and 
authority' Is  used loosely to refer sometimes to permanent 
termination and other times to temporary suspensions 
sometimes to the customer’ s cheques generally and other 
times to only one or more specific cheques or to such 
cheques as are drawn by the customer personally as opposed 
to by his legal representative; and sometimes to both the 
duty and authority of the bank and other times to its  duty 
only and yet other times to its  authority only.
U )  C lassification  of the bank customer relationship
Because of the many fa c il it ie s  offered by banks/1* the 
relationship between a customer and its  bank may comprehend a number 
of d ifferent contracts. For the purposes of this thesis, however, i t  
is  only necessary to examine the c lass ification  of the relationship 
insofar as current accounts*13* are concerned.
The conventional description of tha bank customer relationship 
in relation  to current accounts 1s given by Cowen^* as follows :
(1) eg- current accounts, Investment accounts, leasing, factoring, 
discounting, insurance broking, safe deposit fa c i l i t ie s , etc.
( la ) I t  is  not proposed to examine to what extent savings and other 
accounts may be subject to sim ilar considerations: ef 
P Taklrantbudde ‘The Legacy of the Savings/Current Account 
Olchotoniy in Banking and negotiable Instruments Law' 1981 SAL-J
(2) Negotiable Instruments 365-6. See too N W1ll1s Banking In
wmTOTHcatTLaw 7Cape Town 1981) 30-31; W A Joubertfhe law 
c f south Africa ' vol 19 'Negotiable Instruments' by TTager
i bur Dan 1576-) H 154; P MilHn 4 G Wille Wille and Minin's
Mercantile law of South Africa 18th ed^'toT^'PlToaker ' 4
D T Zeffertt "(Johannesburg 1984) 730-31; S J  van Jaarsveld et
a lii Suid-Afrlkaanse Handelsreg 2nd ed (Johannesburg 198TF
VoT 2 p 396; C Smith ‘The bankers duty of secrecy* 1979 MB 24 
at 25-6; 0 J Goodey Aspekte van die aanspreekllkheld van die
Bankier in die Suid-Afr'fkTanse" Tjekreg {unpunished thesis.
Pretoria UnTversTty I97FJ at 153-S; E E Bekker Die
Aanspreekllkheld van 'n Dank v lr die Verkeerdelike OtshonerTno
van 'n Kl1ent~se TJek (unpublished dissertation. University of
Stellenbosch ly/6) $-14.
6.
‘The primary relationship has been described . . .  as that of 
debtor and creditor In respect of the payment of money (the 
banker being the debtor, and the customer the creditor) with a 
superadded obligation to discharge the debt 1n a particu lar way, 
namely by paying cheques drawn by the customer . . . .  The normal 
relationship may, however, be reversed; for a bank frequently 
grant!* overdrafts to its  customers, and so becomes a c red ito r.1
This description had I t s  origin In the English c a s e s ^  but has 
also been adopted by the courts of this co u n try .^  I t  1s, 
however, a purely functional description which does not Indicate 
into which category or categories of contract the relationship 
f a l l s .^
How, then, is  the relationship to be categorised? The answer is , 
i t  is  considered, that the relationship 1s a combination of a
(3) See eg Joachlmson v Swiss Bank Corporation C19213 3 KB 110{CA) 
at 126-/; "London Joint stock" Bank Ltd v Macmillan and Arthur 
[1918] AC 777TO""at75?:--------------------------------
(4) See eg S v Kearney 1964(2) SA 495(A) at 502H-503A; Sv K o t z e  
1965(1) SA "ll8 (X f a t 124H-125A.
(5) The description 1s, with respect, also misleading in its 
emphasis on the relationship of debtor and creditor. The bank 
customer relationship may come Into existence before any debt 
is owed by either party to the other - eg the bank's duty of 
secrecy would not be suspended until the firs t deposit to or 
withdrawal from the account > and may continue during periods 
when no debt is owed by either party to the other eg a bank 
could not, i t  is considered, refuse to accept further deposits 
to the customer's account and to honour cheques drawn against 
such deposits on the sole ground that the customer's account 
happened temporarily to have a nil balafice at the time the 
deposits were tendered, without f irs t giving reasonable notice 
terminating the bank customer contract. (On notice of 
termination generally see eg Joachlmson v Swiss Bank 
" '■ - ■- ••-'--j' at 12/; ilattorial Westminster
and AssembTTer t t b ~[I572J T  AVI 
s of Exchange # 326.)
uorporation us<uj j  mj u u ^ a  
San* Ltd v Halesowen Presswork 
C T T W in n ’l t 'T O - g  c m an B:l 11
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contract of mandate - the underlying bank customer contract - and 
one or more contracts of loan from time to time.*6*
De Wet 4 Y e a ts ^  define the contract of mandate 
(lasgewingsooreenkoms) as follows :
(6) Malan B i l ls  of Exchange i  320; F R Malan ‘The liberation of 
the cheque' 1976 TSAR T07, 201; J  C Stassen ‘Die regsaard van 
die verhoudlng tussen bank en kH<Snt‘ 1980 MS 77; J  C Stassen 
'Banke en hul kMSnte' 1983 MB 80. See too Joubert Law of 
South A fr ica vol 19 'Negotiable Instruments' # 154; M MegrahlS 
F ft ftyderr l ’£get's Law of Banking 9th ed (London 1982) 12ff and 
70ff* ------------------
An unfortunate practical consequence of the c lassification  of 
the bank customer contract as a contract of mandate is  that 1t 
1s brought into a category of contract which, because of its  
h istorical devclopmerit as a gratuitous favour undertaken by 
one friend for another, was not highly developed in Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law as a comnercial contract - see eg 
J  E de V f]t ie rs  A J  C Macfntosh The law of Agency in South 
Africa 3rd ed by 0 M Silke TCape Town I9 8 IJ ?7? amJ 
D J  Joubert 01a Su1d«Afrikaanse Verteenwoordigingsreg (Cape 
Town 1979} 17-18, The posi tfon Is , moreover, aggravated by the 
fact that the contract of mandate and the power of one person 
to represent another 1n the performance of ju r is t ic  acts were 
not c le a r ly  distinguished - J  C de Wet A A H van Wyk De Wet en 
Yeats Die Sufd-Afrlkaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 4th ed 
(Durban - ~wl*th tHe resu lt, Tt Ts thought, that
riotlons applicable to powers of representation coloured the 
treatment by the old authorities of the contract of mandate to 
which they rea lly  had no relevance - see further 38 n 24 
below. One solution would be to seek to c lass ify  the bank 
customer contract under a d ifferent category such as locatlo 
conductio opera rum or locatio conductlo operis - as some of 
the old autnorftfes did when the contract was not gratuitous - 
see 68 n 108 lielow - but the weight of authority 1s against 
such an approach and the proper solution Is ,  i t  Is thought, to 
develop the contract of mandate to fu l f i l  I t s  modern role by
■ shedding its  anachronistic features. This has happened to an 
extent already in the recognition that remuneration can freely 
be agreed upon - see eg Cowan v Bowern 1924 AD 550 at 563 - 
but as w ill be shown below (a t 37ff) there is  a clear need for 
this process to be carried further.
(7) De Wet 4 Yeats Kontraktereij 340-41. See also H Grotlus The 
Jurisprudence of Holland translated by R W Lee (Oxford 19I5T
(Footnote continued on next page)
'[Mens het] nie met ‘n dlenskontrak te doen waar iemand v1r 'n 
ander besondere dienste lewer sonder om hom onder die gesag van 
die werkgewer te stel nie. Ooreenkomste v lr  die lewer1ng van 
sulke dienste behoort tot die klas "lasgewingsooreenkoms". 'n 
Lasgewingsooreenkoms 1s ‘n ooreenkoms kragtens welke die 
lashebber onderneem om 'n opdrag u1t te voer v1r die lasgewer. 
Die opdrag kan wees om enigiets te doen mits d1t maar geoorloof 
is ,  bv. 'n opdrag om namens die lasgewer 'r? ooreenkoms te s lu it, 
of 'n opdrag om v1r die lasgewer 'n koper te soek, of 'n opdrag 
aan 'r<i medlkus om die lasgewer of iemand anders medles te 
ondersoek of te behandel, e.d.m. Trouens enlge opdrag om dienste 
te verrig , aangeneem deur die persoon aan wie die opdrag gerig 
1s, skep ‘n lasgewlngsverhoudlng, tensy d it van so 'n aard is 
dat d it onder 'n ander soort ooreenkoms tulsgebring kan word.'
When a bank agrees to permit a person (the customer) to operate 
a current account the bank undertakes to render a number of services 
for the customer, the principal service being that the bank w111 not 
merely discharge i t s  indebtedness to the customer by payment to the 
customer himself but that i t  w ill do so by way of payment either to 
the customer himself or to th ird  parties as directed from time to 
time by the customer. Another Important service undertaken by the 
bank is  that i t  w ill co lle c t cheques and other b il ls  deposited to 
the a c c o t s i . T h e r e  are, moreover, many other services which the 
bank impliedly undertakes pursuant to the underlying bank customer
(Footnote continued from previous page)
3*12.2; S van Leeuwen Commentaries on Rotnan-Dutch Law revised 
and edited by C W Decker and translated by 0 G Kotze (London 
1886) 4.26.1; 5 van leeuwen Censura Forensls translated by S H 
Barber and W A Macfadyen (Cape Town 1896) 1.4.24.1; 0 Voet The 
Selective Voet being the Commentary on Pandects translates 
Ey~F~5aiTe (Durban I9bb-B) i M . S j J  van u ir Linden Institutes 
of the laws of Holland translated by G T Morice 2nd ed (Cape 
Town "ISJZi) 17n ,l4 ; "A" Beyleveld Die essensiele vereistes v1r 
die ontstaan van die kontraksvorme mandatum. locatlo conductio 
operYs en localio conduct!o operarum; 'n~ prinsip ieie 
onderskeld (unpublished thesis, Pretoria University 157ST
m m —
(8) See eg Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110{CA) 
at 127;~5tass~eTop 'd t  I9ttt hb ao tit B2-fa.
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contract and which do not depend on separatfii contracts,1 eg, 1t 
is  suggested, to remain open at certain hours, to have reasonable 
quantltites of cash readily available for Immediate withdrawal, to 
allow t it- customer to make withdrawals fn notes and coins of such 
denominations as the customer may reasonably select, to transfer 
monies telegraphically, to issue bankers' drafts, to kaep, and to 
furnish to the customer of, statements reflecting a ll
transact1u:\ .a the customer's account, etc.
(9)
A ll these services are, i t  is  considered, typical of the subject 
matter of a cen trist of mandate. Insofar as the bank's undertaking 
to pay withdrawals to th ird  parties 1f so d irf.ted  by the customer 
is  concerned, there is authority dating back to Roman law that an 
agreement 1n terms of which a debtor undertakes to discharge his 
indebtedness by payment to a th ird  party is  a contract of 
m a n d a t e . G r o t l u s , ^ ^  moreover, specifica lly  categorises 
b i l ls  of exchange under this head:
'A b il l  of exchange Is  a written mandate whereby one person 
charges another with paying a certain sum of money to a third 
party for the msndstor's account.
{9} Such services are to be distinguished from services which are 
dependent on separate contracts such as leasing, factoring, 
discounting, etc, the issportanee of the d istinction being that 
the bank would not be erttUled during the subsistence of the 
bank customer contract to refuse services to which the 
customer Is  entitled  under the bank customer contract whereas 
i t  would be freely entitled  to refuse any service dependent on 
a separate contract.
(10) Digest P , 1.22.7; 17.1.45.4.
(11) 3.13.1 and 2. Cf too 4 Hollands Consultatien (Rotterdam 166Q) 
381; Voet 46.3.2; D G van der Keessel Voorlesinge oor die 
Hedendaagse Reg i.a Aanleldingvan De GrooE se inleidinq tot 
<?5"HoHandse RechtsgeTeerdheyijf~translatgd by p van~karme1o et 
S l i i  (Amsterdam l^feo) voi 4 at 297-9, but see J  G Helneccius 
fcrondbeginselen van het Wisselrecht translated into Dutch by 
R K Reitz (Hiddelburg i774T"’JT< T esp ec ia lly  at 3.3.
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'This contract, ’ ike other mandates, is  concluded by the 
acceptance of the charge.'
Pothier*12* is  even more specific, relating the rule d irectly  to 
the bank customer contract:
‘Le contrat entre le  tireur et celul sur qui la  le ttre  est 
tiree , est un vrai contrat de mandat, mandatum solvendae 
pecuniae: 11 in tervlent et se contracte par 1'acceptation que 
fa it  de la  le t tre  de change cslu i sur qui e lle  est tiree , ou 
meme avant cette acceptation, par le  cortsentement q u 'il donne 
par le ttre  missive au tireur de t ire r  sur lu1. Ce contrat paratt 
aussi tacitement contracte, lorsque celul sur qui la  le ttre  est 
ti!*ee, est un banquier qui a recu du tireur des fonds pour 
accepter et acquftter ses le ttres .'< i3 )
This categorisation of the bank customer contract has been
- recognised on a number of occasions by the courts. In the early case
(14)of Bank of Africa v Evelyn Gold Mining Company Ltd Kotze C -J 
said:
'Pothler . . .  draws a d istinction between expenses and payments 
made by the mandatory in the execution of his mandate . . .  and 
payments made in connection with the mandate . . . .  there is  no 
doubt that the banker, who has paid out the amount of the b ill 
to the forger who has forged my signature, jnust bear the loss, 
"for" (says Pothler) "the general mandate which i nave given the
(12) R 0 Pothler Traite  du Contrat de Change edited by M S iffre ln  
Oeuvres de Po th feM  Paris lffZI) vol iTpara 91.
(13) The contract between drawer and drawee of a b il l  of exchange 
is  a true contract of mandate, mandatum solvendae pecuniae: i t
. comes about and 1s contracted by the drawee’s' acceptance of 
the b i l l ,  or even before the acceptance by consent which he 
gives by le tte r  to the drawer to draw upon him. This contract 
may also appear ta c it ly  contracted when the drawee Is  a banker 
who has received funds from the drawer to accept and discharge 
his b il ls .
(14) (1894) 1 Off Rep 24 at 27.
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banker, to accept and pay b il ls  drawn by me upon him, 1s 
applicable only to b i l ls  which Issue from me
Sim ilarly, In Burns v Forman 1^5* Roper J  said:
*. . .  the bank, being in the position of a mandatory, is  entitled  
to be reimbursed by Its  mandator (the customer) for a ll 
expenditure incurred in the execution of Its  mandate..,'
In 0K~8a2 aars (1929) ltd  v Universal Stores Ltd^ ^  Corbett J ,  as 
to  then was, said:
’ . . .  between the customer and banker there 1 s a contractual 
relationship of mandatum . . . ' t l / J
(15) 1953(2) SA 226(H) a t  229B-C.
(16) 1973(2) SA 281(C) a t 288H.
(17) For further examples see Estate Ismail v Barclays Bank (DC&O) 
1957(4) SA 17(T) at 26G; Stap'eTberg M  v Barclays Sank DC&O 
1963(3) SA 120{T) a t 126H. Sim ilar terminology, although of 
course not necessarily with the same meaning, is  to be found 
in the English cesss - see eg London Jo in t  Stock Bank Ltd v 
Macmillan and Arthur [1918] AC"7/71HLE) at 814 and 830. See 
too the authors Referred to in note 6 above. CoWen is 
•apparently of the same view fo r he states ( Negotiable 
Instruments 367 n 85):
'The use of cheques is , in large measure, governed by 
principles of the law of agency; for a cheque, in addition 
to being a b i l l  of exchange, is  a mandate given by the 
customer to h is banker authorising the la tte r  to discharge 
his indebtedness in a particu lar way.'
The bank does not hold a customer's deposits as the customer's 
agent (Foley v H111 (1848) 2 HLC 28 at 36; R v Davenport 
[1954] O i l  ER 602 (CCA) at 603D), nor does Tt~act  as the 
customer's agent when i t  honours a cheque drawn or other 
payment instruction given 1n favour of a th ird  party (De 
V illte rs  NO v Kaplan 1960(4) SA 476(C) at 478H; Joubert 
Verteenwoordjglngsreg 13ij-9), but i t  1s not an essential of 
W e  contract of mandate that the mandatary should have the 
power to represent the mandant as agent:
'An agent in the s t r ic t  sense must be distinguished from a 
mandatory. The former 1s a person clothed with authority to 
create, vary or discharge contractual relations between his 
(Footnote continued on next page)
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The contract 1s not one of employment { locatio conductio 
operarum) because the bank does not place I t s e lf  under the control 
of the customer 1n regard to the manner of carrying out the 
s e r v i c e s . N o r  1s 1t locatio conductlo operis, the essence of 
wMch Is , I t  Is  considered, a piece of work with a physical subject 
matter such as the erection of a house.
The fact that the underlying bank customer contract Is 
c lass ified  as a contract of mandate does not necessarily mean that 
1t cannot have unique features of I t s  own. For example, 1t could be 
argued that the customer's right to d irect payment by way of cheques 
drawn on the bank 1s unique to the bank customer contract and that 
the bank customer contract 1s to th is extent sui generis, but even 
i f  th is argument is  correct^193  ^ i t  does not follow that the 
contract is  therefore not one of mandate; on the contrary, the 
essentials for the existence of a contract of mandate are s t i l l
(Footnote continued from previous page)
principal and a th ird  party . . . .  A mandatory 1s a person 
who, by contract with the mandator, undertakes to carry out 
a task entrusted to him. Surgeons, attorneys and bankers 
. . .  are mandatories'
{£ Kahn Contract and Mercantile Law through the Cases (Cape 
Town 1971) 31b). see also stassen b p 'c lt~ i98U Mb 7r~at~82; De 
Wet 4 Yeats op c it  341; Joubert Law of $outF~Afr1ca vol 17 
‘Mandate and Negotlorum Gestlo' by D J  Joubert i  D H van Zyl 
0 3; Clarke v Durban and Coast SPCA 1959(4) SA 333{N) at 
336A-B; Beyleveld op c i t  157.
(18) Cf Colonial Mutual Li fe  Assurance Society Ltd v MacDonald 1931 
AD 4iz; De Met & Yeats Kontraktereg 338. But see ri 6~above.
(19) Cf Van Jaarsveld Handelsrefl vol 2 p 251; Beyleveld op c i t  203; 
but see Kahn Contract'T i e ; Joubert Law of South A frica l'oc c i t
# 5; JTfl GfbsorTWriHfe's Principles of South Afrfcan1.aw 7tf) ed 
{Cape Town 1977) 435-6. !
(19a) A contrary argument would be that just as the object sold 
under a sale may vary so may the services rendered under a 
mandate, without that fact causing the contract to be labelled 
as sui generis in any way.
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present and the right to direct payment of the bank's indebtedness 
to the customer by way of cheques drawn on the bank should be seen 
as no more than art addftfortal term imported into the contract of 
mandate by trade usage.*20*
Certain of the services undertaken by a bank under the bank 
customer contract are rendered automatically - eg the rendition of 
statements - or must be kept available at a ll times - eg keeping 
open at certain hours - whether or not the customer e lects to avail 
himself of any particu lar service. Other services, on the other 
hand, are only rendered I f  the customer does e lect to avail himself 
o f the service concerned eg payment to a third party 1n accordance 
with the customer's directions. The question may be asked, however, 
whether the right to services in  th is  la tte r  category 1s not an 
option which on exercise gives rise to a separate, specific contract
(20) But . cf  Cowen Negotiable Instruments 367-8 who concludes his 
discussion of tne nature of the 6ank customer relationship 
with the view:
'Probably the only satisfactory solution is to recognise 
that the contract is  sul generis, containing elements of 
several contracts.'
See too C Smith 'The banker’s duty of secrecy1 1979 NB 24 at 
25-6 and In G C Oosthuizen et a l i i  Professional Secrecy in 
South Africa (Cape Town 1983) H'i f f ; Van Jaarsveid Handeiareq 
vo'i 'i p” 39s. However, as Stassen points out (op e f t  I9ti0 MB-// 
at 79) 1t is  important not to conclude too r e a l l y  from the 
fact that a contract has unique features that 1t 1s sui 
generis and cannot be class ified  into any of the recognise! 
categories of contract. Such c lass ification  1s Important 
because i t  determines what terms w ill automatically be 
Incorporated 1n the contract as natural incidents c f the 
contract 1n the absence of agreement to the contrary. Because 
of the conservatism of our law a contract is  rather regarded 
as a s light deviation from an existing type of contract than 
as an en tire ly  new type of contract - De Wet fi Yeats 
Kontraktereg 5-6.
of mandate 1n addition to the general contract of mandate. Or should 
the exercise of the right to such services be seen simply as taJcfng 
place pursuant to the general contract of mandate?
The better vfew Is ,  i t  ts suggested, that there fs a single 
contract of mandate providing fo r a range of services of which the 
customer may avail himself from time to time without the need to 
construe a separate contract of mandate each time he does so, 
although the consequences would, I t  is  thought, 1^  any event be the
( 2 1 )same even I f  a separate contract occurs each time. Many 
contracts confer rights of which a party may or may not avail
( 22)himself as he pleases, but i t  would not be appropriate to 
construe every such right as an option which on exercise gives rise 
to a separate contract. 'Option1 in this sense is ,  1t is suggested, 
best reserved to describe rights which on exercise give rise  to an 
en tire ly  new category of contract, rather than any right of which a 
party may at his election ava il himself. I f  a right is  an Inheres 
part of a contract i t s  ex erc isers  best not regarded as the exercise 
of an option bringing a new contract into existence.
The bank customer relationship 1s also comprised of one or more 
contracts of loan (rautuuro) from time to tlme.^2^  I f  the customer
(Z l) As Kahn Contract points out (a t 12) an option could be seen 
simply as a contract with the obligation o f the grantor being 
subject to a potestative suspensive condition, namely the 
exercise of the option b.y the qrantee. But c f Venter v 
Blrchholtz 1972 (1) SA 276 (A) at 283 E-H. See too J  W Wessels 
The Law 'of Contract In South Africa 2nd ed edited by 
A A koberts’ lDurbari'TS'BT) H  f f  especially a t ## 1322 f f .
(22) eg a lease which confers the right on the tenant to erect 
advertising signs outside the leased premises, a prospecting 
contract which confers the right on the prospector to erect 
temporary housing on the prospecting area, etc.
(23) The reasons for taking the view that there 1s not a single, 
general contract of loan are dealt with below (a t 19-21).
makes a deposit to his account at a time when the account 1s not 1n 
overdraft, a loan by the customer to the bank occurs:
'Any amount deposited to the credit of the customer immediately 
upon receipt becomes a loan to the bank and 1s not held 1n trust 
for the customer'
(per H ill J  1n Kearney NO v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd^ h «
Sim ilarly , 1f the customer makes a withdrawal from his account 
at a time when the account Is  1n overdraft^2^  a loan by the bank 
to the customer occurs: ■
(24) 1961(2) SA 647 (T) a t 650G. See too Attorney-General for 
Canada v Attorney-General for the Province"of Quebec jiHA/j AC 
TSTpc] i t  44. Cowen Negotiable Instruments 516-7 raises
2 objections to the mati'iato classification^ F ir s t ly ,  he states 
that 'the indention o f  r t'fie parties 1n the case of mutuum 1s 
ord inarily to benefit the borrower, whereas the- contract 
between banker and customer 1s normally intended to benefit 
both p arties '; however, with respect, this is  not a valid 
objection 1n our law 1n whfch 1t is  well-recognised that loans 
may be freely entered Into for the benefit of both parties - 
see eg Grotlus 3.1Q.10; Voet *2.1*18; CIR v lever Bros & Anor 
1946 AO 441 at 450-1. Secondly, he asserts that- rthe contract 
wfth a banker d iffers from mutuum, inter al ta In that the 
money deposited with a banker may "Fe reclaimed On demand 
without notice, whereas In the case of mutuum the lender must 
give reasonable notice of a claim for repayment'; however, as 
Stassen (op c1t 1980 MB 77 at 81) points out, reasonable 
notice is" not essential element of mutuum but merely a 
natural Incident which may be excluded by agreement - see eg 
Mackay v Naylor 1917 TPD 533 at 538. Cowen also points out 
that not’ a ll aspects of the bank customer relationship can be 
explained in terms of mutuum and he cites the duty of secrecy 
as an example. This Is c learly  correct.
(25) Stassen ( op c l t  1983 MB 80 at 83-4) takes the view that even 
where the account 1s Th cred it a claim arises 1n the bank's 
favour when a withdrawal 1s made from the account and that 
this claim is  set-off against the bank's Indebtedness to the 
customer. With respect, however, the payment of the withdrawal
(Footnote continued on next page)
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‘Die respondent [the customer] betoog dat die appellant [the 
bank] onregmatig gehande? het deur die verleertde f asf ? i tef te [an 
overdraft] sonder voorafgaande kennlsgewlng In te trek. Om die 
ju istheid  van hlerdie betoog te kan beoordeel, is d it nodig om 
a llereers die intioud te bepaal van die kontrak wat die 
respondent met die appellant aangegaan het, Dit was 'n 
len1ngskontrak;(26' maar wat die appellant onderneem het om te 
doen, was nie om die £300 in 'n enkele bedrag voor te skiet en 
die respondent onmiddelik met daardie bedrag te deblteer Me. 
Die verpligtlng wat die appellant op hom geneem het, was om 
tjeks bfnne gemelde bedrag u it  te betaal wanneer hul aargebfed 
word, d.w.s. om van tyd tot tyd die geld voor te skiet wat nodig 
is  om so 'n tjek  by aanbiedlng u lt  te betaal1
{271(per Steyn C 0 in Volkskas Spk v Van Aswegen ).
(fooiftsu, lued from previous page)
is  a pro tanto discharge of the indebtedness *e 
Joubert Verteenwoordig 1 ngsreg 138-9. This is a materva-, 
distinction because set-off may be prevented for an extraneous 
reason. The significance of this (say be illustra ted  tiy the 
case of sequestration. As already pointed out, under s 73(c) 
of the B i l l s  of Exchange Act, a bank's duty and authority To 
honour a customer's cheques only terminate on receipt of 
rjottee of the customer's having become insolvent. Payment of 
cheques between the grant of the sequestration order and the 
bank's receiving notice thereof is therefore valid  and pro 
tanto discharges the bank's indebtedness to the customer t F  
the account 1s 1n cred it. I f  the payment were only to give 
r 'se  to a claim by the bank against the customer, set-off 
would be prevented by the establishment of the concursus 
credltorum - see eg Thorne & Anor NWO v The Government i9y'i(4) 
Sa 4Z(T) at  45C-H, confirmed on apoeal sub'nom The Government 
v Thorne & Anor NHO 1974(2) SA i  (a [ at SfPTT-----------------
(26) Cf 19-21 below where i t  is  suggested that the grant of an 
overdraft fa c i l i t y  is  better viewed as the grant of an option 
to borrow than as an actual contract of loan.
(27) 1961(1) SA 493(A) at 495 G-H. A question which may be asked is 
whether the bank customer relationship could not be class ified  
as mandate alone without the need to refer to mutuum as well. 
The answer 1s, 1t Is  thought, in the negative. "SffiTTe i t  is no 
doubt true that in certain circumstances a mandant may pay
(footnote continued on next page)
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This aspect of the relationship 1s not commodatum (loan for use) 
because In commodatum the Identical property 1s returned at the end 
o f the period of the loan, which Is not the case 1n the bank 
customer relationship 1n which i t  Is not necessary that the 
identical notes and coins be returned. I t  1s also not deposltum, the 
essence of which Is that the the deposited property is  deposited for 
safekeeping and that the Identical property 1s returned at the end 
of the period of the d e p o s i t , n e i t h e r  of which conditions are
(footnote continued from previous page)
monies to the mandatary to dealt with In  terms of the 
mandate without any other contract being involved, th is 1s, i t  
3s suggested, only possible where the payment of the monies is 
merely Incidental to the mandate eg where a mandant pays 
monies to the mandatary to enable the mandatary to purchase 
goods for the mandant. This is not the case in the bank 
customer relationship, an Important feature of which Is  that 
the bank may use the monies deposited wftft f t  pending theJr 
being required for performance of the mandate. This, I t  is 
considered, clearly  indicates the presence of mutuum 1n 
addition to mandate. The fact that Interest may be paid by the 
bank to the customer on monies deposited with the bank and the 
fact that the monies to be dealt with 1n terns of the mandate 
may 1n fact bo made available by the bank on overdraft both 
reinforce this indication. The essentials o f mutuum are 
present In the bank customer relationship and i t  would be 
forced to endeavour to explain this aspect of the relationship 
supply in terns of the contract of mandate. Cf, however, 
•roubert Law of South Africa vol 19 'Negotiable Instruments' # 
1 5 4 , -----------------
(28) Gretius 3,9.1; Voet 13,5.1’, Attorney-General for Canada v 
Attorney-General for the Province br Quebec u W J  AC (fc ) 
at 441 '...... .................
(29) 'Deposit is  a contract whereby one person delivers a thing 
to another for the purpose of safe custody and the la tte r  
gratuitously or for reward undertakes to take care of the 
thing and restore 1t on demand . . . .  The agreement must be 
that the Identical thing shall be returned*
{Joubert Law of South Africa vol 8 ‘Deposit1 by D 8 Bester 
§ 68); Grotlus 3.7.2; Voet 15'i3.1.
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met in the bank customer relationship. True, as Cowen*3^ * points 
out, there is  an irregular form of deposit, depositum irregu lars, in 
which these conditions are not essentials and there is support among 
the old authorities*'*1* for the class ification  of the bank 
customer relationship under this head. However, this class ification  
was expressly rejected by Connor C J  in In re White v Brown 
[Standard Bank) ! (32>
'[The p la in t if f ]  argued, ingeniously, that lodgments with a 
banker came within the head of our law known as depositum . . .  
and there is  no doubt but that there Is authority for saying 
that, when i t  is  agreed between a person depositing money and 
the depositary that the la tte r  shall return as much, there is  an 
implied authority to the depositary to use the monies, and that, 
though such a transaction lacks the most noted marks of 
depositm, s t i l l  that i t  is  considered such in an irregular way 
T Y o e F T O . l ;  Macke!d s. 405; Mfl. 16.3.24,25 (1) and 19.2.31 
med.)1. I t  Is , however, also stated to have been settled that, I f  
THere be an express agreement that the depositary may use the 
money, then that the transaction becomes one of loan, and not 
deposlturn . . . .  1 should think that i t  would greatly disturb 
banking relations here, 1f we were to regard the implied 
contract on a lodgment, to be such as would Introduce the 
peculiar rules of the law of depositum, instead of ordinary
(30) negotiable Instruments 367.
(31) See eg Schorer's note 331 to Grotius - H Grotius Introduction 
to Dutch Jurisprudence with selections from the notes' 'oT 
W Sehorer translate^- by A f  is Haasdop^ntj ed (Cape Town TSffBT 
b/»-dw - in which he draws a d istinction between deposits on 
which the bank does not pay Interest and those on which i t  
does. The former he c lass ifies  under depositum and the la tte r 
under mutuum. Cf too U Huber PraeTectionum Ju r is  C iv i l  Is  
(Frankfort 1749) 16.3.11.
(32) (1883) 4 NLR 88 at 9G-2. since followed in Ormerod v Deputy 
Sheriff. Durban 196b (4) SA 670 (D * CLO) at ’5730; Be k a r t 'W  
v~~KYeynhanj & Others 1970 (4) SA 383(0) at 3871T CT Eoo 
Equitable Trust~an3~Tnsurance Co of S A Ltd v Registrar of 
Banks 19b/ U )  SA~ 1&/VQ.
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debtor and creditor relations, so fa r as applicable to banking 
transactions . . . .
'Pothler, writing on old French Law, says (Depot, oeuvr. , vol. 
5,5.83) that 1n practice the deposltum irregutare was "the same 
in effect as loan. V.D. Linden, 1n writing (p.bb4) of the 8ank 
of Amsterdam, does noS connect I t  In any way with the 
pecu liarities of the Roman Law of deposltum; though that law 
might, I presumes be very fa ir ly  applied to what 1s not 
uncommon, deposits of plate. Sc ., in a Bank fo r safe custody. 
Huber, no doubt (ad Dig. 16.3.11}, seems to refer  to Banks 1n 
connection with deposltum; but then they were evidently public 
places of deposit, correspond!ng with the care of monies lodged 
1n Court . . . .
' I  have dealt with th is point ay some length, because, I 
apprehend, i t  might cause no l i t t l e  disquiet i f  we were to 
intimate a doubt as to not applying the peculiar rules connected 
with deposltum to banking transactions.1
I t  1s stated above that a separate contract of loan comes into 
existence each time a deposit is made to an account in cred it or a 
withdrawal is made from an account in overdraft. How ver, the 
question may be asked whether the loan element of the bank customer 
relationship should not be seen as a single general contract of 
loan, as in the case of the mandate element of the relationship. The 
answer is ,  1t is suggested, that i t  is  more appropriate to.view each 
deposit or withdrawal as giving rise  to a separate contract, 
although, as already pointed out,^3^  the question 1s one of 
terminology only and the legal consequences are the same whichever 
approach Is  adopted.
If. is true that this conclusion 1s the opposite of the 
conclusion reached in relation to the mandate element of the 
relationship, but i t  Is  thought that the position in regard to the 2 
elements of the relationship d iffers in several material respects.
(33) See 14 n 21 above.
In the case of the mandate element, the bank undertakes to render a 
range of services several of whlc'i are rendered, or at least must be 
kept a v a i la b le ,w h e t h e r  or not the customer elects to avail 
himself of any particu lar service. I t  1s therefore necessary In any 
event to construe a general mandate whether or not one separates out 
various specific mandates, and In th is context 1t seems preferable 
to view a ll the services as being rendered pursuant to a single 
general mandate.
In the case of the loan element of the relationship the position
is  rather d ifferent. Until the customer msk-ss a deposit or
withdrawal there is  no necessity to construe a contract of loan at
a l l .  Moreover, the grant of an overdraft f a c i l i t y  may take place at
a d ifferent time from the establishment of the bank customer
relationship and may be varied from time to time. One would
therefore need to construe the grant of an overdraft fa c il it y  and
each variation thereof as an amendment of the general contract of
loan. S im ilarly , a cheque drawn or payment instruction given outside
the scope of a cred it in the customer's account and any overdraft
facility-granted by the bank is  in the f ir s t  instance an offer to f351borrow ' which on acceptance would give rise to yet another 
amendment to the general contract of loan. I t  follows, i t  1s 
thought, that i t  1s simpler and more satisfactory to view each 
deposit to an account in cred it and each withdraw*! from an account 
in overdraft as giving rise  to a separate contract of loan.
On this approach the establishment c f the bank customer 
relationship would embrace the grant by the bank to the customer of 
an option to make loans to the bank in such amounts and at such 
times as the customer may from time to time elect and
(34) eg to remain open at certain hours.
(35) Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Wassenaar 1972(3) SA 139 (D&CLD) at
Malan B i l ls  or Exchange"Q~2I nl4.
each deposit would constitute the exercise of this option bringing a 
separate contract of loan into existence. S im ilarly , the grant of an 
overdraft fa c il it y  would constitute the grant by the bank to the 
customer of an option to borrow (or reborrow, i f  e a r lie r  borrowings 
have been repaid) up to the amount of the fad l'ffc" and each 
withdrawal would constitute the exercise of part of this option 
again bringing a separate contract of loan into existence.
In conclusion, i t  is suggested that the expression 'bank 
customer contract1 is  best reserved to refer to the contract of 
mandate between bank and customer, rather than both to the contract 
of mandate and to the various contracts of loan from time to time. 
Where i t  is desired to refer to the broader relationship between 
bank and customer encompassing both the contract of mandate and the 
contracts of loan the expression 'bank customer relationship ' Is 
appropriate, provided that i t  is  borne in mind that the relationship 
is  not a single contract but consists of a number of separate, 
a lbe it interrelated, contracts.
(Z ) The functions of a cheque or other payment instruction
I f  the customer's account Is  in cred it the customer has lent and 
advanced monies to the bank, the loan 1s repayable on demand and the 
customer is  entitled  to direct the bank to repay the loan, or any 
portion thereof, either to the customer himself or to a third 
p a r ty J^ ^  A cheque drawn or other payment instruction given by
(36) Further discussion of the nature of the bank customer 
relationship is  to be found in the pest of th is chapter, in 
the next chapter (a t 28ff below) and 1n chapter 15 (a t 633ff 
below).
(37) See eg Wltbank D is tr ic t Coal Agency v Barclays Sank 1928 TPD 
18 at 20; Coweri'Negotiable Instruments 36Q, 3/1-2: Malan B i l ls  
of Exchange H  32U^H ^  "
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the customer wfthfn the scope of a cred it in his account therefore 
serves a dual function: 1t 1s a demand for repayment of portion of 
the loan and I t  Is a directlon^38  ^ regarding to whom payment is  to
129)be made. The bank is correspondingly obliged to repay that 
portion of the loan as demanded and directed by the cheque or 
payment instruction. In other words the bank 1s obliged, or under a 
duty, to honour the cheque or payment instruction and i t  
automatically follows that the bank also has the right or authority 
to do so (and, with respect, that I t  is  superfluous to expressly so 
provide).
I f  an overdraft fa c i l i t y  has been agreed, the bank has granted 
the customer an option to borrow (or reborrow 1f e a r lie r  borrowings 
have been repaid), up to the amount of the f a c i l i t y ^ 0* and I f  the 
optldn is  exercised the bank is  obliged on demand to advance the
j3fl) A distinction is  drawn in th is thesis between the expressions 
‘payment direction' and 'payment instruction ': the la tte r 
expression 1s used to refer to any instruction given to the 
bank, whether by way of cheque or otherwise, to make a 
payment, while the former expression is  used to refer to one 
of the functions of a cheque or other payment Instruction 
. namely the direction regarding to whom payment is  to be made-
(39) More precisely I t  1s the exercise by the customer of the right 
to the services undertaken by the bank in terms of the bank 
customer contract in relation to withdrawals. As already 
pointed out la t 8 aboye), the principal service that the bank 
undertakes in relation to withdrawals 1s to discharge its  
indebtedness to the customer by payment either to the customer 
or to one or more third parties as directed by the customer 
from tfme to time, but this 1s not the only service. Examples 
of some of the other services undertaken by the bank are set 
out at 8-9 above. I t  follows that even when a customer issues 
a cheque or other payment instruction in favour of himself he 
is  not merely demanding a repayment on account of his loan to 
the bank; he is  also availing himself of the services 
undertuken by the bank. The significance of this dual nature 
even of a cheque or other payment instruction 1n favour of the 
customer is  referred to at 141 n 295 below.
(40) See 19-21 above.
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monies lent and to make payment to the customer or to a th ird  party
(41 \
as directed by the customer- A cheque drawn or other payment 
instruction given within the scope of an overdraft fa c i l i t y  
therefore serves a trip le  function: an exercise of portion of the 
option, a demand that the monies lent be advanced and a direction 
regarding to whom payment is  to be made. The bank is correspondingly 
obliged on exercise of the option to advance the monies as demanded 
and directed by the cheque or payment instruction. In other words 1n 
this situation too th& is  obliged and entitled, or has a duty 
and the authority, to hoisour the cheque or payment instruction.
I f  a ehrsque js  drawn or another payrjibnt isstreeMdn is  given 
outside the seope of any cred it in the customer's account and of any 
overdraft fa c il it y  granted by the bank, the cheque or payment 
instruction in the f i r s t  instance constitutes an offer to borrow 
which the bank may accept or reject. I f  the bank accepts the 
o ffer i t  i s  obliged to advance the monies lent on demand, and to 
make payment to the customer or a th ird  party as directed by the 
cheque or payment in s tru ction .^3  ^ Here, too, therefore a cheque 
or other payment instruction serves a tr ip le  function; an offer to 
borrow, a demand that the monies lent i f  the offer is  accepted be 
advanced and a direction regarding to whom payment is  to be made. I f  
the bank accepts the o ffer 1t is  correspondingly obliged to advance 
the monies as demanded and directed by the cheque or payment 
instruction. As the bank is  not obliged to accept the o ffer, i t  is 
hot under an obligation to honour the cheque or payment instruction 
but i t  dte-.; have the right to do so i f  i t  so wishes.
(41) See eg Volkskas Bpk v Van Aswegen 1961(1) SA 493(A) at 495H; 
Cowen op~clt •si't-i; rcaian o p l i t  #  320-1.
(42) See 20 above.
(43) Generally the acceptance w i l l ,  1t 1s consider: ■» take place by 
way of the honouring of the cheque - see 145 below.
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A cheque or other payment instruction may also fa ll into any 
2 or a ll 3 of these categories. I f  i t  fa lls  wholly into the f i r s t  2, 
ie  i f  i t  'Is drawn or given within the scope partly of a cred it in 
the customer's account and partiy of an overdraft fa c i l i t y  granted 
by the bank, the bank is  obliged to honour i t  in accordance with the 
principles set out above. I f ,  however, any part of i t  would fa ll 
into the third category, 1e the bank would have to lend further 
monies, the bank is  not obliged to honour the cheque or payment 
instruction but i t  is  entitled  to do so i f  i t  so wishes.
Although a cheque or other payment Instruction serves more than 
one function i t  does not follow that the functions are d iv is ib le ; on 
tha contrary the view is  taken belcw^45  ^ that i t  is  im p lic it in 
the bank customer contract that the functions are ind ivis ib le  and 
take e ffec t and lapse together.
(3) Meaning of 'duty and authority* of bank
As pointed out in the previous section, a bank is obliged to 
honour a cheque drawn or other payment instruction given within the 
scope of a cred it in the customer's account or of an overdraft 
f a c i l i t y  granted by the bank or partly within the one and partly the 
other. The bank is therefore under a 'duty' to honour such a cheque 
or payment instruction and i t  has the corresponding right «r 
'authority' to do so.
Where a cheque is  drawn wholly or partly outside the scope of 
any credit in the customer's account and of any overdraft fa c il it y  
granted by the bank, the bank is  not obliged, ie  i t  is  not under a
(44) Trust 8ank of Africa Ltd v Wassenaar  1972(3) SA 139 (DACLD) at 
„ i3?5-H;~£cwen Negotiable Instruments~371.
(45) See 140-2 below.
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duty, to honour the cheque or payment -instruction but f t  does have 
the right or authority to do so.
I t  may be noted, however, that the use of the expression 'duty 
and authority’ in s 73 of the B i l ls  of Exchange Act gives r ise  to a 
number of d iff icu lt ie s . I t  has already been noted^6  ^ that this 
section provides, in ter a lia , that a bank's duty and authority 
terminate on receipt by the bank of notice of the customer having 
become insolvent; in other words, the bank is entitled and, 1f 
applicable, obliged to honour the customer's cheques until i t  
receives notice of the customer's insolvency. The d iff icu lty  arises 
from the fa c t  that the section does not make i t  clear whether the 
bank has a ll  the rights which would normally flow from honouring a 
cheque. This gives rise  to questions such as: Does the section 
protect payment to the customer as opposed to to his trustee? -Is the 
bank entitled  to its  charges for honouring the cheque? I f  the 
customer's account is  in cred it does payment of the cheque 
constitute a pro tanto discharge of the bank's indebtedness to the 
customer, and can the bank's charges be set-off ag~ '*>sfc the credit? 
I f  the customer's account is  in overdraft does the flouring of the 
cheque give rise  to a contract of loan under which the bank can 
claim repayment of the amount paid together with the agreed 
Interest, and is the bank's claim secured by any security the bank 
may hold? Thes«? questions w ill be explored further in chapter 
4 .(4 7)
(4) Meaning of 'termination' of duty and authority
The expression 'termination of a bank's duty and authority1 is  
used in a variety of senses. I t  may mean permanent termination^*^
(46} See 1 above.
(47) At I S i f f  below.
(48) eg in the case of death.
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or temporary termination, 1e s u s p e n s i o n . m a y  refer to 
one,  ^ sorae^^ or aTl^52  ^ of the customer's cheques or 
other payment Instructions. I t  may refer to cheques drawn or other 
payment Instructions given by the customer personally, or by someone 
authorised by him, as opposed to by his legal representative where 
he has ceased to have capacity to act,^53  ^ or f t  may refer to a ll 
cheques and payment Instructions howsoever 4rawn or given.
Both the bank's duty and its  authority may terminate'55  ^ or only 
it s  d uty/56 ^  or the bank may not have been under any duty to 
honour the cheque or payment instruction so that only its  authority 
terminates/57* The bank's duty on one ground may terminate but be 
replaced by a duty on another ground/58  ^ I t  is  also necessary to 
distinguish termination of the bank’s duty and authority and 
termination of the bank customer contract.
(49) eg in the case of temporary Insanity.
(50) eg in the case of countermand of a specific cheque.
(51) eg in the case of an in terd ict affecting certain specified 
cheques.
(52} eg in the case of insolvency.
(53) eg in the case of insanity.
(54) eg where the customer's claim against the bank has prescribed.
(55) eg where the customer countermands payment of a cheque drawn 
within the scope of a cred it 1n the customer's account.
(56) eg where the cred it in the customer’s account is  ju d ic ia lly  
attached.
(57) eg where the customer countermands payment of a cheque drawn 
outside the scope of any cred it in the customer's account and 
of any overdraft f a c il it y  granted by the bank,
(58) eg where the credit 1n the customer's account Is Ju d ic ia lly  
attached but the cheque is also within the scope of an 
overdraft fa c i l i t y  granted by the bank.
(59) See 38 n 24 below.
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(5) Payment instructions other than cheques
Banks make payments not only 1n accordance with cheqi“»s drawn by 
customers, but also 1n accordance with customers' Instructions given 
in various other forms. Common forms fncJude requests to «ake 
payments by way of stop order, telegraphic transfer, the issue of a 
hank draft, etc. There is a dearth of authority on a bank's duty and 
authority to honour payment instructions given in such other forms 
but i t  is  considered that by trade usage a bank has the same duty 
and authority to pay such payment instructions as 1n the case of 
cheques, provided that they are given in customary and regular
(6) Bank charges and interest
Banks make a charge for honouring cheques and other payment 
instructions. Banks also charge interest on loans made by them. 
Consideration w ill accordingly also be given to the effect on a 
bank's right to such charges and in terest I f  the bank's duty and 
authority to honour a customer's cheques and other payment 
instructions terminate.
(7) Unjust enrichment
I f  a bank's duty and authority to honour a customer’ s cheques 
and other payment instructions have terminated, the bank may 
nevertheless have a claim based on unjust enrichment either against 
the customer or against the recipient of the p a y m e n t . T h i s ,  
too w ill be referred to where applicable but w ill nofe be examined in 
detail.
(6 0 ) I f  an instruction Is not given 1n customary form the bank 
would, i t  is  thought, be entitled  but not obliged to honour 
the Instruction.
161) See eq Govender v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1984(4) SA 
392(C). ■
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CHAPTER.3 - INSANITY, TO MANAGE ONE'S AFFAIRS AND
PRODIGALITY
Synopsis
I f  a customer becomes Insane or unable to manage his a ffa irs  or 
1s d ec la re  $ prodigal, he ceases to have capacity to act. This 
loss of o p ac ity  c learly terminates the bank’s duty and 
authority to honour the custosser's cheques and other payment 
Instructions but the question arises as to whether the bank's 
duty and authority terminate on the loss of capacity or only on 
the bank's becoming aware of the loss. In other words, is  i t  a 
term of the bank customer contract that cheques and other 
payment instructions are fu lly  effectual as between bank and 
customer until the bank becomes awara of the customer's loss of 
capacity, or is  1t necessary that a cheque or other payment 
instruction should constitute a valid  separate authority in its  
own right?
Before seeking to determine whether the bonk customer contract 
contains such a term, either as a naturale of the contract or as 
a term inplied from the facts relating to any particular 
contract 1n question, i t  is  necessary to consider whether this 
interpretation is  not precluded by the general rule that 
mandates lapse on the mandant's loss of capacity, or, where the 
cheque or payment instruction constitutes an offer to borrow, by 
the general rule that offers lapse on the offeror's loss of 
capacity. I t  is  a?so necessary to consider whether i t  Is legally 
possible for a cheque 'drawn' or payment Instruction 'given1 by 
the customer a fte r he has ceased to have capacity to act to 
function as a cheque or payment instruction.
I t  is generally stated that a mandate terminates on the 
mandant's loss of capacity. The rule Is , however, subject to an 
exception where the mandatary performs the mandate in ignorance 
of the mandant's loss of capacity and although the precfse scope 
of the exception Is not clear, the better view is  that the true 
formulation of the rule Is that a mandate lapses not on the 
mandant's loss of capacity but on the mandatary's becoming aware 
of the loss. The rule is  therefore consistent with the above 
interpretation of the bank customer contract. Should this view 
be wrong, the rule is  in any event only a naturals of mandate, 
and not an essentialc, and the parties are therefore free to
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exclude i t  by agreement. On th'is approach I t  1s a matter of 
interpretation as to whether or not lapsing of the mandate is 
excluded.
The general rule is  s im ilarly that an offer lapses c:i the 
offero r's  loss of capacity; however, the parties are likewise 
free to exclude lapsing of an offer by agreement, eg an option 
does not l*cse on the grantor's loss of capacity. I t  is , 
therefore, again a matter of interpretation of the bank customer 
contract as to whether or not the offer constituted by a cheque 
drawn or payment instruction given outside the scope of a credit 
or overdraft fa c il it y  lapses on the customer's loss of capacity.
In the ordinary course a document signed by a person who has 
ceased to have capacity to act would be a n u llity , but i t  1s 
once again a matter of interpretation as to whether or not this 
is  so in the case of the bank customer contract because i t  Is 
not an inevitable requirement of law that a cheque or other 
payment instruction must constitute a valid  separate authority 
1n i t s  own right.
Contractual terns may arise in 3 ways: they may be naturalia of 
the contract, they may be expressly agreed upon or they may 
arise by necessary implication from the facts relating to a 
particu lar contract. The principal sources of naturalia are 
legisla tion  and the old authorities but the courts may recognise 
new naturalia. Banks do not expressly stipulate that cheques and 
other payment Instructions are fu lly  effectual as between bank 
and customer until the bank becomes aware of the customer's loss 
of capacity but the necessary conditions are lik e ly  to be 
present in the case of any particu lar bank customer contract to 
enable such a term to be implied; however, in view 'M* the 
standard nature of the bank customer contract such a term should 
be recognised as a naturale of the contract rather than 
requiring proof of an impTTeTTerm 1n every case.
I f  the cheque or payment Instruction Is in favour of the 
customer himself the further question arises as to what the 
bank's position is i f  i t  makes payment to the customer as 
opposed to to his curator. I f  a term as set out above is  
recognised i t  would encompass such a payment which would 
accordingly be valid . I f  such a term is  not recognised a rule 
should be recognised in our law that i f  a debtor pays his 
creditor 1n ignorance of the cred ito r's  loss of capacity the 
debtor is  entitled  to be Indemnified for his negative interest.
I f  a cheque Is drawn or a : v-swv* Instruction is given by a
representative on the shalf the cheque or payment
instruction is , even in of a term as set out above,
fu lly  effectual i f  both and the representative are
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unaware of the customer's loss of capacity, but i f  the 
representative is aware of the loss while the bank is  not, the 
bank is  limited to a claim for its  negative Interest.
Applying these princip les, i f  a term as set out above is 
recognised a customer's cheques and payment instructions w ill be 
fu lly  effectual as between bank and customer until the bank 
becomes aware of the customer's loss of capacity and a ll the' 
normal consequences w ill flow. I t  does not make a difference i f  
the cheque 1s drawn or the payment Instruction 1s given before 
or a fter the loss of capacity, or by the customer personally or 
by a representative on his behalf, and payment to the customer 
as opposed to to his curator is  effectual.
I f  a tern as set out above 1s not recognised several situations 
require to be distinguished.
I f  a cheque or payment instruction 1s Issued a fte r the customer 
has ceased to have capacity to act i t  1s a nu llity  and the bank 
15 limited to such claims as i t  nay have based on unjust 
enrichment, subject to what has been said abova In regard to the 
position i f  payment is  made to the customer and the position i f  
the cheque or payment instruction 1s issued by a representative 
on the customer's behalf.
I f  the loss of capacity occurs a fte r the cheque or payment 
Instruction has been Issued but before 1t  is  received by the 
bank Z situations need to be distinguished, f i r s t ly ,  i f  the 
cheque 1s drawn or the payment instruction is  given within the 
scope of a credit or overdraft fa c il it y  i t  constitutes either 
notice exercising the right to demand repayment of monies lent 
and advanced and to direct to whom payment is  to be made, or 
notice exercising the r f0 ht to borrow, to demand the advance of 
the monies lent and tc- H rect to whom payment is  to be made. 
Although, in the absence ')f agreement to the contrary, notice 
exercising a right only takes effect on communication to the 
addressee, i t  1s only necessary that the addressor should have 
capacity to act. at the time of despatching the notice and not 
also at the time of Ci'smunication of the notice to the 
addressee. The position is  therefore the same as where the loss 
of capacity occurs a fte r receipt by the bank of the cheque or 
payment Instruction, as dealt sjlth below. Secondly, i f  the 
cheque is drawn or the payment Snstvyctlon is given outside the 
scope of a credit or overdraft f a c il it y  i t  fs fn the f ir s t  
Instance an offer to borrow and i t  1s necessary that the 
customer should, have capacity to act at the time of acceptance 
of the o ffer, which generally occurs on the honouring of the 
cheque or payment instruction. The bank w i l l ,  however, be 
entitled  to its  negative Interest i f  i t  honours the cheque or
payment -Instruction -In Ignorance of the customer's loss of 
capacity.
I f  the loss of capacity occurs a fte r receipt by the bank of the 
cheque or payment instruction i t  is  again necessary to draw the 
distinction drawn in the previous paragraph. I f  the cheque is 
drawn or the payment instruction is  given within the scope of a 
credft or overdraft f a c il it y  i t  takes effect on receipt by the 
bank and only lapses when the bank becomes aware of the 
customer's loss of capacity. The cheque or payment instruction 
is  therefore fu lly  effectual unt-il the bank becomes aware of the 
loss of capacity and a ll the normal consequences flow, except 
that i f  the cheque or payment instruction is in favour of the 
customer himself and payment is  made to the customer as opposed 
to to his curator the bank can only recover its  negative 
interest. The position where the cheque is drawn or the psyment 
instruction is  given outside the scope o f a  cred it or overdraft 
f a c i l i t y  has been dealt with in the previous paragraph.
Consideration is  also given to the possible existence of a more 
general rule that a person who acts to hfs prp*-<dice in reliance 
on another’s continued capacity to act sntftled to be 
indemnified for his negative interest.
I f  the bank receives information w h fw iris  insuffic ient to 
conclude that the customer has ceased to have capacity to act 
but which raises the suspicion that the customer may have done 
so, .the bank is  under a duty to make further enquiry. I f  the 
bank reasonably but wrongly concludes that the customer has 
capacity to act, the bank W ill be in the same position i t  would 
6een in had i t  not received any information at a l l .  I f  the 
ba- reasonably but wrongly concludes that the customer does not 
hs i 'japacity to act, th is w ill not avail 1t as a defence to a 
c li, '. i for damages for wrongful dishonour except where the claim 
is  framed in d e lic t. Constructive notice of an order of court 
concerning the customer w ill not be imputed to the bank.
(1) Prelim inary
A person who becomes insane nr unable to manage his a ffa irs , or 
who is  declared a prodigal, lo ;? ' >1*5 capacfty to perform ju r fs t ic  
acts (capacity to act; active capacity; handelingsbevoegheid)/1^
(1) Molyneux v Natal Land and Colonisation Company Ltd 1905 AC 555 
(PC) at WCTff. see generally pqr uoberq rue taw of Persons and 
the famfiy (Cape Town 1977) 130ft. ----------------------
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and In this section consideration 1s given to the effect such loss 
of capacity by a customer has on a bank's duty and authority to 
honour the customer's cheques and other1 payment in s tru c t io n s .^
I f  a person becomes Insane he automatically loses his capacity
to act. i t  1s not necessary that a court should f i r s t  adjudge him
insane or that he should be subjected to the provisions of the
(3)Mental Health Act, ' and ^ven a fte r such 'ce rtif ic a tio n ' he w ill 
regain capacity to act on recovery, or during lucid spells, without 
withdrawal of the c e r t i f ic a t io n .^  Certification  is ,  however, not 
without significance because i t  transfers the onus of proof: an 
uncertified person is  presumed sane until the contrary <s proved, 
while a certif ied  person is presumed insane until the contrary is  
p ro ved .^
A person may also be Unable to manage his a ffa irs  for a variety 
of reasons unrelated to insanity, such as sen ility , retardation or a 
stroke. Such a person may have limited or no capacity to act. A 
curator may be appointed either to supplement such person's capacity 
or to represent him in  a ll matters, as the case may be. As in the 
case of insanity, such a person's mental state, and hence his
(2) I t  should be borne in mind that In dealing with insanity, 
in a b ility  to manage one's a ffa irs  and prodigality one is 
dealing with termination of the bank's duty and authority to 
honour cheques drawn and other payment Instructions given by 
the customer personally or by anyone authorised by him, as 
opposed to by the customer's curator. Moreover, one may be 
dealing either with permanent termination or with temporary 
suspension, depending on whether the insanity, in ab ility  to 
manage one s a ffa irs  or prodigality is  permanent or temporary.
(3 ) 18 o f  1973.
(4) Prinsloo's Curators Bonis v Crafford & Prinsloo 1905 TS 669 at 
b(Z\ Boberg Persons 131-2. 1
(5) Ibid.
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capacity to act, may fluctuate from time to t im e .^
A person may be declared a prodigal i f  he squanders his assets 
threatening to reduce himself and his dependants to destitution. The 
order of court Interd icts him from performing a ll or certain legal 
acts, and his capacity to act is  limited accordingly. The lim itation 
subsists until the order is w ithdrawn.^
fa) Oo a bank's duty and authority terminate on the customer's loss 
of capacity or only ofl the bank's becoming aware of the loss?
Sowen^ refers only b rie fly  to the question of the e ffec t of 
a customer’ s insanity on the bank's duty and authority to honour the 
customer's cheques, saying;
' I t  would seem the duty and authority of a banker to pay his 
customer's cheques are terminated by notice of the customer's 
in san ity .1
As authority for th is  proposition he re lies on a numbev of English 
textbook writers, of whom Pag&if^  may be quoted as being 
representative:
(6) Pienaar v Pienaar's Curator 1930 OPS 171 at 174-5; Boberg op 
c 'n . 'w f f .  '
(7) Phil Morkel Ltd v Niemand .1970(3) SA 455 (C) at 460; Boberq oo 
c"it"T5'gff;
(8) Negotiable Instruments 417.
(9) Paget Banking 246. (Cowen d te s  the 6th ed p 260 which was 1n 
sim ilar terms.) WS Weerasooria & FW Goops Banking Law and 
Practice in Australia (Sydney 1976) § 2619 take the same view 
In regard to Australian law. I F G Baxter The Law of Banking 
3rd ed (Toronto 1981) at 6 states the position-in uanada to Be 
as follows:
'The position on the insanity of the customer is not clear 
and probably the banker-customer contract is  determined by 
notice to the bank of the customer's insan ity.'
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' I f  the customer becomes mentally disordered or otherwise loses 
contractual capacity the banker should not honour his cheques. 
I f  the state of the customer's mind is such that he does not 
know what he is  doing, he can give no mandate and any existing 
mandate is  revoked; but i f  the banker has no knowledge and no 
reason to suspect, then the mandate is  operative.1
I t  may be noted that neither Cowen nor Paget distinguishes between 
cheques issued before and cheques issued after the onset of the 
mental disorder.
The d iff icu lty , however, in seeking support from the English
authorities in regard to the e ffect of insanity in our law is that
English I p*-* proceeds from the principle, inimical to our law, that
i f  an TfYjane person purports to enter into a contract he is  bound by
the contract unless he proves that the other party was aware of his
in s a n ity .* ^  Paget, moreover, re lies on Drew v Kunn^ 1  ^ in
which an agent's ostensible authority to represent his principal was
held to continue until the th ird  party becomes aware of the
princ ipa l's  insanity; however, the correctness of th is decision has 
(121been questioned in England and in any event, in view of the 
fundamentally d ifferent approaches to insanity in English law and in 
our law, i t  is  doubted whether much weight can be attached to this 
decision in our law .’^
(10) The Imperial Loan Company ltd  v Stone [1892] 1QB 599(CA), but 
cf 8 H L  Fridman 'Mental Incompetency1 (1963) 79 LQR S02 at 
509ff.
(11) (1879)4 QBO 661(CA).
(12) Bowstead on Agency 14th ed by F M B Reynolds & 8 J  Davenport 
ILondon 19/6) 434-5; G H L Fridman The Law of Agency 4th ed 
(London 1976) 320-1. Cf too Ypnge v Toynbee O T O T IKT S lS tC A ).
(13) The decision would, moreover, only appear to apply where the 
cheque is drawn or other payment instruction is given before 
the onset of the Insanity - c f Dally Telegraph Newspaper 
Company Ltd v McLaughlin [1904] AC 776(PC). Furthermore, the 
^ecision_ relates to the law of representation and not the 
contract of mandate - cf 11 n 17 above and 97f f  below.
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M alan*^  states:
'The relationship 1s not terminated because the customer becomes 
insane or incapacitated. Because a lunatic lacks legal capacity 
(c f De Wet and Yeats 51-52) cheques "drawn" by him have no legal 
effect. Cowen 417 takes the view that the bank's duty and 
authority to pay such a cheque are terminated only by notice of 
the customer’s insanity but i t  is  submitted that a bank is  not 
entitled  to pay a cheque drawn by a customer who was insane at 
the time of drawing.1
In the same paragraph, however, he submits- that the bank customer 
contract being a contract of mandate is  terminated by the 
sequestraticn, liquidation, jud icia l management or death of the 
customer. Why, then, he excludes insanity and incapacity to act, 
which, as w il l  be shown below, also terminate a mandate, fs 
unclear.{15)
The courts in the United States were on several occasions faced 
with th is question before i t  was regulated by s t a t u t e ^ a n d ,  
with one early e x c e p t i o n , o n  each occasion held that a bank 
which pays a customer's cheques without knowledge that the customer 
has in the interim become insane, is  entitled  to be protected. In 
Poole v Newark Trust Co,^18  ^ for example, the court held:
(14) B i l ls  of Exchange #328 nl43.
(15) Cf too Joubert Law of South Africa vol 19 'Negotiable 
Instruments' by iTTager F~T55 wTiere i t  is  stated that 
insanity, unlike death and insolvency, dots not terminate the 
bank customer contract, only the bank's duty and authority. 
See further 38 n 24 below.
(16) Section 4-405(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code now provides 
that the bank's authority is  not revoked until the bank learns 
that the customer is  incompetent and has had a reasonable time 
to act on that knowledge.
(17) American Trust 8 Banking Co v 8oone 29 SE 184 (SC fia, 1897).
(18) 8 A2d 10 (SC Del, 1939) at 16; see also the other cases cited 
there.
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where a bank deposit is made by a person who is sane and 
who subsequently draws checks upon the account, the bank w ill be 
protected in the payment of the checks even 1f at the time of 
payment the depositor be insane, provided the bank had no 
knowledge of such insanity, or could not be charged with such 
knowledge. The cases support the clear principle that upon the 
making of the deposit the relation of debtor and creditor 
between the bank and the depositor came into existence. When the 
check of the depositor was presented for payment no new contract 
came into being between such depositor and the bank, such as 
would require the bank to ascertain the then mental status of 
the depositor, but the payment of the check v'ts the mere formal 
completion of the pre-existing contract which the bank had 
entered into with Mft.who was sane.... As said in R iley v. 
Albany Savings Bank 1^"* "a bank cannot investigate the sanity 
of a depositor whenever a check is  presented."
‘In Metropolitan L ife  Ins. Co. v. Bramlett 2^0! the Court . . . .  
cited witjh^pproval the quotation from Brady on Bank Checks,
" I f  a depositor a fte r opening an account becoises insane and 
draws cheques while insane or i f  he draws checks while sane 
and becomes insane before the checks are presented the 
drawee bank 1s protected in either case i f  i t  pays the 
checks in good fa ith  and in ignorance of the drawee's 
ins'anity. Unless there are facts present putting the bank 
on notice i t  Is  under no obligation to investigate or 
assure i t s e lf  of the drawee's sanity*1"
Is  the position sim ilar in our law? In other words, is a cheque 
or other payment instruction fu lly  effectual as between bank and 
customer, until the bank becomes aware that the customer has ceased 
to have capacity to act, notwithstanding that the customer may have 
ceased to have such capacity before payment of the cheaue or payment 
instruction or even before i t  was 'drawn' or 'g ive n '? '22  ^ Or is  i t
(19) 36 Hun 513, affirmed 103 NY 669.
(20) 140 So 752 (SC Ala, 1932).
(21) JE  Brady The Law of Bank Checks 2nd ed (Mew York 1926).
(22) I t  is assumed that the loss of capacity occurs a fter the bank 
customer contract was entered into and that accordingly there 
Is  a valid  bank customer contract 1n existence.
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necessary that each cheque or other payment instruction should 
constitute a valid  separate authority fn I t s  own right, ie  that the 
customer should have had capacity to act at the time of drawing and 
issuing the cheque or giving the payment instruction and possibly 
also at the time of payment?
In seeking the answer to this question several further questions 
arise. F ir s t ly ,  does the general rule that mandates lapse on the 
mandant's loss of capacity to act preclude this interpretation in 
our law? Secondly, does the general rule that offers lapse on the 
offeror's loss of capacity to act preclude this interpretation where 
the cheque or other payment instruction constitutes an offer to 
borrow in that i t  is  not drawn or given within the scope of a credit 
or overdraft fa c il it y ?  Thirdly, where the cheque or payment 
instruction 1s 'drawn' or 'given1 after the customer's loss of 
capacity to act, is  i t  legally possible for such a 'cheque1 or 
‘payment Instruction' to f  ..ction as a cheque or payment 
instruction? And fourthly i f  **" to the f ir s t  3 questions 
does not preclude this interprt-. A , is  i t  a term of the bank 
custoater contract, whether as a naturale or as a term Inplied from 
the facts, that cheques and other payment instructions are fu lly  
effectual as between bank and customer until the bank becomes aware 
of the customer's loss of capacity to act?
Each of these questions w ill be considered in turn.
{ { )  The rule that mandates lapse on the mandant's loss of 
capacity
The bank customer contract is  a contract of mandate^2^  and 
the general rule 1s that mandates ipso facto lapse on the mandant's
(23) See 6ff above.
loss of capacity to act.^24  ^ The general rule is , however, subject 
to exceptions, the most important of which for present purposes 
relates d irectly to the point in question, namely the position of a 
mandatary who perforins the mandate 1n ignorance of tfca mandant's 
loss of capacity. This exception w ill therefore be considered f ir s t  
because f f  the e ffect of the exception is  that a mandate 1n fact 
lapses not on the mandant's loss of capacity but on the mandatary's 
becoming aware of the loss, the rule 1s consistent with the 
interpretation of the bank customer contract that cheques and other 
payment instructions art fu lly  effectual as between bank and 
customer until the bank becomes aware of the customer's loss of 
capacity.
{24} See eg Institutes of Roman Law by Gaius translated by E Poste 
4-th ed by E A Whittuck (Oxford 1904) 3.160; Institutes 
3.26.10; Digest 17.1.26, 58; Grotius 3.12.11; A Vinnius 
Instltutlonum Im&eriaUum Commentarfus revised by 
J  ti Heinecdus (Leiden 3726) 3.2/.9, TUT Van Leeuwen CF 
1.4.24.14, Roman Dutch Law 4.26.11, Dictata 3.27.8; U Huber 
The Jurisprudence of ny t ime translates- By P Gane (Durban 
is39) j ,12742; vdet l / . i . ib ,  3.3.21; G Noodt Opera Omnia 
(Leiden 1776) Observationes 2.1; C van Bynkershoek 
Observationes Tumulturiae edited by EM Meljers, AS de Blecourt 
"S HuJ Bodensteln (Haarlem 1926) I 979; Van der Keessel 
Voorlesinge vol 4 th 573 tf 11 (p 233); Van der Linden 1.15.14; 
tToodricke 4 Son v Auto Protection Insurance Co Ltd (1n 
W<wfaat^on7“fSgffriT''5A“717M) 7T722H.-----------------------
The old authorities - and many of the modern authorities too - 
do not always draw, or draw c learly , certain distinctions 
which i t  is  thought are essential to a proper understanding 
and exposition of the law of mandate (and with f t  the law of 
representation).
The f ir s t  and most Important of these distinctions 1s between 
the contract of mandate and the power of representation. ( I t  
must be borne In mind that when a bank honours a cheque or 
other payment instruction in favour of a th ird  party 1t does 
not make payment to the third party as the customer's 
representative but as a principal discharging I t s  own 
(footnote continued on next page)
However, as w ill be seen, i t  1s not clear that this Is  In fact 
the e ffect of the exception and 1f the effect of the exception 1s 
something less than this 1t is  necessary to consider whether the 
rule is a naturale of mandate which can be excluded by agreement or
(Footnote continued from previous page)
Indebtedness - c f De V ll l ie rs  NO y Kaplan 1960(4) SA 476(C) at 
478H; Joubert Verteenwoordiglngsreg ) As alreacty pointed
out (a t 11 n 1/ above), the contract of mandate is  a contract 
to render a service while the power of representation is  the 
power to perform ju r is t ic  acts on behalf of another, and a 
mandatary may or may not also be a representative. The old 
authorities, however, dealt with these institutions together, 
with the result, i t  is  suggested, that notions applicable only 
to representation coloured the ir treatment of mandate.
This confusion of concepts is , i t  is thought, especially 
evident in the ir treatment of lapsing on the mandant's loss of 
capacity to act. I f  a person lacks the capacity to perform a 
ju r is t ic  act himself i t  would not seem conceptually possible 
that some-one should perform that act on his behalf under his 
authority, and i t  follows, 1t is considered, that a power of 
representation should in principle lapse on the grantor’s loss 
of capacity - see eg Joubert Law of South Africa vol 1 'Agency
*rsd Representation' # 123. ( f t  is not proposed to enter the 
debate on the question of irrevocable powers of 
representation.)
No sim ilar consideration, however, arises in the case of the 
contract of mandate. True, in certain circumstances 
performance of the mandate may become impossible on the 
mandant's loss of capacity - eg a mandate to perform an 
operation w ill become Impossible on death - or the mandate may 
be of so personal a nature that 1t is Im p lic it that ’t  lapses 
on the mandant's loss of capacity. On the other hand the 
services may be of such a nature that they can be equally well 
rendered a fter the mandant's loss of capacity and i t  may be in 
neither party's Interests that the contract of mandate should 
lapse.
A further distinction which needs to be drawn is  between the 
lapsing of the contract of mandate and the lapsing of the 
mandatary's mandate 1e the mandatary's right (and obligation) 
to render the mandated services. This distinction 1s necessary 
especially, but not only, where the performance of the mandate 
entails the exercise of a power of representation.
(Footnote continued on next page)
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whether i t  1s an essential^ which cannot be so excluded, because i f  
1t is  an essentiale I t  may preclude the above Interpretation of the 
bank customer contract.
These 2 questions w ill be considered separately.
(Footnote continued from previous page)
Taking the case where the performance of the mandate entails 
the exercise of a power of representation f ir s t ,  the lapsing 
of the power w ill of course prevent the mandatary from 
performing of the mandate. I t  does not, however, necessarily 
follow that the contract of mandate lapses : the mandant's 
legal representative could re-clothe the mandatary with the 
power of representation with the result that the contract can 
proceed as before, and i f  the legal representative chooses not 
to do so, or is  unable to do so, i t  would be a matter of 
interpretation of the contract as to whether or not the 
mandatary would have a claim for damages for breach of 
contract. Cf the position where a contracting party accepts 
the risk of impossibility - see eg Oerlifcon South Africa (Pty) 
ltd  v Johannesburg C ity Council 19/uijisa a/atAT at"bswf.T
I t  Is thought, moreover, that sim ilar considerations apply 
where the performance of the mandate does not entai? the 
exercise of a pcwer of representation; accordingly, the 
mandatary's mandate would lapse on the mandant's loss of 
capacity but i f  the contract does not lapse the mandant's 
legal representative could re-clothe the mandatary with the 
authority (and hence the obligation) to proceed with 
performance, and I f  the legal representative does not do so i t  
would be a matter of interpretation of the contract as to 
whether or not the mandatary may claim damages for breach of 
contract.
A sim ilar distinction arises in the case of revocation. The 
considerations of public policy which m ilitate against the 
va lid ity  of an agreement that a power of representation is to 
be Irrevocable are, i t  is thought, also applicable to an 
agreement that a mandatary's right to proceed with performance 
of the mandate Is  to be Irrevocable. As Van den Heever 0, as 
he then was, said in Ex >i Kelly 1943 OPD 76 at 83 :
‘I t  is  t r i te  law that on grounds of public policy our Court 
w ill not enforce contracts in which one party fetters his 
own liberty  of action unduly. Such restrictions may be too 
onerous in respect of time, in respect of place, e tc .'
I t  does not necessarily follow, however, that therefore the 
contract of mandate is also revocable: i f  the contract were 
(Footnote continued on next page)
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(A) Exception where mandatary is  unaware of the mandant's loss of 
capaci ty^
The rule that mandates lapse on the mandant's loss of capacity 
to act has been subject to an exception where the mandatary performs
{footnote continued from previous page)
also revocable the mandatary could have no claim for damages 
for breach of contract and as Trengove JA said in The f ir s  
Investment Ltd v Levy Bros Estates (Pty) Ltd 1984(2) SA-881(AV 
at ttHbf-
'Generally speaking, a principal has the right and power to 
revoke his agent's authority without incurring any 
l ia b i l i t y  for damages to the agent, but the particular 
terms and circumstances of the grant of the authority may 
show that such a revocation is  a breach of contract.'
This was said in relation to a contract of mandate 
incorporating a power of representation (see at 885H) but is , 
i t  1s tHougH1, equally apposite where the contract does not 
include such a power.
I t  is  also necessary to distinguish lapsing of the mandatary's 
mandate on the one hand and revocation on the other. The 
parties could, for example, agree that both revocation and the 
failu re of the mandant's legal representative to re-clothe the 
mandatary on the mandant's loss of capacity with authority to 
proceed w ill constitute a breach of the contract, or they 
could agree that revocation w il l  do so but that the contract 
of mandate, and with i t  the mandatary's mandate, w ill lapse on 
the mandant's loss of capacity.
in dealing with the termination of a bank's duty and authority 
to honour a customer's cheques and other payment instructions 
one is  dealing with the termination of the bank's right s,nd 
obligation to perform it s  mandate, ie with termination of the 
bank s mandate, and not with termination of the contract of 
mandate It s e lf ,  although termination of the contract may also 
flow from the customer's loss of capacity* I t  1s also thought 
that the old authorities in dealing with lapsing of  mandates 
on the mandant's loss of capacity focussed on lapsing of the 
mandatary's mandate rather tnan on lapsing of the contract of 
mandate. Accordingly, references in what follows to the 
lapsing of a mandate primarily refer to the lapsing of the 
mandatary's mandate rather than to the lapsing of the contract 
of mandate (unless otherwise indicated) and may need 
qualification where the lapsing of the contract of mandate is 
in Issue.
V  '
the insr.fis'fes in Iqnorance of the mandant's loss of capacity since 
Roman tirsies.^^ The d ifficu lty , however, Is  to detsrnvlne the 
precise scope of the exception. As w ill be shown below this 
d iff icu lty  arises partly from the fact that mandates were orig inally 
gratuitous and partly from the fact that the old authorities only 
deal with the question of the mandatary's position i f  he in fact 
performs the mandate; they do not consider the position where he 
fa i ls  to perform i t  or performs i t  negligently.^26*
I t  is suggested that the^e are 3 principal possible 
interpretations of the rule and the exception.
f i r s t ly ,  the true formulation of the rule and the exception 
could be that a mandate lapses not on the mandant's loss of capacity 
to act, but on the mandatary's becoming aware of the loss .*27  ^ On 
th is approach not only the rights but also the obligations of the 
parties would continue until the mandatary becomes aware of the 
mandant's loss of capacity.
Secondly, the scope of the exception could be limited to 
affording a mandatary who in fact performs the mandate In Ignorance 
of the mandant's loss of capacity, the right to be placed in the 
same position he would have been 1n had the mandate not lapsed 1e
4 2 .
(25) Gaius Institu tes 3.160; Institutes 3.26.10; Digest 17.1.26, 58.
(26) This question cannot, however, be avoided for present purposes 
because i t  is  not only termination of the bank's authority 
that is  in issue but also termination of the bank's duty. 
Although in practice f t  fs lik e ly  to be a rare occurrence that 
a bank dishonours a cheque or other payment instruction when 
i t  is  unaware that the customer has ceased to have capacity to 
act and when 1t therefore s t i l l  believes that i t  1s under a 
duty to honour the cheque or payment instruction, 1t is 
nevertheless necessary to examine whether, i f  this happens, 
the bank may be held liab le  for damages for wrongful dishonour.
(2^) This is the view adopted by Kerr, a lbe it without discussion : 
AJ Kerr The Law of Agency 2nd ed (Durban 1979) 200-203.
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his positive Interest. On th is approach the mandatary's rights would 
continue until he becomes aware of the mandant's loss of capacity 
but his obligation to perform the mandate would te rm in a te /^
Thirdly, the scope of the exception could be limited to 
affording the mandatary the right to be placed 1n the same position 
he would have been in had he not performed the mandate ie his 
negative interest. On this approach the mandatary would be entitled 
to be Indemnified for his expenses and any p ro fit he could have made 
elsewhere, but he would not be entitled to the remuneration provided 
fo r under the contract of mandate.
Although the principal significance of the difference between
positive and negative interest lie s  fn the question of whether $r
not the mandatary is  entitled  to his remuneration for performing the
mandate th is Is  not the only significance eig i f  a bank is  e n i.Je d
to  i t s  positive interest the payment of a cheque or other payment
instruction constitutes a direct oro \anto discharae of the bank's
(2 9 )--------indebtedness to the customer, whereas i f  the bank is  entitled 
to i t s  negative interest only, the payment w ill give rise to a right 
of re-lmbursement which w ill constitute only an Indirect pro tanto 
discharge of the bank's indebtedness by way of set-off. The 
significance of this in turn lie s  in the fact that set-off may be 
prevented for some extraneous reason/30^
In seeking to interpret the old authorities i t  is  necessary to 
bear in mind that mandate was orig ina lly  gratuitous by definition 
and although in time I t  came to be recognised that this was not an
(28) Presumably a ll the other obligations of the mandatary would 
continue eg the obligation to act in good fa ith  and wfthout 
negligence.
(29) See 1.5 n 25 above.
(30) Ibid.
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essentia) element of the contract such recognition generally 
occurred Indirectly with lip  service s t i l l  being paid to the 
requirement tha, -e contract be gratuitous.
In Roman lav/3^  mandatum was orig ina lly s t r ic t ly  gratuftous 
and no reward could be claimed under the actio mandati. However, a 
strong social obligation prescribed that the mandatary should be 
rewarded with a honorarium and in time the honorarium became 
enforceable by a cognltlo extraordlnaria. The honorarium, however, 
was no part of the contract of mandats and could not be enforced by
[331
the actio mandati. On the mandant's death the mandate 
lapsed*34* but i f  the mandatary performed the mandate in ignorance 
of this fact he could s t i l l  avail himself of the actio mandati to 
claim his expenses and losses. Authority appears to be lacking, 
however, on the effect of the lapsing of the mandate on the 
mandatary's right to avail himself of the cognitfo extraordfnarfa
(31) Grotius 3.12.2, 6; Vinnius 3.27.13; Van Leeuwen CF 1.4.24.13; 
Roman-Outch lm  4.26.1; Huber 3.12.5-7, 28, 3 5 ;T oe t 17.1.2; 
Van der Linden 1.15.14; R J  Pothier Treatise on the Contract 
of Mandate translated by B G Roqers 4 B X de Wet (Johannesburg 
is/s) paras 22ff. But see C van Bynkershoek Quaestlonum Ju r is  
P riva ti (Leiden 1752) 2.46 (p 2*7) but c f Obs Turn I I  ldlYT 
dg van den Keessel Voorlesinge vol 4, th "V/O Tp 269). In 
modern law i t  1s accepted' that mandates need not be gratuitous
- see eg Gowan v Bowern 1924 AD 550 at 563; Ooubert Law of 
South Africa Von.7~‘Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio1 # 4.
(32) VW Auckland A Textbook of Roman Law from Augustus to Justin ian 
3rd ed by P Stein (London 1^7S) 5 l4 ff; M Kaser Roman Private 
Law translated by R Dannenbrlng 2nd ed (Durban 196Fnr"P7n
(33) The rules applicable on death are equally applicable to any 
other loss of capacity to act - see eg Pothier Mandate 
para 111; Goodrlcke & Son v Auto Protection Insurance Co Ltd 
(in  liq u ida tlon )' l ^ a ( i )  sa~/jT/'ia) at /zzH.
(34) Provided that the mandate was s t i l l  res Integra. 1e nothing 
had ye t been done about i t ,  although the precfsi* scope of the 
proviso 1s unclear. See further 64-7 below especially 65 n 98.
procedure to claim his honorarium, although It; may be suggested that 
i t  would have been assumed that the right to recover the honorarium 
would follow the fate of the actio mandatl. A contrary argument 
would, however, be that the continuation of the actio mandati was...... . ...
based not on contract - the mandate had lapsed - but on equity 
and equity demands no more than that the mandatary should suffer no 
loss, not that he should also receive his p ro fit. This is dealt with 
further below.
Several of the writers of the Roman-Dutch period refer to the 
position of a mandatary who performs his mandate In Ignorance of the 
mandant's death.
Vinnius*36* closely follows the Roman Taw :
'Ets1 mandatum morte mandatoris extlnguitur, & 1deo secundum 
s t r lc t l  ju r is  ratlonem, quamvls mandatarius Ignorans mandatorem 
decessisse mandatum impleverit, agere mandatl non potest: tamer? 
u t l l l t a t is  causa, seu ex bono & aequo, placet impleto per 
ignorantiam mandato actionem el darl
He, however, also draws a distinction between the actio mandati and 
the extraordinary procedure for the recovery of remuneration^3®^
(35) U t l l lt a t is  causa.
(36) 3.27.10.4.
(37) Although mandate is  extinguished by the death of the mandant, 
and therefore following the logic of s t r ic t  law even I f  the 
mandatary has performed the mandate 1n ignorance of the 
mandant's death he cannot bring an action on the mandate: 
nevertheless for the sake of expediency or equity, where a 
mandate has been performed in Ignorance [o f the mandant's 
death] a right of action 1s given . . . .
(38) 3.27.13.1:
'E ts i vero honorarli slve sa la r ii co n stitu te  mandatum non 
(Footnote continued on next page)
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but he does not make i t  clear whether both the actio mandati and the 
extraordinary'procedure, or only the actio mandatl, are available to 
a mandatary who performs the mandate in ignorance of the mandant's 
death.
Voet*39  ^ likewise refers to the distinction drawn in Roman Law 
between the actio mandati and the extraordinary procedure for the 
recovery of a honorarium but i t  is  not clear whether or not he 
regarded the distinction as s t i l l  obtaining in his day. However, in 
dealing with the rule that mandates lapse on the mandant's death he 
states*40  ^ that the rule does not apply, fe not merely that the 
action on mandate continues, i f  the mandatary has 1n good faith 
carried the business to its  conclusion in ignorance of the death of 
the mandant. I t  woul-A seem therefore that whether or not he would 
have allcwed the renuneration to be recovered under the action on 
mandate he would have allowed 1t to be recovered where the mandatary 
performed, the mandate in ignorance of the mandant's death.
H u b e r , l i k e  Vinnius, closely follows the Roman law.
{Footnote continued from previous page)
v it ia t  . . .  de ipso tamen salario mandati actio non est, sed 
extra ordinem peti so le t.'
Even the fixing of a honorarium or salarium does not v itia te  
the mandate . . .  but the action on mandate is  not available to 
claim such salarium; however, i t  is  customarily claimed 
extraordinarily"; '
(39) 17.1.2.
(40) 17.1.15.
(41) 3.12.43 read with 3.12.28, 35. Although Huber wrote on Fris ian  
law he has always been regarded as an authority in Holland - 
Hahlo 4 Kahn Legal System 556.
47.
Potftfer^^  states :
‘Although the mandate 1s terminated on the death of the mandant, 
nevertheless, I f  the mandatary 1s unaware of the mandant's 
death, and In a ll good fa ith  carries out the business for which 
he has accepted responsibility, then the mandant’s heirs or 
other residuary successors would be under an obligation to 
reimburse him and to ra tify  his actions.... The reason for this 
is  that the mandant contracts an obligation, 1n the contract of 
mandate, to indemnify the mandatary in respect of a ll expenses 
incurred in the execution of the mandate; and notwithstanding 
the fact that the mandate terminates on the death of the 
mandant, the obligation contracted by the mandant is  passed to 
his h e irs .‘
(42) Mandate para 106. Although Pothler is a French author he was 
held in high regard by the Roman-Dutch authors and is  treated 
as an important authority by our courts:
’Though he was not a w riter on the Roman-Dutch law, a mere 
casual reference to Van der Linden w ill show that Pothier’s 
treatise on Obligations was considered as an authority of 
the greatest weight. Pothier has also been regarded by the 
courts of South Africa as an authority of great weight on 
the modern aspect of tho Roman Taw of obligation1
(per Wessels 0, as he. then was, In Kroon v Enschede & Others 
1909 TS 374 at 383). .
However, i t  must be borne in mind that his word is  not ipso 
facto the law:
' Pothier is  of course a great authority on the C iv il law, 
but his authority is merely suasive, his works having 
weight only as ratio  scripta. As an interpreter of the 
Roman law, our iaw i n su&sidio, on questions on whfch the 
Dutch ju r is ts  are s ilen t,"h is  opinions naturally carry much 
weight'
(per Van den Heever JA In Gerber v Wolson 1955(1) SA 158(A) at 
170H-171A). Perhaps his views are given rather more weight 
than mere ratio  scripta - for example in the same case 
Fagan JA (a t lBJD-t) v irtu a lly  equated the authority of his 
views with the authority of Voet - but the fact remains that 
his views are not d irectly the law and i t  is necessary to 
examine the reasons he gives for his views.
I t  Is doubtful, however, whether an inference can be drawn from the 
fact that Pothier refers only to expenses that he would therefore 
not have allowed the remuneration to be recovered. He too closely 
follows the Roman law that where remuneration 1s agreed this Is  no 
part of the contract of mandate but takes place outside 1t. 
When, therefore, he states that although a mandate terminates on the 
mandant's death the mandatary who performs the mandate 1n ignorance 
o f ilie death 1s entitled to be Indemnified for his expenses, he is 
apparently referring only to the mandatary's position under the 
contract of mandate and not to any right he may have under a 
colla teral agreement to recover hfs remuneration'
Kone of the authorities deals with the position where the 
mandatary neglects to perform the mandate despite the fact that he 
is  unaware of the lapsing of the mandate due to the mandant's loss 
of capacity.
What conclusions are to be drawn from the aforegoing? The 
answer is ,  i t  is suggested, as follows.
i f  -it is  accepted that a mandate lapses on the mandant's loss of 
capacity, 1t follows, i t  1s thought, that log ically the mandatary 
should be entitled to his negative interest only. To accord the 
mandatary his positive interest would be a negation of the fact that 
the mandate had lapsed. I f  the mandate has lapsed, equity requires 
no more than that the mandatary should suffer no loss, not that he 
should also be entitled  to his p ro fit. I f  the parties are free
^3 ) Op c i t  paras 22ff and 68ff.
(44) See also (3) below (a t 145-54): Excursus: A general rule that 
a person dealing with another in reliance on the other's 
continued capacity to act Is  entitled to be indemnified for 
his negative interest?
49.
to exclude lapsing of the mandate on the mandant's loss of capacity 
to act - as 1s contended in the next section - there is  no reason 
why the mandatary should be entitled  to his positive interest i f  
they do not do so, especially seeing that the mandatary would not be 
liab le  for damages for breach of contract i f  he fa iled  to perform 
the mandate. E ither both the rights and obligations should continue, 
ie  the mandate does not lapse, or the mandatary should be restricted 
to a claim for his negative interest.
Could the true rule be that a mandate in fact lapses not on the 
mandant's loss of capacity to act but on the mandatary's becoming 
aware of the loss? The answer is , i t  is  suggested, in the 
affirmative. The nature of mandate was gradually changing during the 
Roman and Roman-Dutch period from a favour undertaken by a friend 
into a commercially based contract and th is development has been 
completed in modern t i m e s . I n  this context i t  would seem harsh 
to deny the mandatary his remuneration i f  he performs the mandate in 
ignorance of the mandant's 1r>ss of capacity. He has done what he 
contracted to do and his remuneration may be his means of 
livelihood. Conversely, there would seem to be no reason why the 
mandant's estate should not pay for the services rendered when i t  
has had the benefit of the services. Moreover, 1f the 
mandatary is  entitled to a ll his rights under the mandate until he 
becomes aware of the mandant's loss of capacity i t  log ically 
follows, i t  is  suggested, that he should also be subject to the
(45) See eg Gowan v Qowern 1924 AD 550. See further 7 n 6 above.
(46) I f ,  for example, a rent collection agent has continued to 
co llect the rents in ignorance of the mandant's loss of 
capacity why should he not be entitled  to his commission?
50.
o b lig a t io n s .O th e rw is e  he would be entitled to his p ro fit  i f  
he performed the mandate but would Incur no l ia b i l i t y  i f  he 
neglected to do so causing loss to the mandant's estate.
I t  is  true that there 1s no direct authority for th is approach 
but i t  is ,  1t 1s suggested, the logical and necessary development of 
the embryonic rules found in the old authorities. As Innes CJ said 
in Blower v Van Noorden;^^
‘There come times in the growth of every liv ing  system of law 
when old practice and ancient formulae must be modified 1n order 
to keep 1n touch with the expansion of ’ egal ideas, and to keep 
pace with the requirements of changing conditions. And i t  is  for 
the courts to decide when the modifications, which time has 
proved to be desirable, are of a nature to be effected by 
jud icia l decision, and when they are so important or so radical 
that they should be le f t  to the leg is la ture .'
This 1s particu larly true of the contract of mandate which, 
because of I t s  h istorical origin as a favour undertaken out of 
friendship as npposed to a commercial relationship, had not reached 
by the end of the Rcwnan-Dutch period the stage of development 
necessary to meet the sophisticated needs of modern commerce.
(47) Pursuing the example in the previous note, why should the 
agent not be liab le  for any loss suffered by the mandant’s 
estate i f  he neglected to co lle c t the rents? I t  is  perhaps not 
insignificant that in the case of the other exceptions to the 
rule that mandates lapse on the mandant's loss of capacity i t  
1s clear that both the rights and the obligations of the 
mandatary continue a fte r the loss of capacity - see eg Voet 
17.1.15; Pothler Mandate para 107.
(48) 1909 TS 890 at 905.
(49) See 7 n 6 above. I t  is  suggested that i t  1s also not 
Inappropriate to examine what the position would be 1f one 
were to approach the matter from the point of view of what 
term, i f  any, could normally be Implied from the facts. Such 
an examination is made in detail at 76-91 below in regard
(Footnote continued on next page)
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I f  th is view is  accepted, namely that the true rule 1s that a 
mandate lapses not on the mandant's loss of capacity but on the 
mandatary's becoming aware of the loss, i t  follows that the rule 1s 
consistent with the interpretation of the bank customer contract 
that cheques and other payment Instructions are fu lly  effectual as 
between bank and customer until the bank becomes aware of the 
customer's loss of capacity. The position i f  this view is  rejected 
Is  dealt with In the next section.
(B) The rule is  a naturals not an essentials of mandate
I f ,  contrary to the view expressed 1n the previous section, the 
effec t of the exception 1s not that the mandate continues until the 
mandatary becomes aware of the mandant’s loss of capacity but 
something less, the rule together with the exception would be 
inconsistent with the interpretation of the bank customer contract 
that cheques and other payment Instructions are fu lly  effectual as 
between bank and customer until the bank becomes aware of the 
customer's loss of capacity. I t  does not, however, necessarily 
fellow that thfs interpretation of the bank customer contract is  not 
lega lly possible : this would only follow I f  the rule that mandates 
lapse on the mandant's loss of capacity Is an essentlale of the 
contract of mandate which cannot be altered by agreement, and the 
view w ill be taken In what follows that the rule is  in fact not an 
essentlale but a naturale which can be altered by agreement.
{Footnote continued from previous page)
to the bank customer contract and the conclusion reached there 
is  that i t  should normally be possible to Imply a term from 
the facts relating to a hank customer contract that i t  only 
lapses when the bank becomes aware of the customer's loss of 
capacity. Moreover, much of the reasoning is ,  I t  is  suggested, 
applicable to mandates generally and lends further support to 
the approach that the true formulation of the rule is  that a 
contract of mandate lapses not on the mandant's loss of 
capacity but on the mandatary's becoming aware of the loss.
52.
There was not complete unanimity among the old authorities as to 
whether the rule that mandates lapse on the mandant's loss of 
capacity is  a naturale or essentiale of the contract of mandate. As 
Van den Heever J ,  as he then was, said 1n Ex p Kelly;
'Voet^51  ^ proceeds that the general rule [that a mandate 
lapses on the mandant's change of status] does not apply where 
the mandate empowers the mandatory to do something which can 
only be done after* the deatlv5*! of the grantor. In this 
respect there was a con flic t among the authorities. Gerard Noodt 
(Observe Lib. 2.C.3) maintained that this mandate to be executed 
a fte r deatFT 1s permissible only in a ffa irs  having sacrlstic 
significance: e.g. raising a monument to the deceased, buying 
land for his grave, etc. He ascribes the privileged treatment of 
such mandates to the be lie f that the sp irits  of unburled corpses 
have to wander about unhappily for a century before they can 
secure passage across the Styx Into Hades. ( V irg il, Aeneid, 
vers. 325 et seq.)  However that be, no authority goes so fa r as 
"Eo""suggest that a mandate remains in force a fter the death of 
the grantor where this 1s not expressly stated or does not 
follow by necessary Intendment. Vinnius in his Commentary on the 
Institutes (3.27,10, n.2) records the common opinion that such 
mandates remain valid  a fte r the death of the grantor i f  that 
Intention was. expressed or i f  f t  follows by necessary 
intendment,'53' e.g. "to arrange for my funeral; to erect a
(50) 1943 0P0 76 at 82. K e lly 's  case In fact related to a power of 
representation and not a contract of mandate but the 
authorities referred to did not distinguish between these 2 
institutions - c f 97ff below.
(51) 17.1.15.
(52) I t  has already been pointed out - see 44 ri 33 above - that the 
authorities hold that insanity has the same effect as death. 
This could have given rise  to a d ifficu lty  because much of the 
reasoning of the authorities dealt with below can only be 
applied with d ifficu lty  to insanity; however, 1n view of the 
fact that the conclusion 1s 1n any event reached below that 
the parties can exclude lapsing even on death I t  Is 
unnecessary to explore the possib ility that the e ffect of 
death and Insanity may not be identical.
(53) I t  1s doubted whether what Vinnius says can be interpreted In 
this way - see 57-8 below.
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monument to me after ny death; to buy land for my he irs ." He 
continues: " I f ,  however, the mandate was something which was 
capable of being carried out during the lifetim e of the 
principal, the mandate is  extinguished with his death." As a 
matter of fact the authorities I have quotedJtr.ote in the dark. 
The rediscovered Gaius makes 1t quite c lear‘d '  that there was 
no such exception to the general ru le; that passages from the 
Corpus lu rls  seeming to indicate such exception relate to 
mandates fo rtified  by the intervention of an adstipulator. 1
With respect, however, even 1n classical Roman law the position 
regarding the va lid ity  or otherwise of a mandate to be performed 
a fter the death of the mandant was not as clear as Van den Heever J  
suggests, although the better view on balance would appear to be 
that such a mandate was not valid.
The objection in classical Roman law to such a mandate was said 
to be that an obljgatio could not commence in a h e r e s , 1e a 
contract was considered to be personal to the parties and could 
s t r ic t ly  produce no e ffec t for or against those not parties to 
1t.^57* To circumvent thfs restriction recourse was had to 
adstEpulatio which was used to reinforce the stipu latio  between the 
actual parties by one made with the promissor by a mandatary, who 
stipulated for the same t h i n g . I f  the adstipulator sued on his 
contract he would be liab l . under his mandate to account for the 
proceeds to the principal or his heres, as the case might be.*59*
Whether or not the rule that an obUgatio could not comence in 
a heres operated 1n classical Roman law to invalidate a mandate to 
be performed a fter the mandant's death is  a matter of controversy
(54) Apparently a reference to 3.117,158,160.
(55) Watson op c i t  135 f f ,  especially at 147.
(56) Gaius 3,100.
(57) Buck land Roman Law 426 ff.
(58) Gaius 3.117; Buckland op d t  443 f f ,
(59) Ibid.
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among the authorities, old*60* and modern,*61* on Roman law; 
however, I t  would be beyond the scope of this thesis to enter this 
controversy as the position in classical Roman law is of only 
limited relevance because i t  is  the law of Justin ian and not of 
classical Rome that was received in f illa n d . *62* I t  suffices to 
quote Buckland*6 *^ on the position in classical Roman law:
in mandate for performance a fte r the death of the mandator, 
the personal reason does not apply and the rule fs not stated by 
Gaius, though i t  is  by Paul, in the Digest, with the reason that 
mandate ends by death of either party. One text may imply that a 
mandate to conduct my funeral gives no actio mandati, but 
another gives i t  on a mandate to build iqy monument," not easily 
distinguished. Another gives i t  on a mandate to buy land for ny 
heres after ny death, and Gaius gives i t  for adstipulatio on a 
stipulatio post mortem. In one text in which the mandate was 
operative after death of mandator, the reason is  assigned that 
on the facts (the text was "wrTlten of fiducia) the mandator 
might have an action in his l i f e  so that the o6Tigation did not 
begin in the heres. In another, corrupt, f t  is  said sim ilarly  
that mandatary might incur expense, with a right of 
reimbursement, before the death. I t  is  not clear why i t  should 
be possible to incur expense on a monument before the death, and 
not on other funeraria. In fact, since on almost any mandate i t  
was possible for money to be expended before the death, or, 
fa ilin g  th is, for the mandator to have some claim, the 
exceptional case p ractica lly negatives the rule, which Justinian 
abolished.1
(60) See ea U Huber Eunomia Romana (Franeker 1700) ad Digest 17 (pp 
603-5). -------------  —
(61) See eq A Watson Contract of Mandate in Roman Law (Oxford 1961) 
135; 1
'The question of the va lid ity  of mandatum post mortem 
mandatoris in classical law is  not so easy and has received 
a great deal of attention in recent years. The texts on the 
point are few, but the Interpretations of them are so 
varied that the easiest way to get a clear view of the 
problem is to begin by summarizing the most important of 
the modern theories. . . . '
(62) See eg J  W Wessels History of Roman - Dutch Law (Grahamstown 
1308) 128; H R Hahlo & E Kahn The Union of South Africa The 
Development of its  Laws and Constitution (London and Cape Town 
I960) 36-/; The So u th Ifrican  Leqal System and its  Background 
(Cape Town 195BTTI?.
(63) Roman Law 517 - 18.
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reimbursement, before the death- I t  is  not clear why i t  should 
be possible to incur expense on a monument before the death, and 
not on other funeraria. In fact, since on almost any mandate i t  
was possible for money to be expended before the death, or, 
fa iling  Shis, for the mandator to have some claim, the 
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abolished.1
(60) See eq U Huber Eunomia Romana (Franeker 1700) ad Digest 17 (pp 
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(61) See eq A Watson Contract of Mandate in Roman Law (Oxford 1961) 
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'The question of the va lid ity  of mandatum post mortem 
mandatoris In classical law 1s not so easy and has received 
a~~greae deal of attention In recent years. The texts on the 
point are few, but the interpretations of them are so 
varied that the easiest way to get a clear view of the 
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the modern theories. . . . '
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(63) Roman Law 517 - 18.
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Justin ian f ir s t  Issued a constitution^64* abolishing the rule 
that an obligatlo could not commence In a heres in 528 AO. This 
constitution could not have proved suffic ient for 1n 531 AD be 
issued a second more specific constitution^®* providing:
'In  former times, stipulations, legacies and other contracts to 
be executed a fte r death were rejected, but We have permitted 
this to be done for the common welfare of manklno, as i t  
appeared to be advisable that this rule, which was adopted in 
ancient times, should be amended by a more humane custom; for 
the old ju ris ts  did not allow actions to be brought by or 
against heirs in the case of stipulations or other agreements to 
be carried out a fte r death. I t  seems to us to be necessary to 
abolish this ancient abuse, and to annul this rule, so that 
suits and obligations can be brought and enforced by heirs and 
against heirs, in order that the accomplishment of the wishes of 
the contracting parties may not be frustrated, through the 
excessive subtlety of the legal terms employed.'
Watson^6  ^ states that although mandates are not expressly 
mentioned they c learly  fa ll under the constitutions and therefore 
under Justinian mandates for performance after the mandant's death 
were v a l id .^ ^
(64) Codex 8.37 (38), 11.
(65) Codex 4.11.1.
c i t  135. See too Buckland op c i t  519 and Kaser Roman Law
(67) I t  must bs borne in mind, however, that even i f  the modern 
commentators on the Roman law are entirely correct 1n this 
respect this is  not necessarily the end of the matter:
' I t  would serve no useful purpose for me to examine into 
the true meaning of these passages [in  the Corpus Iu r ls ] 
because even i f ,  by the ligh t of modern critic ism , we are 
now able to pronounce that the Dutch authorities 
misinterpreted the passages, we could not on that account 
alone re ject any generally accepted law although founded on 
such misinterpretation'
(per Lord De V ll l ie rs  CJ in Green v Fltzaerald & Others 1914 
AD 88 at 99). --------------
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That mandates for performance a fte r the mar.dant's death are 
valid  was also the view of the majority of the Koman-Dutch authors 
who dealt with the question. Grotius^6®^  states the position 
succinctly:
'The death of either party, as a rule, determines the mandate 1n
the absence of a clear indication of a contrary Intention
Scbomaker^5  ^ and Van der Keessel^0  ^ state the position in 
sim ilar terms.
Other authors could at f ir s t  sight be understood to Hm1t the 
va lid ity  of mandates for performance after the mandant's death to 
services which can only be rendered a fte r death 1e i f  the servfces 
could have been rendered before death but have not in fact been 
rendered before deUh the mandate w ill terminate despite agreement 
to the contrary. Voe t,^ 1  ^ for example, states:
'Nevertheless the above rule [that mandates terminate on the 
mandant's death] fa ils  1f a mandate has been given for something 
which can only be fu lf i l le d  a fter the death of the mandator....'
(68) 3.12.11.
(69) J  Schomaker ConVHa et Responsa Ju r is  part 4 (Zutphen 1752) 
XXVII questionTu.'
‘Of de Volmagt . . .  door dode van de Constltuanten geelndigt 
fs~of n le l? m W ers affirmative in gen ere na regten bulten 
contradlctle 1s . . . .  Schoon er evenswel specials gevallen 
en uitzonderingen van deze regel zyn, als E.G.
I .  Indlen een mandaat contineerde, om y ts  te verrlgten na 
dode van den constituent of mandant.
(70) Voorlesfnge th 573 # 11 - see below.
(71) 17.1.15.
Westenberg,^2  ^ Huber^3* and P o th ie r^ ^  state the position 
in sim ilar terms.
Vfnnfus^75  ^ is  even more ex p lic it  in lim iting the 
qualification to services which can only be rendered after- death:
'De i l lo  quaeritur, an mandatum morte mandatoris usque adeo 
solvatur, ut idem probandum s it , etiamsi nominate mandaverit 
quid f ie r i  post mortem suam? Et in eo haec d istinctio communiter 
probata esc ut hujuscemodi mandatum post mortem mandatoris non 
fln iatu r, sed omnino implendum s it ,  si tale s it ,  quod non nisi 
post mortem ejus impleri queat; veluti si cui funeris sui curan; 
mandaverit, aut ut post stortem suam sibf monumentum fie re t, aut 
haeredibus sufs fundus emeretur. Sin autem quod mandavit, eo
(72) 0 0 Westenberg Opera Omnia Ju rid ica  vol 1 {Hanover 1746) 
3.27.18. After stating the rule that a mandate lapses on the 
mandant's death'he qualifies the rule as follows:
‘Nisi quid mandatum s it ,  quod non nisi post mortem 
mandantis perfic i potest.1
(Unless something has been mandated which cannot be performed 
except after.the death of the mandant.)
(73) 3.12.45, writing of Frisian law:
‘There srs also soma kinds of mandate which are expressly 
directed to the end that they shall f i r s t  be carried out 
a fter the decease; such pass without doubt to the heirs.'
(74) Mandate para 108, writing of french law:
"The principle we have established* namely,' that the 
mandate is  terminated by the death of the mandant, of 
necessity allows of exception when the business forming the 
subject of the mandate is of such a nature that i t  can only 
be carried out a fter the mandant's death
(75) 3.27.10. Cf, however. Van den Heever J ’s interpretation in 
K e lly 's  case of what Vinnius says - see 52 above.
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vivo impleri potuit, mortuo eo mandatum extingui; ve luW ..si 
jusserit debitorem suum post mortem suam solvere T itio .
Despite what Vinnius says^77' 1t is  doubted whether a valid  
distinction can be drawn between a mandate to render a service which 
can only be rendered after the mandant's death and a mandate which 
provides for a service which can be rendered before or after death 
and which provides further that i t  1s not to lapse on death, and i t  
is doubted whether this is  what the other authors referred to had in 
mind. The significance of a mandate to do something which can only 
be done after the mandant’s death is that i t  by implication 
necessarily excludes the naturale that a mandate lapses on the 
mandant's death/78' I f  what is to be done pursuant to the mandate
(76) In th is connection one may ask whether mandate is  dissolved by 
the death of the mandant to such an extent that the same is 
true even i f  he has expressly mandated something to be done 
afte r his death? In thfs case the distinction is  generally 
accepted that a mandate of this kind is  not terminated on the 
death of the mandant but must be performed 1n Its  entirety i f  
i t  1s of such a Hint! that 1t cannot be performed except after 
his death, such as a mandate to arrange his funeral or to 
raise a monument to him a fter his death or to purchase a farm 
for his heirs. I f ,  however, what he has mandated could be 
performed while he was a live  the mandate is  extinguished by 
his death, such as i f  he has ordered his debtor to pay T itius 
a fte r hfs death.
Cf the different distinctions Donellus and Noodt seek to draw
- in fra .
(77) Vinnius' views w ill be referred to again below because, 
following the Roman law, he requires that the mandate be res 
Integra for i t  to lapse on the mandant's death, and, as wTTT 
tTe shown below, the e ffect of th is on modern mandates is  to 
largely negate the rule that mandates lapse on the mandant's 
death.
(78) That this is  what Voet and Pothier had in mind is , i t  1s 
thought, supported by the fact that both writers l i s t  other 
exceptions as well - eg the mandate of a factor in charge of a 
business (Voet 17.1.1S; Pothier Mandate para 109), a mandate 
to do something pressing which cannot be delayed or carried
(Footnote continued on next page)
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can be done before or after death this implication does not arise* 
but 1f the parties expressly agree that the mandate is  not to lapse 
I t  would be anomalous i f  i t  nevertheless did so as there does not 
seem to be any basis in principle for distinguishing between this 
situation and the situation where the service to be rendered can 
only be performed after death.
Van der Keessel,'79* i t  is  thought, had this in mind in saying:
‘Dis ook by ons die erkende beginsel dat met die dood van die 
lasgewer a lle  lasgewing beelndlg word. Die skrywer [Grotius] 
stel egter 'n uitsondering vas 1nd1en d1t die bedoeling was dat 
die lasnemer die saak na die dood van die lasgewer noes 
waarneem, veral indien d it van sodanige aard 1s dat d1t dan eers 
waargeneem kan word.. . . 1
Noodt, as already iwrvtroned, is a notable exception to the 
general view among the Roman-Dutch writers that mandates for 
performance a fter the mandawt's death are valid , and although he'and 
Vinnius appear to have stood almost alone among Roman-Dutch writers 
1n holding the view that the right of the parties to exclude lapsing 
on death is  limited, his high standing as a ju r is t,^ 80* and the 
fsct that other ju rists^8** elsewhere I p Europe had sim ilar 
d iff icu lt ie s , requires an examination of his views.
(Footnote continued from previous page)
out by anyone other than the mandatary because the heirs are 
absent (Pothfer Mandate para 107), .etc - and 1n each Instance 
they appear to 51 referring to cases where lapsing is 
Impliedly excluded, rather than to a closed l i s t  of cases 
which the parties are not free to extend even by express 
agreement.
(79) Voorleslnge th 573 # 11.
(80) Hahlo & Kahn Legal System 554.
(81) See eg Donellus In fra .
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Before dealing with Noodt's v1?ws, however, i t  is  convenient to 
f i r s t  deal with the views of the 2 great french Humanists Cujacius 
and Oonetlus, not on'ly because they preceded Noodt chronologically 
but also because Cujacius challenges the accuracy of the main text 
on which Noodt's arguments are b u ilt  and Donellus deals with the 
same texts as Noodt with particular lucid ity .
The 3 texts concerned are a ll from the Digest:
17.1.12.17 'Marcellus also says that i f  anyone directs a 
monument to be erected to himself a fte r his death, his heir can 
proceed in an action on mandate. Indeed I think that the man who 
ha* undertaken the mandate has an action on the mandate i f  he 
has used his own money, unless the mandate was to the effect 
that he should erect the monument at his own expense. For he 
could have sued the man who gave the mandate to pay the money to 
him to carry f t  out, particu larly i f  he had already taken steps 
to perform the mandate.1' 0* '
17.1.13 'The rule is  the same i f  I have directed you to purchase 
a tract of land [ fo r ]1®3' my heirs a fte r my death.1
46.3.108 'Where anyone, 1n obedience to ny mandate, makes a 
stipulation to be executed a fte r n\y death, payment w ill 'legally 
be made to him, because such is the law of obligations.
{82} For the second and third sentences Scott has:
‘But i f  the party who received the mandate erected the 
monument with his own money, I think that he can bring an 
action on mandate, even i f  he was not charged to erect the 
monument with his own money; for the action w ill also l ie  
1n his favor against him who directed him to employ his own 
money in constructing the monument, and especially is  this 
the case i f  he had already made preparations for that 
purpose'
but, with respect, this does not correctly re flec t the text:
'Ilium  vero qu1 mandatum suscepit, si sua pecunia fe c it , 
puto agere raandatl, si non 1ta el mandatum est, ut sua 
pecunia faceret monumentum. potuit enfm agere etiam cum eo 
qul mandavlt, ut sibi pecuniam daret ad faciendum, maxime 
si 1am quaedam ad faciendum p arav lt.1
{83) Scott has 'from'.
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Therefore he can lega lly be paid, even against my consent. But 
when I have ordered my debtor to pay someone a fter rny death, 
payment w ill not be lega lly made, because the mandate is 
annulled by death.'
The d ifficu lty  lie s  in the fact that the f ir s t  2 texts appear to 
allow the va lid ity  of a maridtfte to be performed a fte r the mandant's 
death, while the third text appears not to.
Cujacfus*8^  takes the view that the third text is the result 
of words being copied in the wrong order. The la tin  text reads:
'£1 qui mandate raeo post mortem meam stipulatus est, recte 
solv itur, quia ta ils  est lex ob ligations: ideoque etiam Invito 
me recte el solv itur. E1 autem cui jussi debitorem meum post 
mortem meam solvere, non recte so lv itur; quia mandatum morte 
d isso lv itu r.'
He would emend the text as follows:
'E i qui martdato meo [post mortem Beam] stipulatus est, post 
mortem meam recte solvitur: quia t^ lis  est lex obligationTsT 
ideoque etiam Invito  me recte ei solv itur. £1 autem cui jussi 
debitorem meum [post mortem meam] solvere, post mortem meam non 
recte solvitur: quia mandatum morte d issolviturT1
He points out that in the case dealt with in the f ir s t  sentence 
the mandatary has, 1n execution of the mandate, entare-d into an 
agreement with a third party in terms of which payment is  to be made 
to the mandatary and payment must therefore be made to the mandatary 
whether or not the mandant is a live  and whether or not the agreement 
refers to payment to the mandatary after the mandant's death. 
Clearly, Cujacius1 suggested emendation of this sentence accurately 
’-eflects the position and eliminates the erroneous impression which 
might otherwise be obtained from the wording that payment can ewily 
valid ly be made to the mandatary a fter the mandant's death 1f the 
agreement with the third party expressly so provides.
(84) J  Cujacius Opera Omnia vol 4 (Naples 1758) Observationes 1.38.
In the case dealt with in the second sentence he sim ilarly takes 
the view that the words ' post mortem meam1 have been placed In the 
wrong position:
'Quae verba vldentur allena esse a prlncip lis  ju r is  c lv i l ls .  Nam 
si sim pliciter jussi debltorem meum solvere, fateor equidem 
extingui morte mandatum. At si jussl meum debltorem post mortem 
meam solvere, non video cur morte mandatum fin la tu r, quod in 
tempus mortis nominatim collatum e s t . ' I86'
This would certain ly bring the text into line  with the other Digest 
texts, and Justin ian 's  constitutions, referred to above.
Oonellus^^ takes a different view. He gives^87  ^ as the 
reason why a mandate lapses on the mandant's death that i t  is  
personal to the parties in that a mandate by its  nature is  
undertaken out of friendship for the mandant which may not extend to 
the mandant's heirs, and also In that the heirs may not want the 
task to be carried out by the mandatary and the mandant may 
reasonably be supposed not to have wished to impose the mandate on 
them. And a contract which is personal to the parties does not pass 
to the parties1 heirs.
He proceeds^*^ that this is so much so that even where the 
parties have agreed that the mandate is  not to lapse i t  nevertheless 
does so. The authority he quotes for tM s is the third Digest text
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{85) These words appear to be at variance with the principles of 
the dv<l law. For i f  I have merely ordered my debtor to make 
payment I concede that the mandate is terminated by death, 
but i f  I have ordered ny debtor to make payment after ity 
death, I do not see why the mandate is terminated by death, 
because i t  1s specifica lly postponed until the time of my 
death.
(86) H Donellus Opera Omnia Commentarlorum de lure C iv il i  vol 4 
(Lucca 1764) 16.i3.i3ff.
(87) 16.23.5. See too Vinnfus 3.27.10.1.
(88) 16.23.6.
:e
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quoted above, but he adds that i f  anyone disputes the text, as 
s e v e r a l h a v e  done, further support is to be had from another 
Digest text:
11.7.14.2 'Mela says that i f  a testator directs anyone to attend 
to his funeral and he does not do so after having received money 
for that purpose, an action on the ground of fraud shall be 
granted against him; nevertheless, I think, that he can be 
conpelled to conduct the funeral under the extraordinary 
authority of the P raeto r.1
The significance of this la tte r  text Hes in the fact that 1t refers 
to the actio de dolo (actio d o li) not the actio mandati. However, 
for the d ifficu ltie s  1n the way of drawing any Inference from this 
fact, reference may be made to Watson.
l 01 }
He then turns' ' to the f ir s t  2 Digest texts quoted above and
seeks to distinguish them from the third text and the additional 
text cited by h'!m on the ground that the f ir s t  2 texts deal with
(89) Oonellus refers to Accurslus by name and 3 others.
(90) Mandate 1S0-SU
‘Here 1t would seem that the deceased gave a mandate 
(mandaverlt) to X to bury hfm. X accepted and failed to 
carry out his instructions, and yet Mela w ill only give the 
actio de dolo. I f  there is 1n fact a mandate i t  must be 
unenforceable, otherwise the actio mandatl rather than the 
actio de dolo would be given, and the reason may be that i t  
1s a mpni tmandatum post-mortem] mandatorls. But equally the 
reason may be that the mandatum " is "s tm  integrum and there 
1s no Interesse in Its  performance. Also I t ’ is  possible 
that the principa ll s directions were contained 1n his w ill 
(although thfs does' not necessarily follow from the use of 
the word testator) and not made known to X until a fte r the 
testator's deaW. I f  this 1s the case 1t could not be 
regarded as a mandate.1
(91) 16.23.7.
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matters which do not concern the heirs*92* and therefore the 
mandates In question do not Vapse, while the matters dealt with 1n 
the seconJ 2 texts do concern the heirs and therefore the mandates 
in question do lapse. A payment due to the deceased no doubt 
concerns the heirs and he takes the view that the arranging of a 
funeral does likewise because 1t 1s the heirs' duty to arrange the 
funeral. On the other hand, he considers that the erection of a 
memorial does not concern the heirs because the ir duty does not go 
beyond arranging the funeral. Sim ilarly, he considers that a mandate 
to purchase a farm for the heirs does not concern them because the 
farm belongs to someone else. He accordingly concludes that mandates 
1n the la tte r  categories do not lapse on the mandant's death because:
‘ ...mandator 1n his etlam post mortem n ih il mandat de re aliena, 
sed sua: t  quod mndatarlus cusi id mandatum exsequetur, operam 
praestablt mandatori, non elus heredibus.. . . 1
But, with respect, the distinction Oonellus seeks to draw fa ils  to 
convince. In a ll 4 cases the mandate concerns the heirs financially 
because the cost of performing the mandate w ill come out of their 
inheritances, and 1t Is  unclear what other distinction can be drawn 
between what concerns them and what does not.
Oonellus also differs^9®* from the majority of the Roman-Outch 
writers in stating an important qualification to the rule that 
mandates lapse on the mandant's death, namely, that the rule only
(92) Ad heredes non pertlnet.
(93) ...th e  mandant in these cases mandates nothing after his death 
concerning another person's a ffa irs , but concerning his own, 
and because when the mandatary executes the mandate he 
performs a task for the mandant, not for his h e irs .. ..
(94) Cf too the d ifferent distinctions that Vfwrfus and Noodt seek 
to draw - see supra and Infra respectively.
(95) 16.23.8.
applies 1f the mandate Is  s t i l l  res integra 9^^  at the time of the 
death:
'Sed dura morte mandatorls fln le tu r mandatum, sicut In 
revocatione mandati, ita  hie quoque haec conditio est $J mors 
mandatorls re Integra seu integro mandato In te rvenerit.' ' 97'
This qualification existed 1n Roman Law^98  ^ and 1s explained[QO\
by Oonellus as follows:1 1
'Res Integra h1c accipienda est, quae 8 mandantf Integra est, & 
mandatarlo. Est autem mandatori Integra, cum nihildum 
intervenit, cur mandator quod mandarat, non posslt adhuc aeque 
commode per se aut per allum exsequi.... Mandatario res Integra 
est, cum nihildum ei per caussam mandati abest.1
Th<? e ffect of this approach in modern conditions where mandates 
are generally for the benefit of both parties would, i t  is
(96) Intact 1e nothing has yet been done about the matter.
(97) While a mandate w ill lapse on the death of the mandant8 as in 
the case of revocation of a mandate here too this is  subject 
to the condition that the death of the mandant occurs while 
the matter or mandate is  intact.
(98) Institu tes 3.26.10; Watson Mandate 129-30. Although only 4 of 
the 6 texts of the Corpus- iu ris  dealing with the question 
refer to the res Integra qualification Watson states:
'Often when two ju ris ts  deal with the saise topic, and one 
mentions a requirement and the other does not, and there is  
no evidence that the matter was disputed, the most probable 
explanation is that the la tte r, for one reason or another, 
did not mention i t  but would nevertheless hold i t  an 
essential.'
(99) 16,23,8.
(100) The matter must be accepted as being intact where i t  is  In tact 
as regards both the mandant and the mandatary. I t  is  intact as 
regards the mandant when nothing has taken place by reason of 
which the mandant cannot equally conveniently execute what he 
has mandated either himself or through another . . . .  I t  is  
Intact as regards the mandatary when he has incurred no loss 
as yet as a result of the mandate.
suggested, be to largely n u llify  the rule that mandates lapse on the 
mandant's death either because the executor or heir-- would be unable 
to equally conveniently perform the task themselves or to arrange 
for someone else to do so or because the mandatary would suffer some 
loss, i f  only of his p ro fit, I f  the mandate lapsed.*101^
The majority of the Roman-Outch writers do not refer to any such 
qualification of the rule that mandates lapse on the mandant's 
d e a t h , a l t h o u g h  V innlus^®^ is a notable exception:
si mandator integro adhuc mandato decesserit, didmus, 
mandatum soivi •••• Cur vero in utraque specie [ ie  lapsing on 
the mandant's death and lapsing on the mandatary's desth] 
additur, s1 re adhuc Integra mors intervenerlt? Non sane quod 
postquam res Integra esse d es iit, seu interesse coepit, morte 
a lterutrius intervenlente mandatum non solvatur, 8 adhuc libere 
perflci possit, quod coeptum est: sed quia obllgatio mandati & 
actfo ante mortem nata post mortem perseveraV Ut ecce, actio 
mandati statim competit, cum coepit interesse. E t ig itu r sive 
mandatarius decesserit, quo tempore jam interesse coeperat 
mandatoris, puta cum jam i l l e  eandem rem per alium explicare non 
poterat, si vs decesserit mandator: cum res non amplius Integra 
esset mandataHo, quod forte jam sumptus ad negotium exequendum 
necessarios fecisset, actio mandati semel a lte ru tri quaesita
(101) I t  my be that the res Integra qualification essentially 
merely refers to circumstances 1 in which, I f  one were 
approaching the matter from the point of view of the intention 
of the parties, lapsing would be Impliedly excluded.
(102) Some require that the mandate be res Integra 1n the case of 
lapsing on the mandatary’s death: Grotlus 3.12,11; Van der 
Keessel Voorleslnge th 573 d 11. See too Huber 3.12.44.
(103) 3.27.10.1 and 3, See too A V1nn1us Ju r isp ru d en ts  Contractae 
(Rotterdam 1664) 2.76.
(104) M Wesenbeck Para titla  (Amsterdam 1665) ad Digest 17.1.9 also 
mentions the requirement, but without’"^iscussion. Pothler, 
writing on French law, does likewise: Mandate paras 103-4.
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neiitrlus morte in te rdcS lt.' ( i05)
Although Vlnnius states that I t  Is only the obligation and action on 
mandate that continue where the matter 1s no longer res Integra on 
the mandant's death, and that the mandate I t s e lf  lapses, 1t 1s not 
clear whether he has 1n mind a d ifferent result from Qonellus.
Noodt argues*106  ^ in the f ir s t  instance that Inasmuch as a 
mandant must have an Interest in the performance of the mandate for 
the mandate to be v a l i d , a  mandate cannot survive the death 
of the mandant because he r;an have no Interest in its  performance 
a fter his death. He acknowledges that Justin ian abolished the rule 
that an obligatio could not corpulence 1n a heres, but takes the view 
this was not Intended to apply to mandate. He then draws a parallel 
between mandate and precar turn, deposit and partnership, a ll of
(105) . . .  1f the mandant dies while the mandate 1s s t i l l  In tact we 
say that the mandate lapses . . . .  Why is  there added in each 
case '1 f death occurs while the matter Is s t i l l  in tact1? Not 
indeed because the mandate does not lapse on the death of 
either party a fte r the natter has ceased to be intact or the 
interesse has commenced and what has been started can freely 
be completed, but because the obligation and action on mandate 
which have arisen before death continue a fte r death. As can be 
seen the action on mandate is competent when the interesse 
commences. Therefore 1f the mandatary dies after the mandant's 
Interesse has commenced eg I f  he is unable to arrange the same 
matter through another, or i f  the mandant dies when the matter 
Is  no longer in tact as regards the mandatary in that, perhaps, 
the mandatary has already incurred necessary expenses for the 
performance of the mandate, the action on mandate once having 
accrued to either party does 5t lapse on the death of either.
( 1 0 6 ) Observatlones 2.1.
(107) Digest 17.1.8.6.
which, he says, lapse on d e a t h . H e  considers, moreover, that 
Digest 46.3.108, being the third Digest text quoted above, makes the 
position clear.
As pointed out by Van den Heever J  in Ke lly 's  c a s e j1^  Noodt 
argues**10  ^ that the f ir s t  2 Digest texts quoted above are limited 
to mandates *1th sacrlstic  significance. He deals with the f ir s t  
t^xt as follows:
'Verum quod ad Ulpianuro [Digest 1 7 .1 .1 2 .1 7 ]  attlnet; (nam de eo 
primurn dicam) me Uberat respondendl verecundla, quod non 
proponit Ulplanus exemplum mandatae quallscumque post mortem 
reU  sed exemplum mandati post mortem monumenti. S i t  enim mi hi 
verlslm ile, Veteres in t a ll  mandato 4 sim lli quod ad funerarlam 
causam spectet, a certa Ju r is  egula idcirco recessisse: quod 
rigorem benignltate in f le c t l, suaderet publica u t llita s , ne
(108) I t  is  thought that the support to be derived from these 
analogies 1s doubtful eg a precarium (a thing the use of which 
has been granted gratuitously but is revocable at w il l )  is 
only a precarium because the parties have not agreed on a 
period of use~~le~~lapsing can be excluded by agreement. In any 
event, a closer analogy exists, i t  is thought, between mandate 
and locatio ccnductlo operarum and operls, neither of which 
lapses on tHi employer's loss o f  capacity - Digest 
1 9 .2 .1 9 .8 -1 0 ; Grotlus 3 .1 9 .1 6 ; Voet 1 9 .2 .2 7 ; Huber 3 .9 .1 2 ;  
Van der Unden 1 .1 5 .1 2 ; R J  Pothier Pothier's Treatise on the 
Contract of Letting and Hiring translated by (3 A Mulligan 
(burban 13S3) para 5 i/; Boyd v 5tuttaford 4 Co 1910 AD 101 at 
114-115; SR van Jaarsveld I  WN Coetzee Arbeldsreg 
(Johannesburg 1977) 22; but see De Wet 4 Yeats Kontraktereg 
157. In fact, several of the authorities state tfiat Tt 
remuneration Is  ..stipulated for, a contract wljfch would 
otherwise be one of mandate is  ipso facto one of locatio 
conductio operarum - Grotlus Vah der Linden 17T57RT 
Pothier Mandate~para 22. Huber 3 .1 2 .6  and 7 states that 1t 1s 
either 'verhuiring1 or an Innominate contract. Cf too Voet 
1 7 .1 .2 .
(109) See 52 above.
(110) Observations 2 .2 .
6 9 .
1 nsepulta jacerent cadavera; atque, ut Papinianus a it  suirnia 
ratio  esset quae pro religione fa c it . Nempe credebat vetustas, 
ineptae plena superstitionis, m1>errimam defunctorum, quamdiu 
insepulti essent, conditionem esse: non enim venire, n is i post 
sepulturam, ad placidas in morte sedes; sed errare centum 
annos..••
'Sed apparet Veterum superstftio ; sin/1 ratio  d ifferentiae Inter 
mandatum de facienda quail quali re post mortem, 4 quod ad 
sepulchrl monumentive procurationem pertineat: aiterum, quia 
mandantem nec commodo a f f ic i t ,  nec incommodo, non videtur 
mandati forma continere: aiterum contra, auia ejus salutem 
tra h it, ut valeat, relig ion i convenit
He sim ilarly lim its^ *2* the second text:
'Transeo ad Gajum [Digest 17.1.13]. Verba Gaji. Idem est & si 
mandavi t ib i,  ut post mortem meam heredibus meis emeres fundum."
(111) As fa r as Ulpian is  concerned ( I  shall discuss him fv rs t ), I 
suggest, with respect, that he is  not setting out an instance 
o f any fcfrrd of mandate whatsoever a fte r death, but an Instance 
of a mandate for a memorial after death. For i t  looks to ttte as 
i f  fn a mandate of that type the old authorities had made an 
exception to the noriral legal principle precisely because the 
mandate had regard to funeral arrangements: that in f le x ib ility  
was mitigated on the grounds that public policy required that 
bodies should not be le f t  lying about unburied; and, as 
Papinlan says, the strongest reason is  that which Is based on 
the observance of religious rites . There is  no doubt that the 
ancients, fu ll of foolish superstitions, believed the 
condition of the departed to be most wretched as long as they 
were unburled, for they would not reach a place where they 
could rest in peace in death until a fter burial but would 
wander for 100 years. . . .  But the superstition of the ancients 
1s apparent: at the same time the'reason is  apparent for the 
difference between a mandate to do anything whatsoever after 
death, and one which relates to arranging for a tomb or a 
memorial: the form of a mandate does not seem to enconpass 
the one, because 1t is  neither to the advantage nor 
disadvantage of the mandant; on the other hand, the other is 
suited to religion, because i t  brings his safety, that he may 
be well . . . .  ’
(112) Obseryatforces 2.3.
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fe r t  autem mea opinio, continuari a Gajo quaestionem, ab Ulpiano 
[Digest 17.1.12.17] Inchoatam; 4 hoc Indlcari primls Gaji 
verbis, Idem est 4 sf_. Ita  non loquitur Gajus de mandato, quo 
quis in genere jubeatur, fundum heredibus emere post mortem 
mandatoris; sed fundum ad hereditarlum monumentum.'
He further suggests that an error in transcription occurred and that 
' heredibus meis' should read ' heredltarlo monumento',  both of which 
would have been abbreviated HM, abbreviations being coranon in early 
la tln  texts.
Which approach 1s to be preferred: that the parties are free tc 
exclude lapsing or that the ir right to do so is  restricted? Tne 
answer is , 1t 1s thought, that the former approach .» 
preferable. Not only does i t  enjoy the support of the;
majority of the Roman-Dutch authorities but also i t  better servos 
the needs of parties to contracts of mandate.
The desirab ility of parties' being able to contract on the basis 
that the mandate w ill not automatically lapse i f  the mandant ceasest 
to have capacity to act 1s, I t  1s thought, manifest. For exaifytle. 
the mandant may have negotiated for the services concerned to he 
rendered on favourable terms which cannot be matched by simply
{113) I new come to Gaius. Gaius1 words are: 'The position is the 
same i f  I told you to buy a property after my death for my 
h e irs .1 My view, however, is  that Gaius was continuing the 
subject le f t  unfinished by Ulpian and that this 1s shown by 
Gaius1 f ir s t  words, namely 'The position is the same, i f  
Gaius 1s not talking about s mandate in which anyone is 
ordered in general to buy a property after the mandant s death 
for his heirs, but (to buy) a property as an hereditary 
memorial.
{114) This is  the view of Wessels Contract # 1675 and Kerr Agency 
200 - 201. Joubert Law of South Africa vol 17 'Mandate and 
Negotiorum Gestio' does not deal with the question (see § 16},, 
Cf too ^e Wet 4 Yeats Kontraktereg 343; De V il l ie rs  & 
Macintosh Agency 627-32; Joubert* Verteenwoordiglngsreg 3,32.
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placing the mandate elsewhere and in any event the delay th is may 
cause may i t s e lf  be prejudicial. Sim ilarly, the mandatary may have 
turned down other mandates in the meantime or may have negotiated a 
favourable rate of remuneration which also cannot simply be replaced 
by obtaining another mandate, etc.
The alternative approach of restricting  the parties' right to 
exclude lapsing is fraught with d ifficu ltie s . Not only do the views 
of the authorities who support such an approach vary on what the 
scope of the restriction  is ,* i i5  ^ but in addition the concomitant 
of this approach is the technical and ill-defined res integra 
qualification of the rule that mandates lapse on the mandant's loss 
of capacity. I t  is  fa r better, i t  is  thought, to opt for the f ir s t  
approach which has been shorn of the techn icalities of Roman law and 
which simply gives e ffec t to what the parties agree.
I t  is  true that i t  is  d if f ic u lt  to reconcile this approach 
Digest 46.3.108, although i t  may be that the text should be emended 
as Cujacius suggests, or that even i f  i t  is not so emended i t  can 
s t i l l  be read in the way Cujacius wants. I f  not, the text should, i t  
is  thought, be taken as reflecting the law at the time Paulus 
o rig inally wrote the text and not at the time of the compilation of 
the Corpus lu r is , i t  not being uncommon that the compilers 
overlooked updating a text to re flec t reforms of the law enacted by 
Justinian.
(115) See eg the varying views of Noodt, Vlnnius and Donnellus dealt 
with above.
(116) Cf W Kunkftl An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional 
History translatecTBy J  M Kelly 2nd ed (Oxford iy/dj it>8:
‘There were supposed to be neither contradictions nor 
confusions in [the Corpus lu r is ] . Every leg isla tor tends to 
believe this of his work, but; hardly any has entertained 
(footnote continued on next page)
I t  follows that the rule that mandates lapse on the mandant's 
loss of capacity 1s a naturale of the contract of mandate which can 
be excluded by agreement and that the rule 1s therefore not a bar to 
the interpretation of the bank customer contract to the effect that 
’ a cheque or other payment instruction is  fu lly  effectual as between 
bank and customer until the bank becomes aware of the customer's 
loss of capacity.
(11) The rule that offers lapse on the offeror's loss of capacity
Where a cheque 1s drawn or another payment instruction Is givers 
outside the scope of any cred it in the customer's account and of any 
overdraft fa c il it y  granted by the bank, the cheque or papent 
instruction is 1n the f ir s t  instance an offer to borrow/117  ^ and 
the general rule is  that offers lapse on the offeror's loss of 
capacity to a c t/ 118' This gives rise to the question whether such
{Footnote continued from previous page)
such illusions about the perfection of his work as did 
•Justinfart and his cowpfJers. Considering the casuistic 
nature and the monstrous dimensions of the materials they 
had to handle, and the speed with which the gigantic 
undertaking was completed, numerous weaknesses were 
unavoidable. Even where Justinian carried out planned 
reforms, traces of the older state of the law often 
remained in more or less hidden corners.'
(117) See 20 above.
(118) Grotius 3.1.6; Voet 5.1.73; Wessels Contract ## 241-250. The 
reason for the lapsing of the offer fs th a tth e  offeror lacks 
the capacity to form the requisite w ill at the time the 
contract would come into existence, thus preventing consensus 
ad idem. I t  may he noted, however, that De Wet "T ~ 7 ia t i 
Kbntraktereg 31 1n dealing with the effect of an offeror's 
aeatn on the offer dispute this reasoning. They contend that 
the continued existence of an offer does not depend on the 
continued intention of the offeror, as is evidenced by the 
fact that mere Intention to revoke is  ineffective i f  i t  is not
(Footnote continued on next page)
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lapsing can be excluded by agreement between the parties, because 1f 
i t  cannot 1t would not be possible in our law for a cheque or 
payment instruction to remain effectual In this respect on the 
customer's loss of capacity to act.
The answer to this question 1s, 1t Is  considered, that lapsing 
of an offer on the offeror's loss of capacity to act can be excluded 
by agreement between the parties. The question of whether an option
(Footnote continued from previous page)
communicated to the offeree, and that therefore the reason 
generally given for the lapsing of an offer on the offoror's 
death is  invalid . (Cf too the position in Germanic law where 
the rule 'Belofte maakt schiild' prevailed - J  M van Dunne 
Mormatieve u itieg  van rechtshandel fngert (Deventer 1971) 
lu o f f . ) "lie "ket & Yeats nevertheless reacn the same conclusion 
that an offer lapses on the offeror's death on the basis that 
i f  the offer has not been accepted before the offeror's death 
there Is  no l ia b i l i t y  which can be proved in the estate.
The distinction between the 2 approaches becomes important 
when one seeks to determine the e ffect on an offer i f  the
• offeror ceases to have capacity to act due to insanity, 
fnabflity to mnage one's a ffa irs  or prodigality. On the 
traditional approach the loss of capacity w ill prevent 
consensus ad Idem ju s t as e ffec tive ly  as death, but on De Wet 
Sweats' approach i t  is considered that there would, unlike in 
the case of death, be no cut-off point at which the person's 
estate is administered and that i t  would follow that there 
would be no basis for holding tnat the o ffer lapses: E Kahn 
'Some Mysteries of Offer and Acceptance' (1955) 72 SALJ 246 at 
270. On sequestration and winding-up, on the other hand, there 
would be such a cut-off point - see chapter 4 (a t 161ff).
Kahn op c i t  271 states that appealing though the reasoning of 
the authors is , 11. may be considered very doubtful i f  our 
courts w ill accept a solution of so novel a character. One can 
but agree: the authority for the lapsing of an offer on the 
offeror's loss of capacity to act Is  too exp lic it for the 
courts to disregard i t  - c f, however, the development in this 
area 1n France and the Netherlands despite the traditional 
authority that offers necessarily lapse on the offeror's loss 
of capacity: see lOSff below.
lapses on the grantor's death arose 1n Van der Pol v Symington 6 
Anor^119  ^ and Hiemstra J  held :
'n Opsie is  'n onherroeplike aanbod om te verkoop. D lt verval 
nle met die dood van die aanbieder nfe, en is 'n verbintenis wat 
ln las teen sy boedel bly . . . '
I t  is  considered that there is  no reason why this reasoning should 
be limited to options or to death, and that therefore any agreement 
that an offer w ill not lapse on the offeror's loss of capacity to 
act 1s v a lid .(120)
(111) Is  i t  legally possible for a c- • ’e ‘drawn* or other 
payment instruction 'given1 a fte r customer's loss of 
capacity to function as a cheque or payment instruction?
Where the customer'ij loss of capacity occurs not merely before a 
cheque or payment instruction 1s honoured but before i t  is  even
(119) 1971(4) SA 472{T) at 473H. See too Costaln & Partners v Sodden 
NO & Anor 1960(4) SA 456(SR) at 45t»i:-rT M  Kerr~The Principles 
o f the Law of Contract 3rd ed (Durban 1980) 44 considers that 
some doubt-  1s raised by the discussion In Stofberg v Estate 
van Rooyen & Hamel Town Council 1928 OPD 38 at 4z; however, in 
that case- the court”  was concerned with the question of what 
the effect is  of a grantor's death on an option for an 
unspecified period and, while finding i t  unnecessary to decide 
this question, the court appears to have accepted that a 
grantor's death would have no effect on an option for a 
specified period. With respect, the true pos'ftfon Is  that no 
option, whether for a specified or iinspecifled period, lapses 
merely by reason of the death of the offeror, unless 1t 1s a 
term, whether express or Implied, that I t  w ill do so. I f  the 
option is  for an unspecified period terminable, say, on 
reasonable notice, notice w ill s t i l l  be necessary even 1f the 
offeror dies.
(120) Cf too the la s t  paragraph on 75 below.
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'drawn' or 'given' the question arises as to whether it is legally 
possible for such a 'cheque' or 'payment instruction' to be fully 
effectual as between the bank and customer.
In the ordinary course a document signed by a person who has 
ceased to have capacity to act, eg because he is insane, would be a 
nullity. But does it inevitably follow that in the context of the 
bank customer contract it must also be a nullity? The answer is, it 
is considered, in the negative.
A separate authority for each payment 1 s only necessary to the 
extent required by the bank customer contract. No separate authority 
•‘ould eg be necessary where in terms of the bank customer contract 
ft 1s agreed that regular payments are to be nv N >v the bank to a 
third party or that payment is to be made S=iga1ns presentation of a 
claim by a third party. It follows that ft is not an Inevitable 
requirement of the law that a cheque or other payment instruction 
must be a valid separate authority: ft is a matter of 
interpretation of the bank customer contract as to whether this 1s 
required or whether the bank's authority arises from some other fact 
or circumstance, such as that the cheque or payment instruction 
appears to be regular 1 t< all respects and the bank has no knowledge 
of any fact or circumstance rendering It irregular.
Cheques arid other payment instructions function, depending on 
the circumstances, as demands, the exercise of options, offers to 
borrow and directions regarding to whom payment is to be made. Could 
it be argued that this gives rise to a conceptual difficulty in that 
1t would not seem possible that a person who has ceased to have 
capacity to act can make a demand, exercise an option, make an offer 
or gfve such a direction? The answer Is, ft fs thought, that the 
bank customer contract should not be seen as 1n fact rendering a 
cheque 'drawn' or other payment instruction 'given' after the 
customer's loss of capacity an actual demand, etc, but as entitling
the parties to be placed 1n the same position they would have been 
in had it been a valid demand, etc.
(1v) Is it a term, either as a naturale or as an implied term, 
of the bank customer contract that the bank's duty and 
authority only terminate when the bank becomes aware of the 
customer's loss of capacity?
In view of the conclusion reached 1n the preceding sections that 
there- is no legal bar to the inclusion of a term in the bank 
customer contract that cheques and other payment Instructions are 
fully effectual as between bank and customer until the bank .becomes 
aware of the customer’s loss of capacity to act, it is appropriate 
to return to the central question, namely : Does the bank customer 
contract contain such a term?
Contractual terms may arise in 3 ways:*121* th^y may be 
naturalia of the contract in question which automatically apply 
unless excluded by agreement, they may be express‘iy agreed upon and 
they may be lulled from the facts relating to the particular 
contract tn question. The principal sources of naturalia are 
legislation and the old authorities but, as will be shown below, new 
naturalia may be recognised by the courts. Express terms arise f>-om 
the express agreement of the parties. Implied terms^12^  arise l*y 
necessary Implication from the facts relating to the particular 
eontract 1n question. Trade usage and custom play an important role 
Jn the recognition of new naturalia and of Implied terms.
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(121) Cf Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial 
Admfn'1 stratTon 1D 74T 3 } SA~i>Q6 (A) at 531 S-h; Kerr contract 
23b; rii Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa’ luurban 
1981) 146ff.
(122) Often called tacit terms - see the Alfred McAlpjne case supra.
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In practice banks do not stipulate for an express term in the 
bank customer contract that cheques and other payment Instructions 
arc fully effectual as between bank and customer until the bank 
becomes aware of the customer's loss of capacity to act. It is 
therefore necessary to examine whether such a term is a naturale of 
the bank customer contract and, 1f not, whether such a term can be 
inplied in any particular bank customer contract from the facts 
relating to that contract.
Both the Bills of Exchange Act and the Roman and Roman-Dutch 
authorities are silent on the point under consideration; however, 
although legislation and the old authorities are the most important 
sources of the naturalla of contracts, they are not the only sources;
'Die begrlp "stilswyende beding" word in meer as een betekenls 
gebruik. Die tot dusver aanvaarde betekenls is eon waarvolgens 
die bestaan van die beding gefundeer word op die onuitgedrukte 
bedoeling, of vemoedelike bedoeling, van die partye. Dit dien 
onderskei te word van ‘n natural urn (sic) van 'n kontrak wat 
vanaf regswee geld tensy die werking daarvan ultgesluit 1s deur 
ooreenkonts (hetsy ultdruklik of stilswyend) van die partye. Die 
naturalia van verskillende kontraksoorte kan, wat die 
Suid-Atrftaanse reg betref, in hoofsaak teruggevoer word na 
begrippe van redelikheid en billikheid wat 1n die Romeinse reg 
ontwikkel het, maar kan 1n 'n lewende regstelsel n1e as 'n 
numerus clausus beskou word nie. By die aanpasslng van die reg 
by veranderde omstandighede en nuwe behoeftes kan dus steeds by 
Wyse van analogic addisionele naturalia erken
(per Van Heerden AJA, as he then was, in A Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd v 
Becker & Others*1231).
That the courts have the power to adapt and develop the law has 
been frequently recognised by the courts.*1241 Schreiner JA
(123) 1981(3) SA 406 (A) at 419F-G.
(124) See generally Hahlo & Kahn Legal System 304ff.
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expressed the position as follows 1n Die Spoorboiid & Anor v South 
African Railways:(12S)
'Mo doubt where new needs require that new remedies should be 
devised or that the scope of the old ones should be extended 
there is sufficient elasticity in our law to provide therefor 
within its basic principles.'
A recent reaffirmation of this principle Is to be found in Braun v 
Slann & Botha WHO & Anor^ 6 ' in which Joubert JA said;
'I now turn to considtr whether or not our common law powers of 
appointment should be extended to trustees .... It is one of the 
functions of our law to keep pace with the requirements of 
changing conditions 1n our society. To recognize the validity of 
conferring our common law powers of appointment on trustees to 
select income and/or capital beneficiaries from a designated 
group of persons would be a salutary development of our law of 
trusts and would not be in conflict with the principles of our 
Jaw. The approach of our Courts is to ^pply the principles of 
our law to the development of our law of crusts. 1
The principles on which the courts exercise this function are 
justice, convenience and social policy/127' but it must not be 
understood from this that the courts will lay down a new rule 
whenever it would be just or convenient to do so:
‘The matter was well put by Jadge Tanaka, of Japan, 1n the 
I n t e r n ^ ^ a l  Court of Justice in one of the South-West Africa
(125) 1946 AD 999 at 1013, See too Oanlels v Daniels 1958(1) SA 
513(A) at 522G - 523B. ---------------------
(126) 1084(2} SA 850(A) at 866D and 866H - 877A.
(127) See eg the Spoorbond case supra at 1012; Essa v Oivaris 
.1947(1) SA 753(A) at 765 andT/j^B; Union Government v ocean 
Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd l a a c m  sa 5//1A) at 
534H and 587F; Hahlo~l Kahn Legal Syste?  314-317.
(128) South Host Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v 
South Africa) Second Phase ICJ Reports 1966. 6 at 277.
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"We cannot deny the possibility of some degree of creative 
element in ... judicial activities. What 1s not permitted 
to judges, 1 s to establish law Independently of an existing 
legal system, Institution or norm."
Many years ago an eminent English judge, Stephen J., put the 
attitude of judges thus:^i29'
"... in exercising the narrowly qualified power of quasi 
legislation which the very nature of our position confers 
upon us, we ought to confine ourselves as far as possible 
(there may be cases where such a course 1s not possible) to 
applying well-known principles and analogies to new 
combinations of facts or to supplying to general 
definitions, and maxims, or to general statutory 
expressions qualifications, which, though not expressed, 
are, in our opinion, implied.1'
In short, then, 1t is only in a secondary sense that a judge 
makes law. He fashions it as far as possible out of materials at 
hand. He does not conceive himself as having, like Parliament, a 
tabula rasa, a blank sheet on which he may wrfte as he wills. By 
training and tradition he damps down the law-creative side of 
his activities.’U30)
The development of the law by the extension of a principle to a 
new, analogous combination of facts is, as Stephen >3 points out, the 
obvious way 1n which the courts may develop the law. However, this 
approach Is not available in relation to the present Inquiry because 
there is no analogous principle which could be extended to the bank 
customer contract. Is there then some other basis on which the 
courts could conclude that it is ^ laturale of the bank customer 
contract that cheques and other payment instructions are fully 
effectual as between bank an<i customer until the bank becomes aware 
that the customer has ceased to have capacity to act? The answer is, 
It is suggested, in the affirmative, but it is convenient to first 
consider whether there is a basis for Implying such a term from the 
facts and then to return to this question.
(129) The Queen v Coney S Others (1832) 8 QBO 534 at 55i.
(130) Hahlo A Kahn Legal System 306.
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The cases abound in formulations of the test for the implication 
of terms from the f a c t s , b u t  2 of these formulations are 
clear favourites. The first of these 2 formulations had its origin 
in Hanilyn & Co v Wood & C o ^ 3g  ^ but has bren repeatedly adopted In 
this c o u n t r y . ^ ^ ” ln this case Lord Esher MR s a i d : ^ ^
the Court has no right to imply in a written contract any 
such stipulation, unless, on considering the terms of the 
contract in a reasonable and business manner, an Implication 
necessarily arises that the parties must have Intended that the 
suggested stipulation should exist. It is not enough to say that 
it would be a reasonable thing to make such an implication. It 
must be a necessary implication 1n the sense that I have 
mentioned.'
In the same case Kay Id sald:^*3^
the Court ought not. to imply a term in a contract unless 
there arises from the language of the contract itself, and the 
circumstances under which 1t Is entered into, such an inference 
that the parties must have Intended the stipulation in question 
that the Court is necessarily driven to the conclusion that it 
riust be implied.‘
The second formulation had its origin in Reigate v Union 
Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) ltd & Anor^1^  but has also ‘ieen
(131) See generally Christie Contract 156 ff.
(132) [1831] 2 QB 488 (CA).
(133) See eg Union Government (M in ister o f Railways and Harbours) v 
Faux Lfd ai) “ iusj al He!;~ Adniini'strator ( iransvaa lT " v 
Indu stria l & Commercial Umber 4 Supply Co Ltd L932 "AO K~~at 
32; MulHn TFtv) Ltd v GenadeTtT 1952111 'S'A 'TTI (A) at 214E.
(134) At 491.
(135) At 494.
{136} [19183 X KB 592 (CA). -
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repeatedly adopted in this c o u n t r y . I n  this case Serutton LJ 
said:*1381
'A term can only be -implied if it is necessary frt the business 
sense to give efficacy to the contract; that is, 1f it is such a 
term that it can confidently be said that if at the time the 
contract was being negotiated some one had said to the parties, 
"What will happen in such a case," they would both have replied, 
"Of course, so and so will happen; we did not \roub1e to say 
that; it Is too clear." 1
This formulation of the test is often stated even more stringently, 
as 1n MacKinnon L J ‘s formulation 1n Shirlaw v Southern Foundries 
(1926) Ltd:11391
'Prima. facie that which In any contract is left to be implied' 
and need not be expressed 1 s something so obvious that it goes 
without saying; so that, if, while the parties were making their 
bargain, an officious bystander were to suggest some express 
provision for it in their agreement, they would testily suppress 
hiisi wit'n a common "Oh, of course!"’
The first fansulation is, with respect, to be preferred.
The second fonaulatlon is too stringent in 2 respects. Firstly, as 
Wessels ACJ, as he then was, said in Administrator (Transvaal) v 
Industrial & Commercial Timber & Supply Co Ltd:*141*
(137) See eg Barnabas Plein & Co v Sol Jacobson & Son 1928 AO 25 at 
31; Administrator (Transvaal) vTndustrial & Commercial Timber
Su^ly^^Co^Lt^ 1932 AD 25 at 32-3; Van den Berg v Tenner
(138) At 605.
(139) [1939] 2 KB 206 (CA) at 227.
(140) But see AJ Kerr 'Implied Provisions in Contracts' (1974) 91 
SALJ 121.
(141) 19,"2 AD 25 at 33. See also Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) 
Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Lt<Ti&78(4) SA 901~~(N) at 9Q9E.
'The Court is to determine from all the circumstances what a^ 
reasonable and honest person who enters into such a transaction 
would have done (The italics have been added.)
In other wo^ds, it is not the answer of the actual contracting 
parties to the officious bystander's question that is relevant but 
the answer honest and reasonable contracting parties would have 
given. Secondly, Scrutton LJ's and MacKinnon Li's formulations 
appear to imply a degree of spontaneity in the answer to the 
officious bystander's question, which, with respect, is
unnecessary. It aiaj *ell be that one, or even both, of the 
contracting parties w o u H  only have concluded that the term was 
necessary to give efficacy to their cofttract after careful 
considefation and possibly even with consitfsrab'is reluctance, but 
this would seem to be inadequate reason for refusing to imply a term 
which is necessary and which reasonable parties would have 
recognised to be necessary after due consideration.
The c o m o n  denominator of both formulations of the test is that 
the term sought to be implied must be necessary and not merely 
reasonable. When can a term be said to be 'necessary'? If the 
contract would be frustrated without the term, the term is clearly 
necessary, but it does not follow that this is the only situation in 
which a term will be Implied:
‘Mr. M I H i n  argued that this term cannot be implied unless the 
agreement would be frustrated without it. This argument is based 
on statements In judgments such as that, e.g., by 
Scrutton, L.J., in Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co. (1918,
1 ■<’..%> 592) that "a term can” only be implied if it is necessary 
iii ».ho business sense to give efficacy to the contract." If this 
test were applied, it could be said that the defendants have not 
proved conclusively that the object of the lease could not have 
been achieved unless fawcus got the licence moneys; but, on the 
other hand, it has not been proved that such object could have 
been achieved unless he got the licence moneys, because, as it 
turned out, the Government stipulated for a share of such moneys
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as the price for making possible the laying out of the ground in 
stands. I think Mr. Millin's argument puts the matter too 
narrowly, i prefer to apply the test adopted by the Privy 
Council in Douglas v. Baynes (1908, T.S. 1207), namely, whether 
there- arises from tRe language of the contract and the 
circumstances [1n] which it was entered into, an Inference that 
the parties must have intended the stipulation 1n question which 
draws the Court necessarily to the conclusion that it must be 
implied. The fact Is that when a court of law implies a term 1n 
a contract it draws an Inference as to what the intention of the 
parties was. It 1s not sufficient that the Inference is 
reasonable; It must be necessary. But it is going too far to 
say, in a case like the present, that the Inference can only be 
necessary 1f it 1s shown that Fawcus could not have laid out the 
land in stands unless the lease gave him the stand licence 
moneys'
(per Tindall J, as he then was, in Van Boeschoten & Lorentz v
Minister of Hines & A n o r ^ *).
This is well illustrated by Administrator (Transvaal) v 
Industrial & Commercial Timber & Supply Co L t d / * ^  The 
respondent had applied for and been granted permission to lay out a 
township on certain land. Prior to the grant trading had been 
prohibited on the property except under permit. The respondent had 
sought and been refused a permit. The effect of proclamation of the 
township was that the trading restriction fell away in the absence 
of provision to the contrary. One of the conditions of the approval 
of the township was that erven should be transferred subject to the 
condition that business would not be conducted thereon, but the 
conditions contained no express provision prohibiting the respondent 
a- township owner from trading on the property pending the transfer 
of erven and the question in issue was whether such a condition 
could be implied. The court held that it could. Clearly, it was 
reasonable on the facts to imply the condition, but it would be 
wrong to say that the condition was necessary: the grant was fully
(143) 1933 TPD 169 at 177-8.
(144) 1932 AD 25. The case did not relate to contract but 1t is 
thought that the principle is the same.
effectual without it. All that could be said to be necessary was 
that the facts necessarily gave rise to the Inference that the 
grantor intended to prohibit trading by all persons on the property 
and that the respondent would necessarily have agreed to such a 
condition had the question been raised at the time.
It is no doubt questions such as these which caused Lord 
Denning MR to challenge the accepted tests 1n Liverpool City Council
'It is often said that the courts only Imply a term in a 
contract when it is reasonable iind necessary to do so in order 
to give business efficacy to the transaction .... Or when tt is 
obvious that both parties must have intended it: so obvious 
indeed that If an officious bystander had asked them whether 
there was to be such a term, both would have suppressed it 
testily: "Yes, of course"....
'Those expressions have been repeated so often that it is with 
some trepidation that I venture to question them. I do so 
because they do not truly represent the way in which the courts 
act. Let me take some instances ....
'If you read the discussion in those cases, you will see that in 
none of them did the court ask: what did bo< parties intend? If 
asked, each party would have said he never 9; .• it a thought: or 
the one would have intended something different from the other. 
Nor did the court ask: Is it necessary to give business efficacy 
to the transaction? If asked, the answeir would have been: "It is 
reasonable, but it 1s not necessary." The judgments in all those 
cases show that the courts implied a term according to whether 
or not it was reasonable in all the circumstances to do so.'
Lord Denning'? judgment was a dissenting judgment and the House of 
L o r d s ^ ® *  expressly rejected his substitution cf a test of
(145) [1976] QB 319 (CA) at 329F-330F. See too Lord Denning The 
Discipline of the Law (London 1979) 32ff; The Closlnq Chaotir
'(London 1963) 91ff.
85.
reasonableness for the test of necessity (although it nevertheless 
upheld his conclusion on the ground that t*- term sought to be 
Implied was necessary).
What conclusion is to be drawn from the aforegoing-? The answer 
is, It is suggested, that the range of circumstances 1n which it may 
be necessary to imply a term in a contract Is too broad to admit of 
a single test which will apply In all citrumstances.*1471 In any 
event it is unnecessary for present purposes to endeavour to 
formulate a test or tests to cover all circumstances. What is 
necessary is to formulate a test which governs the issue under 
consideration. The following approach is suggested.
It Is not practicable for banks to investigate whether customers 
still have capacity to act before honouring each and every cheque 
or other payment instruction. If they were to attempt to do so not 
only would they be unable to fulfil their normal obligation to 
honour cheques at once,*14® 1 but also banking would necessarily be 
seriously disrupted. It follows, it is considered, that the 
implication necessarily arises that 1n order to give business 
efficacy to the contract the parties, as reasonable contracting 
parties, did not intend the bank to verify the customer's capacity 
to act before honouring each cheque or other payment Instruction.
(147) As Lord Wilberforce pointed out In the House of Lords in the 
Liverpool City Council case (at 253f) 'there are varieties of 
i'nipJ'fcationswh 1 ch "fhe courts think fit to make and they do 
not necessarily involve the same process'. See too at 254A 
where he says: 'The present case, in my opinion, represents a 
fourth category, or I would rather say a fourth shade on a 
continuous spectrum1.
(148) freeman v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1905 TH 26 at 30; 
Bank of England v Vagllano Brothers LlffilJ AC 107 at 157; The 
Governor and Company of 'bank of "ffaroda Ltd v Punjab NationaT 
Bank Ltd A Others 19^4 AC r?6 (PC) at 1847 but cf NationaVBank 
v Paterson W u a  VS 322 at 327. See generally Matan Bills of 
Exchange F 321. -
A similar conclusion was reached 1n an analogous situation by 
the Hong Kong Court of Appeal 1n the recent case of Tal H1ng Cotton 
Mill Ltd v L1u Chong Hlng Bank Ltd & Others/ 149  ^ The question 1n 
Issue was whether a customer 1s under a duty 'to take such 
precautions as a reasonable customer In his position would take to 
prevent forged cheques being presented to his bank for payment', or 
at least ‘to take such steps to check his monthly bank statements as 
a reasonable customer 1n his position would take to enable him to 
notify the bank of any items debited therefrom which were not or may 
not have been authorised by him.’ After reviewing the English cases, 
especially Liverpool City Councfl v Irwin & Anor/ 1,50* Cons JA 
concluded that a customer does owe Its bank such duties,
'It cannot be said that the imposition of a duty of care on the 
customer is absolutely essential to the relationship. The banks 
could I think manage to service current accounts without that 
assistance. So could, 1 think, the tenant of the high rise flats 
have managed to live there without the benefit of lifts, lights 
on the staircase or garbage chutes [a reference to the Liverpool 
City Council case]. But that did not deter their Lordships. They 
took a more practical view of necessity. They Inquired if the 
transaction would become "futile, Inefficacious or absurd" ff 
these amenities were not maintained. For my part 1 can think of 
little more futile than for the operator of an active bank 
account to tftrw hfs monthly statements in the waste paper 
basket without ever bothering to look at them; little irore 
inefficacious than to leave the operation of that account to a 
clerk whose work is never checked; and little more absurd than 
to expect the bank to Insure the honesty of the customer’s clerk 
when the customer deliberately puts into the clerk's hands the 
weapons with which he can plunder and rob the bank. It cannot be 
economically feasible nowadays for a bank to subject the 
signature on each and every cheque presented to a thorough 
examination or comparison with the specimen signature card.
(149) [1984J1 Lloyds LR S55(HK>,
(150) [1977] AC 239.
(151) At 560.
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Banks must look to other p r o t e c t i o n . T h u s ,  after a great 
deal of hesitation, I find myself finally led to the conclusion 
that, 1n the world In which we ?fye today, it is, a necessary 
condition of the relation of banker and customer that the 
customer should take reasonable care to see that 1n the 
operation of the account the bank 1s not Injured.'
It does not yet follow, however, that the parties necessarily 
Intended that cheques and other payment Instructions would be fully 
effectual as between bank and customer until the bank becomes aware 
of the customer's loss of capacity to act. It 1s 1n addition 
necessary to consider the possibility that the parties may have 
intended bank, and not the customer, to bear the risk arising 
from its not verifying the customer's capacity. In other words, 
although it is necessary to impty a term 1n the contract, there are 
2 possible terms that can be ImpH e d  and it 1s further necessary to 
determine whfch one of these 2 terns should be implied. The correct 
approach to this question 1s, it is bought, to inquire which of the
2 terms reasonable contracting parties would have intended/153^
The essence of this inquiry 1s to determine which party 
reasonable contracting parties would have intended should bear any 
loss arising out of the bank's not verifying the customer's 
capacity. If the outcome of the Inquiry is that the customer or his 
estate should bear the loss then a term is to be Implied in the bank 
customer contract that cheques and payment instructions are fully 
effectual as between bank and customer until the bank .tecomes aware 
of the customer's loss of capacity to act, but if the outcome of the 
inquiry is that the bank should bear the loss no such term will be 
implied.
(152) Cons JA should not, 1t is considered, be understood as 
intending to convey that banks need not check customers' 
signatures on their cheques; his point 1s that It 1s not 
practical for them to make a thorough examination of every 
signature and the risk they run as a result 1s a factor to be 
taken into account 1n determining whether or not the customer 
should be held to be under a duty to take reasonable care to 
avoid loss to the bank.
(153) But cf Lord Wllberforce's speech in the Liverpool City Council 
case supra at 254.
Who, then, should reasonably bear the loss If loss is suffered 
arising out of the bank's honouring a cheque or other payment 
instruction after the customer has ceased to have capacity to act? 
The answer is, it Is thought, that the customer should bear the 
loss. The loss of capacity is a circumstance relating to the 
customer, not the bank, and it follows, it is suggested, that prima 
facie the loss should fall on the customer. Further support for this 
approach 1s to be had from the fact that, as already pointed out, 
the bank is unable from a practical point of view to take any action 
to protect itself from the risk of loss, whereas in the case of the 
customer, the law provides the machinery for the appointment of a 
legal representative to take charge of the customer's estate and 
such representative 1s therefore in a position to tafce actfon to 
prevent or minimise loss to the customer's estate by notifying the 
bank of the customer's loss of capacity to act. ^  It follows, 
it is thought, that the risk of loss should properly fall on the 
customer and not the bank and that reasonable contracting parties 
would, after due consideration, readily accept this.^155*
(154) Even before the appointment of a legal representative, family, 
friends, business associates, creditors and others are in a 
position to, and in practice often do, notify the bank.
(155) A question which may be asked is whether ft could not be 
argued that the risk of losses arising from the honouring of 
cheques and other payment instructions after a customer has 
ceased to have capacity to act is a risk which is Inherent in 
the carrying on of the business of banking and which the bank 
accepts by carrying on business. The answer to this argument 
1s, It is thought, that 1t can equally well be argued that the 
customer accepts the risk of such losses by availing himself 
of the facilities offered by the bank. Another argument which 
may be raised is that a parallel can be drawn between losses 
arising from forgery and losses arising from the honouring of 
cheques and other payment instructions after the customer has 
ceased to have capacity -rt. However, it is doubted whether 
the analogy with *. s valid. Forgery is a fraud 
perpetrated on tfw xhe use of the customer's name is 
generally essentio-.v -■ Yantai: another customer's name 
would normally serve. ssme purpose. The loss, therefore, 
properly falls on the u,ik and not on the customer. In the 
case of losses arising from the customer’s loss of capacity to
(Footnote continued on next page)
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It follows 1n turn, it Is suggested, that It should be 
possible on the facts relating to any particular bank customer 
contract to imply a term that cheques and other payment Instructions 
will be fully effectual as between bank and customer until the bank 
becomes aware that the customer has ceased -to have capacity to act. 
This presupposes that the cheques and payment instructions are 
apparently regular in all respects, but subject to this they will be 
fully effectual as between the bank and the customer notwithstanding 
that the customer may have ceased to have capacity to act before 
they were honoured or even before they were drawn or given.
The question, however, remains as to whether such a term 
should not 1n any event be recognised as one of the naturalia of the 
bank customer contract, making it unnecessary to imply the term from 
the facts in each case. The disadvantage of having to Imply a term 
from the facts in each case is ffrstly that the term must be proved 
in every case where there is a dispute and secondly the term that 
is inplied may not be uniform 1n all cases. In the case of a highly 
standardised contract such as the bank, customer contract a more 
satisfactory approach is, it is thought, to regard such a term as a 
naturale of the contract.
The need for flexibility in regard to the recognition of new 
naturalia in contracts is, it 1s believed, clear. This is 
well-illustrated by the of trade usages. New trade usages are 
constantly developing am3 the law takes account of this by readily 
recognising that trade usages which have achieved a sufficient 
degree of uniformity and notoriety have been impliedly incorporated 
by parties in their contracts.*156* However, it would be an
(Footnote continued from previous page)
act, on the other hand, the losses do arise from a 
circumstance relating to the customer and there 1s accordingly 
no obvious reason why the losses should fall on the bank and 
not the customer.
(156) See eg Coutts v Jacobs 1927 EDL 120 at 127ff; Golden Cape 
Fruits (Pty) Ltd"~v~Totoplate (F>ty) Ltd 1973 (2) SA 642(C) at 
645H; Kerr Contract 237-9.
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exercise in futility to require such trade usages to be proved in 
every case In which a dispute arises; a vital legal system should 
obviate such an exercise 1n futility, and the means of achieving 
this 1s to recognise appropriate trade usages as naturalia of the 
contracts concerned. That a term arising from trade usage may become 
a naturale of the type of contract concerned, was recognised by 
Corbett A J A , ^ ^  as he then was, in Alfred McAlplne & Son (Pty) 
Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration:*1581
'Such implied terms [1e implied by law] may derive from the 
contnon law, trade usage or custom, or from statute. In a sense 
"Implied term" is, in this context, a misnomer in that in 
content it simply represents a legal duty (giving rise to a 
correlative right) imposed by law, unless excluded by the 
parties, 1n the case of certain classes of contracts. It is a 
naturalium (sic) of the contract 1ri question ....
'The implied term {in the above -ieffned s'” ' is essentially a 
standardised one, amounting to a rule p . which the Court 
will apply unless validly excluded by *' • • -Vact itself. While 
it may have originated partly in t»* .untractual intention, 
often other factors, such as legal policy, will have contributed 
to its creation.'
Similar considerations are, it is considered, equally applicable
where, as in the case under discussion, an implied term arises not
from f*'ade usage but from necessary Implication as to what
reas\ ->1e parties to a standard form of contract would have agreed 
(1591
in relation to the point In question.
(157) In a dissenting judgment but the dissent was not on this point.
(158) 1974(3) SA 506 (A) at SSitf and 5J2S; but cf Christie Contract 
150. ---------
(159) Cf Mears v Safecar Secu-~:y Ltd [1983] QB 54(CA) In which 
Stephenson LJ said (at i W ^ r l "
‘On examination Llvety ooj City Council v. Irwin [1977] A.C.
tenants Mr. and Mrs. Irwin. As ! 
their Lordships in Lister's case, 
(Footnote continued on next page)
ion, as helpful to the employee's 
aford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd.
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It follows, it is thought, that it should be recognised that It is a 
naturale of the bank customer contract that cheques and other 
payment instructions are fully effectual as between bank and 
customer until the bank receives notice of the customer's loss of 
capacity to act.
(v) Effect of such a term on the bank’s duty
A consequence of tnts Interpretation of the bank customer 
contract 1s that not only the bank's authority but also Its duty, if 
any, to honour a customer's cheques and other payment Instructions 
continues until 1t becomes aware of the customer's loss of capacity 
to act. This is likely to be of little practical significance 
because a bank 1s unlikely, except on the rarest of occasions, to 
dishonour a customer's cheques and payment instructions when it
{Footnote continued from previous page)
particularly those of Viscount Simonds at pp.576-579, and 
Lord Tucker at p.5H, and in Liverpool City Council v. 
Inyln C1977] A.C. 239, particularly tRose of Cortf 
vHTberforce at pp.254 and 255, Lord Cross of Chelsea at 
pp.257 and 258, Lord Edmund-Davies at pp.265 and 266 and 
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton at p.270, the House of Lords has 
laid down that there are contracts which establish a 
relationship, e.g. of master and servant, landlord and 
tenant, which demand by their nature and subject matter 
certain obligations, and those obligations the general law 
will Impose and Imply, not as satisfying the business 
efficacy or officious bystander tests applicable to 
commercial contracts where there is no such relationship, 
but as legal incidents of those other kinds of contractual 
relationship. In considering what obligations to imply Into 
contracts of these kinds which are not complete, the 
actions of the parties may properly be considered. But the 
obligation must be a necessary term; that is, required hy 
their relationship. It~"ls not1 enough that it would be a 
reasonable term. 1
It appears therefore that 1n England in the case of the 
established categorfes of contract the courts will more 
readily recognise a new natural Incident than they will imply 
a term from the facts. Whether our courts, as courts of law 
and not equity, will do likewise remains to be seen.
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stf7 7 believes that it 1s under a duty to honour them. However, 
should It do so and should the customer suffer loss as a result, the 
bank would be liable for the loss.
It may seem anomalous at first sight that the bank should be 
obliged to honour cheques and payment instructions which it would 
not be obliged to honour if 1t knew of the customer's loss of 
capacity, but It 1s suggested that this is not unreasonable. For 
exsmple, 8 customer may, either before or after ceasing to have 
capacity to act, draw a cheque in payment of an insurance premium in 
circumstances in which non-payment of the premium will result in 
cancellation of the policy. If the bank honours the cheque after the 
customer has ceased to have capacity to act It is entitled to a full 
Indemnity and It follows, 1t is considered, that If 1t dishonours 
the cheque without knowing that the customer has ceased to have 
capacity to act, the equftfes favour the customer's being entitled 
to claim his loss rather than the bank's being entitled to raise the 
customer's loss of capacity to act as a defence. The term to be 
Implied Is such tefTn as reasonable contracting parties would 
necessarily have agreed to had they applied their minds to the 
point, and it Is thought that what such parties would have agreed is 
that If the bank Is to enjoy the privilege of Its authority 
continuing despite the customer's loss of capacity to act its 
concomitant duty should likewise continue.
{vi) Position if the bank customer contract does not contain 
such a tern .
While it Is considered that the better view Is that the 
aforegoing interpretation of the bank customer contract is correct, 
the position is clearly not free from doubt and it is therefore 
appropriate to also consider what the consequences will be if the 
courts decline to recognise that it 1s either a naturale or an 
implied tern of the contract that cheques and other payment
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Instructions are fully effectual as between bank and customer until 
the bank becomes aware of the customer's loss of capacity to act.
In the absence of such a naturale or implied term it would, it 
fs considered, be necessary that each cheque or other payment 
instruction should constitute a valid separate authority in its own 
right failing which the bank would have no authority, and would not 
be under any duty, to honour the cheque or payment instruction. 
Bearing in mind that a cheque or other payment instruction may serve 
various functions depending on whether it is drawn or given within 
the scope of a credit in the customer's account, or within the scope 
of an overdraft facility granted by the bank, or outside the scope 
of either such a credit or such a facility, it follows that it is 
necessary to examine) firstly the effect of the customer's loss cf 
capacity to act on each such function and secondly the effect of the 
lapse of one function on the other functions served by the same 
cheque or payment instruction.
Fundamental to this examination, moreover, is the point in time 
at which the loss of capacity occurs: the consequences may be 
entirely different according to whether the loss of capacity occurs 
before a cheque is 'issued', or after it is issued but before it is 
received by the bank, or after it is received but before it is 
honoured or dishonoured. The point in time at which the bank becomes 
aware of the loss of capacity is likewise of fundamental importance.
The differing considerations applicable to each of these 
situations will be considered below.
(160) See I28ff below.
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(b) Capacity to receive payment where cheque Is drawn or payment
instruction 1s given In customer's own favour
Cheques and other payment instructions 1n the customer's own 
favour give rise to an additional problem 1n that 1f the customer 
has ceased to have capacity to act he lacks the necessary capacity 
to receive payment pursuant to the cheque or payment 
instruction.*1611 What, then, is the bank's position 1f it pays 
such a cheque or payment instruction to the customer and not to his 
legal representative?
The view has already been taken above'1621 that it is a term 
of the bank customer contract that apparently regular cheques and 
other payment instructions are fully effectual as between bank and 
customer until the bank becomes aware of the customer's loss of 
capacity to act, and if this view is correct such term would, it is 
suggested, encompass the receipt of payment by the customer and the 
payment .would be fully effectual despite the customer's tack of 
capacity-
If, however, this view is rejected, the position is more 
difficult because there is a surprising dearth of authority on what
(161) Performance of an obligation Is a bilateral act requiring 
capacity to act on the part of both parties: Grotius 3.39.14; 
Voet 4.4.22, 46.3.5; R J Pcthfer A Treatise on the law of 
Obligations, or Contracts translated Ely W u Evans (Dublin 
1806) para 468; Brath v~Mulder [1836) 1 Menz 207; Estate 
Delponte v Barnes 3 ffnor T9TO CPD 118 at 124; Matador 
Buildings (Pty) Ltd v HarmTn 1971(2) SA 21(C) at 25H; WesseTs 
Contract #Z156; De Wet & Yeats Kontraktereg 236; HR Hahlo The 
south ATrlcan Law of Husband and Wife 3th ed (Cape Town 197FT
(162) See 76-91 above.
a debtor's position is if he performs his obligations without 
knowledge that the creditor has ceased to have capacity to act. 
Y o e t / 163  ^ however, makes certain sfgnfffcant remarks fn dealing 
with the situation of a debtor who, after the death of his creditor, 
pays his debt not to the true heir but to a possessor of the 
i n h e r i t a n c e . V o e t  draws a distinction between the situation 
in which the debtor is negligent in paying the wronf party and the 
situation in which negligence is absent and proceeds:
'In the former case payment cannot avail to release, since a 
slack and studied Ignorance affords nobody an excuse, and no one 
ought to be ignorant of the condition of him to whom he pays, 
any more than of him with whom he contracts. But in the latter 
case good faith accompanied by a just mistake of fact appears to 
protect the person paying from being forced into making payment 
over again to the true heir.
The rule which was approved above makes in the same direction, 
the rule namely that a debtor is released who pays an agent or 
steward of the creditor after the revocation of. his mandate, 
when he is unaware that it had been revoked.(i65l So too does 
the rule that, just as good faith bestows as much on a possessor 
as does truth, ft appears that in the same way it ought also to 
excuse one who, being deceived by a just mistake, makes payment 
to one who is held in general opinion to be such that payment 
can be rightfully made to hie. Particularly 1s this so since the 
laws direct us to be more Inclined to releasing than to putting 
under obligation. '
Voet’s reasoning is, it is suggested, also applicable to 
payments made by a debtor to his creditor after the creditor has
(163) 46.3.5. He seeks support for his statement from Digest 14.6.3 
in pr, 14.3.38.1, 50.17.136 and 44.7.47.
(164) This situation cannot of course arise in modern administration 
of estates law and practice.
(165) Or that it had lapsed by reason of the mandant's loss of 
capacity to act - see eg Pothier Obligations paras 81 and 475.
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ceased to have capacity to act, and such payments should therefore 
be sfmf)ar1y  protected if the debtor made payment in good faith, 
ie without knowledge of the creditor's loss of capacity to act, and 
without negligence.
It is suggested, however, that the payment should not be seen as 
being directly valid but rather as giving rise to a right in favour 
of the payer to be indemnified for his negative interest, which 
right is then set off against the debt he sought to pay. The payer's 
rights can only rest on equitable principles and equity requires no 
more than that the payer should not suffer any loss, not that he 
should also be entitled to his p r o f i t . T h e  difference may be 
of considerable practical significance. For example, if the payment 
was intended to be the advance of monies lent the payer would be 
entitled to recover both the capital and the agreed interest if the 
payment is directly valid, but wnul^ m u  be entitled to recover the 
capital together with any interes te cv A have earned elsewhere 
had he not made the payment, if he entitled to his negative
interest. The difference is also significant in that set-off may be 
prevented for an extraneous reanon^11^  with the result that if 
the payer is only entitled to his negative interest the payment will 
not serve to discharge the debt.
The desirability of affording such payments some protection is, 
it is thought, clear, but whether or not the courts will be willing 
to recognise a rule that such payments cither are directly valid or 
give rise to a right in favour of the payer to be indemnified for 
his negative interest remains to be s e e n / 168  ^ If the courts
(166) See further (3) below (at 145-54): Excursus: A general rule 
that a person dealing with another in reliance on the other's 
continued capacity to act is entitled to be Indemnified for 
hfs negative interest?
(167) Cf 11 n 28 above.
(168) See further 145-54 below.
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decline to do so the bank will be limited to such claims as It may 
have based on unjust em-fchment.
(c) Cheques and payment Instructions Issued on the customer's behalf
It 1s also necessary to consider whether the position regarding 
termination of a bank's duty and authority to honour a customer's 
cheques and other payment instructions on the customer's loss of 
capacity to act 1s any differ**-1 where the cheque Is not drawn and 
Issued, or the payment Instruction 1s not given, by the customer 
personally but by another person on the customer's behalf.
The authority of one person, the representative, to
perform juristic acts on behalf of another person, the principal, 
may derive from an act of authorisation by the principal or from 
some other source such as the representative's capacity as guardian 
or curator of the p r i n c i p a l . H o w e v e r ,  only the first 
situation is dealt with here as the second situation is of only very 
limited practical significance 1n relation to the termination of a 
banker's duty and authority to honour a customer's cheques and other
(169) Cf Voet 4.4.22, 46.3.S; Pothier Obligations para 468; Estate 
Dalponte v Barnes & Anor 1910 CPD U S  at 124; Wessels Contract
rs i '5 7 7 ------------------------ -----------
(170) The expression 'representative' is used in preference to 
'agent'. When a person draws and issues a cheque or gives a 
payment Instruction on behalf of another ha performs a 
juristic act on behalf of the other. Although the expression 
'agent' is often used in this context it Is also used in other 
senses not involving the performance of juristic acts on 
behalf of a principal - eg In the expression 'estate agent'. 
It is also not apt to describe various persons who do have the 
authority to perform juristic acts on behalf of another eg 
guardians and curators. Cf J C de Wet in Joubert Law of South 
Africa vol 1 'Agency and Representatfon' # 101.
(171) 0 C de Wet op clt # 114.
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payment Instructions on the customer’s loss of capacity to
If the view taken above is correct that It 1s a term of
the bank customer contract that apparently regular cheques and other 
payment Instructions are fully- effectual as between bank and 
customer until tbe bank becomes aware of the customer's loss of 
capacity to act, it makes no difference whether the cheque was drawn 
and issued, or the payment Instruction was given, by the customer 
personally or by a representative on behalf of the customer. The 
only question is whether or not the cheque or payment Instruction is 
apparently regular 1n all respects. If it is, it is fully effectual 
and it is Immaterial whether it was drawn and Issued, or given, by 
the customer personally or by a representative on the customer's 
behalf.1174’
{172) It 1s difficult to visualise any circumstances in which the 
second situation could arise on a customer’s becoming Insane 
or unable to manage his affairs or his declaration as a 
prodigal, but on rare occasions it could possibly occur on the 
customer's insolvency, eg where a minor’s estate is 
sequestrated.
{173) See 76-91 above.
(174) This conclusion 1s not, 1t is considered, in conflict with 
s 23 of the Bills of Exchange Act which provides:
'A signature by procuration operates as notice that the 
agent has but a limited authority to sign, and the 
principal is only bound by such signature 1f the agent in 
so signing was acting within the actual limits of his 
authority.
The section 1s, it is thought, only intended to apply where 
the agent has limited authority and exceeds those limits, not 
where the agent had sufficient authority but the authority has 
lapsed. There would, roireover, not appear to be any reason why 
the principal should not be free to waive the benefit of the 
section by agreement; accordingly, if the section and the bank 
customer contract are in conflict the contract will take 
precedence.
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If, however, a cheque or other payment Instruction must 
constitute a valid separate authority 1n its own right, the answer 
to the question of whether it makes a difference that the cheque was 
drawn and issued, or the payment instruction was given, by a 
representative on the customer's behalf depends on what the position 
is of a third party, such as the bank In the present case, who is 
affected by an act performed by a representative on his principal's 
behalf if either the representative or the third party or both were 
ignorant of the principal's loss of capacity to act.
This question has received only cursory attention from the 
authorities, old and modern. Most of the Roman-Dutch authors do not 
refer to the question at all; however, Voet*175* is an exception 
for dealing with the rule^176* that mandates*177* lapse on the 
mandant's death*1’''®* he states :
(175) 17.1.15.
(176) See 37ff above.
(177) As already pointed out - see 7 n 6 above - mandate is a 
contract in terms of which one person, the mandatary, 
undertakes to perform a service on behalf of another, the 
mandant, and it Is not essential that the mandatary should 
have the power to perform juristic acts on behalf of the 
mandant; in other words, a mandatary may or may not also be a 
representative. However, the Roman-Dutch authors did not 
distlnquish clearly between the contract of mandate and powers 
of representation 1n keeping with the fairly low level of 
development the concepts of mandate arid representation reached 
in Roman-Dutch law and 1t is therefore necessary in seeking to 
develop a coherent and adequate set of rules governing 
representation generally in the complex conditions of modern 
comerce to adopt and develop the embryonic rules found in 
Roman-Dutch law especially in the writings on mandate - cf 50 
above.
(178) Death is but one instance of loss of capacity and what Voet 
says ts equally applicable by analogy to any other loss of 
capacity eg due to insanity - cf Tucker's Fresh Heat Supply 
(Pty) Ltd v Echakowitz 1958(1) SA 5Ut»(Aj at bilk (dealing with 
tfre power o? representation); Goodrlcke & Son v Auto 
Protection Insurance Co Ltd (in liquidation) lMk(l) SA /17(A) 
a T T ^ H  (dealing wiffi the contract of mandate).
'... the above rule [fe the rule that mandates lapse on the 
mandant's death] fails .... If a mandatary has in good faith 
carried the business to its conclusion in ignorance of the death 
of the mandator, for in that case it [ie the performance] still 
remains valid and is not liable to be upset. Here you may put in 
the special case given 1n the passage cited below.'
The passage referred to by Voet reads
'If a father should permit his son to manumit his slave, and, in 
the meantime, should die intestate, and his son, not being aware 
that his father was dead, should grant the slave his freedom, 
the slave w i n  become free through the favor conceded to 
liberty, as it does not appear that the master changed his mind.'
It is true that Voet's reference to the position of a third 
party appears to be essentially incidental in that he was focussing 
on the position of the representative. Nevertheless it is thought 
that it is .clear that he intended to convey that the 
representative’s act is fully effectual, not only as between the 
principal and this' repr*s£rftat1ve but also as between the principal 
and the third party, despite the principal's loss of capacity to 
act, and it 1s further thought that what he says is equally 
applicable by analogy where the power to represent arises not 1n 
connection with a contract of mandate but from some other source.
Pothler^®*^ deals more directly with the position of a thfrd 
party:
'...although the commission terminates by the death of the 
person giving it, and there appears a repugnancy fn supposing me 
to contract by the ministry of another, who after my death 
contracts 1n ny name; yet if he contracts 1n my name after my 
death, but before it could be known at the place where tne 
contract is made, such contract shall oblige my successor as if
(179) Digest 40.2.4 pr.
(180) Obligations para 81.
1 had ^tually contracted by the ministry of this agent. For 
this the preceding decision we may deduce an argument from 
Its being legally established,(181) that a payment math: to an 
agent Is ..alid though after the death of a principal, or the 
revocation of the authority, If the death or revocation were not 
known.’
It may be noted that Voet focusses on absence of knowledge of 
the principal's loss of capacity on the part of the representative 
although 1t would seem likely that he also had in mind absence of 
knowledge on the part of the third party. Pothier on the other hand 
appears to focus on absence of such knowledge on the part of the 
third party although he too may well have had 1n mind absence of 
knowledge on the part of both the representative and the third
The modern authors on agency do not present a uniform picture. 
De VilHers & Macintosh,^1® 31 citing Pothier,^1841 state:
'...transactions entered Into with the agent by third partfes 
having no notice of such death or change of status, on the faith 
of the continuance of the agent's authority, are binding on the 
principal's estate, whether or not the agent knew that his 
authority had been revoked.'
As already pointed out, however, It is not clear that Pothier 
considered the transaction binding even 1f the representative was 
aware of the principal's loss of capacity. Moreover the expression 
'on the faith of the continuance of the agent's authority' gives 
rise to considerable difficulty and calls for closer examination.
(181) Digest 46.3.12.2, 46.3.32ff.
(102) But cf De Viniers ft Macintosh's Interpretation of what 
Pothier says - see below.
(183) Agency 628.
(184) Obligations para 81 - see above.
Several situations can be distinguished: Before the principal's 
Toss of capacity he may have held out to the third carty that the 
representative had the authority to represent him. Or before 
his loss of capacity he may have furnished the representative with a 
written authority which 1s only produced to the third parly after 
the loss of capacity. Or before his loss of capacity the principal 
may have orally authorised the representative to represent him but 
this say not have been conveyed by the representative to the third 
parly until after the authority had lapsed by reason of the 
principal's loss of capacity.
In which of these situations can the third party be said to have 
acted 'on the faith of the continuance of the agent's authority' if 
the third party was unaware of the principal's loss of capacity? 
Clearly, in the first situation the third party could be said to 
have done so and the same is probably true of the second situatk. 
On the other hand it is less clear whether De Vllllers & Macintosh 
had the third situation in mind. In th1r- situation the third party 
acts on the faith of the Incorrect assertion, whether fraudulent or 
unwitting, by the representative that his authority is still extant; 
the principal has not held out the representative to the third party 
as having authority to represent him and it would therefore seem 
more difficult to say that the third party relies on the 
'continuance' of the authority. Especially where the assertion that 
the authority is still extant Is fraudulent the position is, it is 
suggested, not readily distinguishable from the situation where the 
person claiming to represent another never had the authorfty to do 
so at any time.
(185) The representative may have had ostensible authority only or 
both actual and ostensible authority.
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Ooubert/186* in dealing with the lapsing of a power of 
representation on the principal's loss of capacity to act, 
states :<187>
'Daar was in die fjemene reg 'n spesiale reeling ten aansien van 
die 1asgew1ngskoiurak sodat die lashebber wat te goeder trou in 
onkunde van die lasgewer se dood gehandel het, die lasgewer se 
boedel kon aanspreek asof die handellng In sy leeftyd verrig 1s. 
Hierdle reel dlen om die gevolge van die bee1ndig1ng van die 
lasgewfngsverhoudfng te verslap wat die bona__nde-lashebber 
betref. H1erd1e beskermlng behoort in die moderne tyd uitgebrei 
te word sodat 'n handellng wat die boedel bind, ook teenoor 
derdes van krag sal wees.'
It appears that Ooubert has in mind only the situation where both 
the representative and the third party are unaware cf the 
principal's loss of capacity and he gives no indication of what his 
view might be in regard to the position where the representative is 
aware of the loss of capacity but the third party is not, especially 
where the representative had ostensible authority to represent the 
principal.
Kerr^1881 does not deal with the position of the third party; 
however, he takes the view that a representative's power to 
represent his principal only terminates when the representative 
becomes aware of his principal's loss of capacity and he would, 
therefore, no doubt hold that the representative's acts are fully 
effectual as between all 3 parties - principal, representative and 
third party - until the representative becomes aware of the 
principal's loss of capacity, fie too, however, gives no fndfcatfon 
of what his view would be In regard to the position where the 
representative Is aware of the principal's loss of capacity but the 
third party fs not, especfaHy where the representative had 
ostensible authority to represent the principal.
(186) Verteenwoordigingsreg 132-3.
(187) At 132.
(188) Agency 200-203.
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J C de Wet*189  ^ unequivocally rejects the concept of a power 
sum'rfng the principal's loss of capacity to act, but he does not 
deal with the representative's and third party’s positions where 
either or both of them are unaware of the principal's loss of 
capacity; however, 1t Is suggested that it does not necessarily 
follow that because the representative's power has lapsed he and the 
third party have no remedies. This will be dealt with below.
Little assistance 1s to be had from English law where the 
position is similarly unclear. Frldman^90  ^ analyses the cases and 
concludes :^191^
'The result of this Investigation of the cases seemEs] to 
indicate that (apart from statute), whatever the reason for the 
termination of the agency (except possibly the death of the 
principal) a thifci party who deals with the agent without actual 
or constructive notice of the fact of termination will be 
protected as against the principal, or the principal s estate 
and, in some cases, either alternatively or concurrently, will 
have a remedy against the agent.'
In the United States the power of a representative to bind the 
estate of his principal after the principal's loss of capacity to 
act where the loss 1s unknown to the representative has long been a 
source of dispute,^92 * but the Restatement of the Law of 
Agency*193  ^ concludes that the better view is that:
(189) In Joubert Law of South Africa vol I 'Agency and 
Representation1 # 123. “  '
(190) Agency 319-21.
(191) At 321.
(192) American Law Institute Restatement of the Law Second Agency 
(St Paul 1958) vol 3 # 12TH
(193) Supra vol 1 §§ 120, 122 and 124A comment a.
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'(1) The death of the principal terminates the authority of the 
agent without notice to hlnu-except as stated in subsections (2 ) 
and (3) and in the caveat.'*9*'
'(2) Until notice of a depositor's death, a bank has authority 
to pay checks drawn by him or by agents authorized by him before 
death.
'(3) U.itil notice of the death of the holder of a check 
deposited for collection, the bank in which it is deposited and 
those to which the check is sent for collection have authority 
to go forward with the process of collection....
'(1) Except as stated in the caveat,(195) the loss of capacity 
by the principal [due to insanity] has the same effect upon the 
authority of the agent during the period of incapacity as has 
the principal's death---
'If there, was appareni; authority previously, its existence is 
unaffected until the knowledge or notice of the termination of 
authority comes to the third person, except when all agency 
powers are terminated without notice by death, loss of capacity 
by the principal or by an event making the authorized 
transaction Impossible.'
The exceptions in the case of banks have been developed by the 
courts on the grounds of justice and expediency, the protection of 
business being deemed to take priority over the risks to the 
customer's estate. Legislation has also been enacted in rnny 
states modifying tire harshness of the general rule^197  ^ and is 
recormnended by the Restatement. ^ 8 )
(194) The caveat is not relevant for present purposes.
(195) The caveat reads :
'The Institute expresses no opinion as to the effect of the 
principal's temporary incapacity due to a mental disease.'
*196) Supra vol 1 § 120 comment a.
(197) Supra vol 3 # 120. .
(198) Ibid.
What conclusions are to be drawn from the aforegoing? One 1s 
compelled, it is suggested, to accept that in principle a power to 
represent another must lapse if the principal ceases to have 
capacity to act. If a person lacfcs the capacity to perform a 
juristic act himself, it would not seem conceptually possible that 
someone should perform that act on his behalf under his authority. 
It is suggested, however, that it does not necessarily follow that 
the representative and the third party have no remedies if the 
representative performs the act after the principal's loss of 
capacity but before the representative or third party or both become 
aware of the loss.
There is no lack of authority that a mandatary who performs his 
mandate in ignorance of the mandant's loss of capacity to act is not 
remedyless. ^  Similarly, in the case of a third party affected 
by an act performed by the mandatary there is the authority of both 
Voet and Pothler that he 1s entitled to be protected. Moreover, it 
1s thought that in the case both of the representative and of the 
third party this is in accordance with justice and expediency. The 
only difficulty 1s, it is suggested, to determine the precise 
circumstances in which the representative and the third party are 
entitled to protection and the precise extent of the protection.
A mandatary's position if he performs his mandate in ignorance 
of the mandant's loss of capacity to act has been dealt with
above^200  ^ and the conclusion reached there is that he is entitled 
to be Indemnified for his positive interest/201  ^ It Is thought,
(199) See 41-51 above.
(200) Ibid.
(201) Should this view be wrong the mandatary is clearly entitled to 
be indemnified for at least his negative Interest - ibid - and 
for present purposes the result is the same whetfiir- he is 
entitled to be indemnified for his positive or negative 
interest.
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moreover, that this is not a rule peculiar to the contract of 
mandate but that It is equally applicable by analogy wherever a 
person represents another in ignorance of the lapsing of his 
authority due to the principal's loss of capacity to act.
If the representative is entitled to indemnification, it
follows, it 1s suggested, that juristic acts performed by him on
behalf of the principal must be fully effectual as between the
principal and the third party because anything less than this would
net provide him with a full indemnity. If the.- representative's acts
were not to be fully effectual as between the principal and the
third party the representative would be in breach of his implied 
(2D?\warranty of authority, and even indemnification for his
liability to the third party for damages would not constitute an 
adequate indemnity because his good name is also at stake. This 
approach presupposes that the third party is also unaware at tile 
time of relying on the representative's act of the principal's loss 
of capacity because if the third party is aware of the loss of 
capacity his bad faith would preclude his acquiring any rights 
against either the representative or the principal.*2031
Where the representative is aware of the principal's loss of 
capacity but the third party is not the position is more difficult. 
If the representative did not have ostensible authority to represent 
the principal the third party can, It is thought, be in no better a 
position than he would have been in had the representative never had 
any authority 1e the third party would acquire no rights against the
(202) See eg Blower v Yan Noorden 1909 TS 8r0 at 900-1; Kerr Agency 
234ff. it is not proposed to deal with the controversies 
surrounding this rule - cf Claude Neon Lights (SA) Ltd v 
Daniel 1976 (4) SA 403(A) at W i  t;-u - more especial ly "as in 
the case of bills of exchange the warranty is statutory - see 
s 24 of the Bills of Exchange Act.
(203) Cf Digest 50.17.134.1; Principal Immigration Officer v Bhula 
1931 AD 323 at 330; Wille "Principles lb1-!??
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principal. However, where the representative had ostensible 
authority there is much to be said for a rule that the third party 
should be entitled to be indemnified, although the appropriate 
indemnification is, it is suggested, for his negative interest only. 
To accord the third party his positive Interest would be a negation 
of  the fact that the representative's authority had lapsed. If the 
representative's authority has lapsed there can be no contractual 
basis for the right to indemnification which can therefore only rest 
on equitable principles, and equity demands no more than that the 
third party should suffer no loss, not that he should also be 
entitled to his profit.
Applying these principles to the bank customer contract, if a 
cheque is drawn and issued, or a payment instruction is given, by a 
representative in Ignorance of the customer’s loss of capacity and 
if the bank is likewise unaware of the loss of capacity at the time 
of honouring the cheque or payment instruction, the representative's 
drawing and Issuing of the cheque or giving of the payment 
instruction is prftna facie effectual as between bank and customer.
It is however necessary to have regard further to the effect of 
the customer's loss of capacity on the bank's own mandate. This 
question has been dealt with above^205  ^ and the conclusion reached 
there is that the bank's mandate does not lapse until the bank 
becomes aware of the customer's loss of capacity. If this view is 
correct the cheque or payment instruction is fully effectual as 
between 5ank and customer for all purposes. On the other hand, if 
this view is wrong, and it is held that the bank's mandate does in 
fact lapse on the customer's loss of capacity and that the exception 
where the bank perforins its mandate In ignorance of the customer's
(204) Cf 41-51 above especially at 48 dealing with the mandatary's 
right to indemnification. See further (3) below {at 145-54): 
Excursus: A general rule that a person dealing with another in 
reliance on of the other's continued capacity to act is 
entitled to be Indemnified for his negative interest?
(205) See 41-51 above.
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loss of capacity 1s limited to according the bank the right to Its 
negative interest, the efficacy of tfce cheque or payment Instruction 
will be similarly restricted. In other words, the position is the 
same as where the customer drew and Issued a cheque or gave a 
payiaent instruction while of full capacity but before payment of the 
cheque or payment Instruction the customer ceased to have capacity.
Where the representative is aware of the customer's loss of 
capacity to act but the bank Is not, the bank will be entitled to be 
indemnified for Its negative interest. The view has already been 
taken that where a representative has ostensible authority to 
represent his principal a third party is entitled to be Indemnified 
for his negative interest if he was unaware of the principal's loss 
of capacity even though the representative was aware of the loss, 
and it 1s thought that in practice in all cases in which a bank 
honours a cheque drawn and issued, or a payment instruction given, 
by a representative on behalf of the customer, the customer will 
have held the representative out as having authority to represent 
the customer, by furnishing the bank with a written authorisation to 
thi s effect.
(d) Rights of an offeree who 'accepts' offer and performs his
'obligations1 in ignorance of the offeror's loss of capacity
A cheque drawn or payment instruction given outside the scope 
either of a credit in the customer's account or of an overdraft 
facility constitutes in the first instance an offer to 
borrow/206  ^ and, as already pointed out , ^ 0^  in the absence of 
agreement to the contrary an offer lapses on the offeror's loss of 
capacity to act 1f the offer has not been accepted prior to the loss 
of capacity-
(206) See 20 above.
(207) See 72-4 above.
What is a bank's position if, contrary to the view taken above, 
1t 1 s held that a cheque or other payment instruction must 
constitute a valid separate authority in its own right and in 
ignorance of the customer's loss of capacity the bank honours a 
cheque or payment Instruction drawn or given outside the scope 
either of a credit in the customer's account or of an overdraft 
facility? The answer depends on the answer to the vexed question in 
our law of whether or not an offeree who purports to accept an offer 
and performs his 'obligations' under the resulting ’contract' in 
ignorance of the fact that the offer has lapsed due to the offeror's 
ceasing to have capacity to act is entitled to be indemnified for 
his expenses and losses fe his negative interest, if the answer is 
in the affirmative the bank will be entitled to recover the amount 
paid together with the Interest and charges it could have earned 
elsewhere had it not honoured the cheque or payment instruction. If 
the answer is in the negative the bank will be limited tc such 
claims as 1 t may have based on unjust enrichment.
No Roman or Roman-Dutch autho "" ' s to have dealt with
view that the offeree is entitled to be Indemnified:
'Et ideo puto quod si antequam pervenft nuntius vel epistola,
moriatur mittens vel efficiatur furiosus, quod tunc non
confcrahatur obligatio per nuntium vel epistolam quia non durat 
voluntas nec intervenlt consensus tunc temporla ....
'Puto tamen quod reciplens nuntium vel epistolam si aliquas 
iapensas fecisset vel damna habuisset propter nuntium vel 
epistolam, ante certiorationem vel sclentiam de revocatione 
mittentis, ad expenses et damna posset agere.'<209'
(208) Baldus de Urbaldls Opera (Venice 1577-1599) ad D 17.1.1.
(209) 'And I am, therefore, of the opinion that if, before the 
messenger or letter has arrived, the sender dies or becomes 
Insane, then no obligation is contracted through the messenger
(footnote continued on next page)
this question. The Commentator however, takes the
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Pothier, ^ 101 1s of the same view:
if I write a letter to a merchant living at a distance, and 
therein propose to him, to sell me a certain quantity of 
merchandise, for a certain price; and, before my letter has time 
to reach him, I write a second, Informing him that I no longer 
wish to make the bargain;'***' or if I die; or lose the use of 
my reason; although the merchant, on the receipt of ity letter, 
being in Ignorance of my change of will, or of my death or 
insanity, makes answer that he accepts the proposed bargain; yet 
there will be no contract of sale between us ....
{footnote continued from previous page)
or letter because.the Intention does not persist, nor 1s there 
any consensus at that moment ....
1 am of opinion that the person receiving the message or 
letter, if he has on account of that message or letter 
incurred any expenses or suffered any  losses before obtaining 
certainty or knowledge of the revocation of the sender, has a 
good ground of action for the expenses and losses.'
(Wessels' translation: Contract ##241 and 244.)
(210) RO Pothler Treatise on the Contract of Sale translated by 
IS Cushina (Boston Itf-W oara j z . See too M iroplono Le Droit 
Civil Oe La Vente (Brussels 1841) art 1582 #27.
(211) Loss of capacity to act 1s generally dealt with in conjunction 
with this situation, namely the crossing In the post of 
letters of acceptance and revocation of the offer, and the
2 situations are often simply equated as Pothier does. Whether 
the 2 situations can be equated is questionable but need not 
detain us In view of the fact that under our law the problem 
of the crossing in the post of letters of acceptance and 
revocation generally does not arise due to the fact that the 
letter of acceptance takes effect on posting (Cape Explosives 
Works Ltd v South African Oil and fat Industries Ltd f92T 
Cpp Kergeulen sealing and Whaling Co Ltd v CIR 1939 
AD 487), whereas the letter of revocatfononly talces effect on 
receipt (Yates v Dai ton 1938 EDL 177). It is, however, useful 
to bear in mind that the authorities discussed in what follows 
were generally Interested primarily In the situation where 
letters of acceptance and revocation crossed 1n the post and 
they only dealt with loss of capacity to act as an adjunct to 
the discussion of such crossing.
'It must be observed, however, that, 1f .my letter causes 
the merchant to be at any expense, in proceeding to execute the 
contract proposed; or ff ft occasions him any loss, as, for 
example, if, in the intermediate time between the receipt of my 
first and that of my second letter, the price of that particular 
kind of merchandise falls, and my first letter deprives him of 
an opportunity to sell it before the fall of the price; in all 
these cases, I am bound to indemnify him, unless I prefer to 
agree to the bargain as proposed by my first letter. This 
obligation results from that rule of equity, that no person 
should suffer from the act of another: Nemo ex alterlus facto 
praegravari debet.‘ '
Although Pothier does not make his view entirely clear it would seem 
that he has the offeree's negative Interest, not his positive 
interest, in nrjnd.
Pothier's reliance on the rule of equity nemo ex alterius facto
praegravarl debet as the basis of the rule gives rise to a
difficulty in seeking to apply the rule to our law in that equity
alone 1s not a sufficient basis for recognising the existence of a
(2i2)
legal right In our law. Nor Is there any genera? legal right 
corresponding to the maxim concerned: in order to be entitled to 
recover Iqss suffered as the result of the act of another 1t is 
necessary to be able to bring the facts wfthfn one of the recognised 
categories of legal liability sue. as unjust enrichment 
delict, etc:
reference or Upservlce to a vague and nebulous notion is 
not enough to establish 1t as a rule of law'
(per Van den Heever JA in Tjollo Ateljees (Elns) Bpk v Smatl^2^ ) .
(212) Weinerlein v Goch 3u11d1ngs Ltd 1925 AD 262 at 295; W1lle 
7rTncipVe~s~D^l9.
(213) It may be noted that the offeree's negative Interest may well 
exceed the offeror's unjust enrichment.
(214) 1949(1) SA 856(A) at 865.
113.
Unlike in Germany/2**^ the position 1n France has never been 
regulated by statute; however, the development of the consnon law by 
the courts and writers has seen the extension of the protection 
accorded to offerees to the point where offers for a fixed period 
are now regarded as Irrevocable and capable of be1; 3 accepted during 
the fixed period despite purported revocation, and offers not for a 
fixed period will, If revoked before the lapse of a reasonable 
period, give rise to a claim for damages. The position on 
death or other loss of capacity 1 s less clear, some authors taking 
the view that the offer lapses, others that it lapses but that the 
offeree is entitled to be indemnified and yet others that the offer 
- 4. 1 {217) does not lapse.
The source of the offeror's obligation has also been the subject 
of much discussion, although the fact of its existence, at least 
Insofar as revocation Is concerned, 1s not questioned. The principal 
theories are that there is a contract not to revoke the offer, that 
the obligation not tu revoke the offer arises from the unilateral 
declaration of will by the offeror and that the obligation arises 
from equity or the offeror's 'civil responsibility'.
(215) See 115 below.
(216) See generally 0 Flour Droit Civil Les Obligations (Paris 1975)' 
vol 1, 102-6. For a survey of the position on 'this point in 
our iaw see K M Krltidnger 'The Irrevocable Offer' (1983) 100 
SALJ 441.
(217) See eg Flour Obligations 106; E Gaudemet Theorie General des 
Obligati on* {Paris 1937 j 41; G Rlpert S J Bouiariger iraiteKa 
B r o U  civil .I'apres le Tralte de Planlol (Paris 195/) vol 2 „’ 
133; C Aubry & C Rau Cours de Droit Cjy-fl Francafs 6th ed 
(1942) translated by Louisiana state Law Institute C1v1l Law 
Translations vol 1 #343; M Planlol Treatise on the CTvT T ^ a w  
n t h  ed (is39) translated by Louslana-  state Law Institute 
(1959) vol 2 part 1 #980; G Baudry - Lacantinerie 4 L Qarde 
Tralte Theorettoue et Pratique de Droit Civil des Obligations 
3rd ed (Paris- 1.906}"vof 1 #34. “
Planiol^2^  Is a supporter of the first theory:
'One can thus analyze the situation. The offer contains two 
things: a principal proposition which has as Its object a 
bargain to be concluded; a secondary proposition, which accords 
a dtelay for reflection. The person to whom the offer is made has 
no reason for not accepting the latter proposition, it being to 
his advantage, since in accepting he does not bind himself to 
anything, and keeps the right to reject the principal 
proposition. His acceptance regarding the offer of the delay for 
reflection should, therefore, be presumed, or what amounts to 
the same thing, a tacit and immediate acceptance of this offer 
should be admitted. 1
Qaudry - Lacantinerle 8 Barde^219  ^ may be quoted as supporters 
of the second theory:
'Toute offre qui est accompagnee de la fixation d'un delai pour 
1 'acceptation donne naissance par elle-meme a deux obligations 
distinctes: d'abord a 1 'obligation de maintenlr Voffre pendant 
le delai fixe; puis a 1 'obligation conditionnelle d'accomplir la 
prestation <ju1 fait 1 'objet de 1 'offre, si celle-ci est 
acceptse. Ces deux obligations ont pour cause ganeratrice une 
manifestation Unilateral® de volonte. Et d'abord 1'obligati on de 
inaintenir l ’offre pendant le delai ne peut decouler d'une 
convention; le delai est fixe pflkJe pollicltant seul; il n'est 
pas convenu entre Ibs parties.
(218) Op cit #983.
(219) Op cit #33. Wrongly cited by Wessels Contract #246 for the 
contrary view. *
(2 2 0 ) Every offer which is accompanied by the determination of a 
delay for acceptance gives rise by Itself to 2 distinct 
obligations: firstly the obligation to maintain the offer 
during the fixed delay, secondly the conditional obligation to 
execute the performance which is the object of the offer, if 
ft is accepted. These two obligations have as their source a 
unilateral manifestation of will. The obligation to maintain 
the offer during the delay cannot arise from an agreement; the 
delay 1s fixed by the offeror alone; it 1s not agreed between 
the parties.
Iu s.
Most of the authors cite equity 1n general terms as underlying 
the rule, either alone or in conjunction with one of the other 
theories- This need not detain us, however, as equity alone is not, 
as already pointed out, a sufficient basts for the recognition of a 
legal right in our law.
In Germany the position was largely resolved by statute^2^
at an early stage in favour of the offer's remaining available for
acceptance despite the offeror’s loss of capacity to act, but the
question nevertheless attracted the Interest of the 19th century 
(222)
Pandektists. Jhering 1n particular dealt with the matter in
detail in his Culpa in Contrahendo. H i s  theory is built on
(221) The German Civil Code {as amended to January 1, 1975) 
translated by il Forrester, SL Goren & HM Ilgen 
(Amsterdam-Qxford 1975) s 153:
‘The conclusion of a contract 1s not prevented by the fact 
that the offerer dies or becomes Incompetent to enter legal 
transactions before acceptance, unless 4 contrary intention 
on the part of the offerer may be Inferred.’
(222) Special weight Is accorded by our courts to the views of the 
German Pandektists of the 19th century - see Hahlo 8 Kahn Laws
(223) R v Jhering 'Culpa in Contrahendo' (1860) 2 Jahrbiicher ftir die 
Dogmatik des heutigen romischen und deutschen TRvatrechts l; 
E  von -Jhering oeuvres Choisles translated Ejy o Meulenaere 
(Paris 1893) voTT,
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certain texts 1n the Institutes*224  ^ and Digest ^22S* r$?atfng 
to the sale of things which by law cannot be the subject of a sale 
eg sacred objects, a free nan, an Inheritance which 1 s not yet in 
existence, etc. These texts are not readily reconcilable but the
(224) 3.23.B: 'Anyone who knowingly purchases land which is
sacred, religious, or public, (as, for instance, 
a forum or a portico), does so to no purpose, 
even though, having been deceived by the vendor 
he buys It as private or profane property; and he 
will be entitled to an action of purchase because 
he could not obtain It, and may recover indemnity 
to the amount that it would have been worth to 
him not to have been deceived. The same rule 
applies where a party buys a freeman as a slave.'
(225) 18,1.62.1: 'Where a party ignorantly purchases sacred,
religious? or public places, supposing them to 
belong to private individuals, it is held that 
the- purchase is void; and an action on sale can 
be brought against the vendor by the purchaser, 
to recover the amount of the interest he had in 
not being deceived.'
11.7.8.1: 'Where a place that is religious is alleged to 
have been sold as profane, the Praetor grants an 
action in factum in favour of the party who is 
interested in the matter against the vendor; and 
this action can also be brought against the heir 
of the latter, since it resembles an action on a 
contract of s*le.'
18.4.8: 'Where the vendor has no right of succession to 
an estate, in order to ascertain how much he 
should pay the purchaser, a distinction must be 
made, namely: where a right of succession, in 
fact, exists, but does not belong to the vendor, 
it should be appraised; but if there is no right 
of succession at all, with reference to which the 
agreement appears to have been made, the 
purchaser can recover from the vendor only the 
price which he paid, and any expenses which he 
incurred on account, of the property*'
i
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better view 1s that they give the innocent purchaser the right to be
indemnified for his negative Interest despite the fact that no
contract comes into existence.*2251 Jhering argues that the reason
for the seller's obligation to Indemnify the purchaser 'Mi the
seller’s culpa (whether or not he fcfiew the object was not legally
saleable ), and having deduced a general rule that parties
contracting with one another owe each other a contractual dlligentia
both fn relation to the formation of the contract and in the
contract, which if contravened gives rise to a claim for damages, he
applies the rule to other situations such as the revocation of an
offer and the Joss of capacity to act by the offeror. His theory has
not, however, met with general acceptance, and it is especially in
relation to loss of capacity to act on the part of the offeror that
it is criticised on the ground that it is not feasible to attribute
(228)culpa to the offeror. Jhering was very conscious of the
/ ^
difficulty and sought to deal with it as follows:
‘Maintenant, lorsque sans connaitre le deces de 1’auteur de 
1 ‘offre, le destinataire accepte celle-ci et execute le contrat, 
dans la croyance qu'1l est devenu parfait, l'equlte exige la 
reparation du doomage resulte de cette execution. Mais comment 
justifier la demande de domnages-fnterets? Du cote du 
destinataire les conditions de cette action existent toutes, il 
est vrai, mais conroent justifier une culpa dans le chef de
1 'autre partie? 11 est impossible d'appeler le dices une culpa. 
Je dois avouer que ma theorle se heurte ic1 a une pierre 
d'achoppement que je ne puis lui faire surmonter sans 1 'effort 
le plus violent. Quant a refuser dans ce cas 1 ‘action en
(226) De Wet ft Yeats Kontraktereo 77-8.
(227) The texts may give the Impression t'-.i'i dolus_ Is required but 
Jhering shows that this fs not so - op c f F ?7
(228) See eg Goudsmlt, infra, 30-92 and Van der Does, Infra, 68-75,
(229) At 81-3 of Meulenaere's transatlon.
donrnges-interets, mon sentiment du droit s'y oppose de la 
maniere la plus energlque, et plutot que d'exclure ici 1 ‘action, 
je veux croire que dans la construction de ma thsorfe j'af 
commis quelque faute dont mo1-meme je ne me suis pas aper;u. Or, 
du moment qu'on 1 ‘accorde, il ne reste plus qu'a deduire la 
culpa de la maniere suivante. Si V o n  avait conclu entre 
presents, la mort n'aurait nullement pu avoir cette influence 
doiranageable. Lors done qu'un absent veut contracter, il doit, 
pour garantir Vautre partie contre cette eventuallte 
dommageable, se donner la peine d'aller la trouver en personne; 
s‘11 ne le fait point, si au lieu de cela il choislt la vole 
plus simple de la comsunication par voie de lettre ou 
d'intermedialre, 11 substitue par cela meme, dans l'interet de 
ses aises, une forme qul expose 1 'adversaire au danger dont il 
s'agit. La culpa consiste done en ceci qu'au lieu du moyen, seul 
sur, de la communication orale en personne, il,Arfiu recours, au 
peril de 1 'autre partie, a un moyen incertafn.1<230'
(230) Now, when without knowing of the decease of the author of the 
offer, the addressee accepts it and performs the contract in 
the belief that it has become perfected, equity demands the 
making good of the damage resulting from this performance. But 
how can one justify the claim for damages? from the side of 
the addressee the conditions for such action all exist, it is 
true, but how can one justify culpa on the part of the other 
party? It is impossible to c a l T t R e  decease culpa. I have to 
admit that my theory knocks against a stumbling block here 
which I cannot cause it to overcome without a most violent 
effort. As for refusing an action for damages in this case, my 
feel for right (the law?) objects most strongly, and rather 
than excluding the action here, I would believe that in the 
formulation of my theory I have made some mistake which I have 
not perceived. Now, the moment one accepts this, it only 
remains to deduce culpa in the following manner. If it had 
been concluded between persons who were present, death would 
not have in any way been able to have this damaging influence. 
Accordingly, when a person who is absent wishes to contract, 
he ought, in order to guarantee the other pacty against any 
damaging eventuality, to put himself to the trouble to go to 
find him in person; if he does not do this at all, if Instead 
of this he chooses the simpler way of communication by way of 
letter or intermediary, he substitutes thereby, for his own 
convenience, a form which exposes the other party to the 
danger in question. The culpa consists therefore in that 
instead of using the only sure way, communicating orally 1n 
persort, he had recourse at the peril of the other party to an 
uncertain way.
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However, as Wessels 2^311 pofnts out:
'Surely an offer by letter is quite a normal way of transacting 
business, and a person who executes such a contract before he 
knows that his acceptance has reached the offeror Is as much 
guilty of culpa as the proposer.'
One might add that, if culpa is the basis of the liability, the 
offeree's act in acting on his 'acceptance' of the offer before he 
knows whether or no* the acceptance is effective appears to be an- 
actus novus Interveniens destroying the causal chain between the 
offeror's act and the loss suffered. Similarly, it would s'eem 
arguable that the offeree elects to take the risk ie one is dealing 
with a case of volenti non fit inluria. ^ ^
This does not, however, necessari’y invalidate the analogy 
between sales of articles which are lfega.’H y  unsaleable and offers 
which lapse due to the offeror's loss of 'capacity to act.^233  ^ If 
in the case of sales of legally unsaleable articles the seller is 
liable, despite the absence of a valid contract, to indemnify the 
purchaser whether or not the seller was at fault in any way, one has 
another instance in our law where liability does not arise 'ither 
ex contractu or ex delicto. The question then arises as to whether
(231) Contract #243.
(232) True, this Is to adopt the language of the law of delict and 
it 1s clear that Jhering's concept of culpa in contrahendo is 
far removed from delictual culpabi fityT However, this 
notwithstanding, it is thought that these problems inevitably 
apply to the concept of fault 1n any context.
(233) The analogy lies in the fact that 1n both cases expenses may 
be incurred and losses may be suffered by a party 1n the bona 
fide belief that a contract exists when due to a technicality 
of the law no contract in fact exists. But see Wessels 
Contract #245.
sales of legally unsaleable articles Is an isolated exception or
whether it is an application of a more general rule, bearing in mind
that in Roman law rules are not always stated generally but are to
be inferred from specific examples of their application.
(2341 (23SiWindscheid,' ' amongst others,' ' is a strong supporter on
this bas4s of Jhering’s conclusions regarding an offeree's right to
indemnification even though he does not accept Jhering's culpa
theory.^236^
Turnfng ts the Netherlamds, the most important writer for 
present purposes is Goudsmit.:^^ He appears to consider that but 
for the codification of Dutch law the offeree would have had a right 
to indemnification for his negative Interest in the event of 
revocation but not of loss of capacity to act:
'Wei wordt eene zoodanige schadevergoeding voor dergelijk geval 
in het Romeinsche recht niet uitdrukkelijk vermeld, doch z^u ze 
door de Rom. Jurlsten vermoedelijk niet zijn uitgesloten 
! geweest, indien heri het handelsverkeer onder afwezigen tot 
dien graad van ontwikkeling ware gekomen als bij ons het geval 
is.
['De uitdrukkelijke bepalingen van het Rom. recht betreffen het 
geval, dat iemand lets beloofd heeft, wat niet in den handel of 
waarvan de praestatie onmogelijk is .... Eene analogische 
uitbreding tot ons geval is niet boven bedenking. Ook de
(234) B WfndScheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts 9th ed by T K1pp 
(Frankfurt 19o6j
(235) See the further writers referred to by Windscheld, loc cit.
(236) See also 3 below (at 145-54): Excursus: A general rule that a 
person dealing with another in reliance on the other's 
continued capacity to act is entitled to be indemnified for 
his negative interest1?
(237) J E Goudsmit Pandecten-Systeem (Leiden 1866) part 2 at 90-91. 
Goudsmit is described by M  Roberts A South African Legal 
Bibliography (Pretoria 1942) as: 'One" of the outstanding 
scholars of Roman Law in the 19th century1.
juridlsche constructs der actie tot schadevergoeding is nog 
zeer betwist. De culpa in contrahendo, gelljk ze door Jhering 
geformuleerd, en later door hem zelf merkelijk gewijzigd is, 
laat zich inderdaad n1et met consequents doorvoeren.]
’Oofc dan als de vcorsteller komt le overlijden voor het 
tljdstlp, dat de aanneming den voorsteller 1s kenbaar gemaakt, 
in de gevallen waarln die kennls verelscht wordt, is geen 
overeenkomst voltrokken, en zijn zljne erfgenamen jegens den 
bewilliger, die onbekend met dlens dood het aanbod had 
aangenomen, zelfs niet tot praestatie van het negatieve belang 
gehouden.'
The other early post-codification writers take the view that 
there is no right to indemnification in the case either of 
revocation or of loss of capacity to act- O p z o o m e r ^ ^  and 
Diephuls^239* rely solely on the provisions of the Civil Code, but 
Van der Do e s / 240  ^ who devotes a chapter of his published thesis 
to the question, considers and rejects various possible theories, 
including, In particular, Jherlng's culpa t h e o r y . A s  1n 
France, however, with the passage of time the law developed in the 
direction of recognising that an offeror may make an offer
(238) CW Opszoomer Het BurgerlUke Wetboek 2nd ed (Amsterdam 1879) 
vol 6 , 19-20.
(239) 6  Diephuis Het Nederlandsch Burgerlijk Regfr 2nd ed (Gronigen 
1886) vol 10, 359-61, 368-9.
(240) A van der Does de Bijde Qvereenkomsten cjesloten deur mlddel 
van Brleven, Boden. OpenFare "flankondigingen of Telegrammen 
^Leiden TjfaTJ) biff.
(241) The principal theories he considers and rejects are: 
acceptance takes effect on despatch (64); damages may be 
recovered under an actio doll or in factum (64,75-6); damages 
may be recovered orPtfte basis of ' del ict" (65-8); Opzoomer's 
theory (66-6 8 ); Jherlng's theory (68-75, 81); damages may be 
recovered on analogy with the position in mandate (64-5, 73-4, 
01-2); and the Dutch statutory position (76-79).
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Irrevocable and that If he does so the offer may be accepted even ff 
he has purported to revoke ft. That this Is the law was finally 
(2421settled by the Hoge Raad in 19691 ' and has since been expressly 
embodied in the new Civil Code.*243* The Hoge Raad did not 
directly hold what the source of the offeror's obligation is, and(2<i4i
little attention 1s given to this question by the writers.
The dominant approach is, however, to see the source of the 
offeror's obligation as being the offeror's unilateral declaration 
of will which is construed as a waiver (which may be unilateral 
under Dutch law) of the capacity to revoke the offer where the offer 
1s for a fixed period.*245
Strangely, in South Africa there is no reported case law on the 
question despite the fact that the problem must be of dally 
occurrence. Wessels^245* deals with the matter 1n some detail and 
while he concedes that there 'are many jurists of great weight who 
have followed Baldus 1n holding that an indemnity can be claimed 
from the estate of the offeror1, he appears to doubt whether this is 
so in our law for he says:
‘It is difficult to see upon what principles we are to base a 
claim for damages. It seems to be a risk to which all persons 
who desire to contract are exposed. 1
(242) Llndeboom - Amsterdam 19 December 1969, NJ 1970, 154.
(243) Art 6.5.2.2. •
(244) But see Van Dunne Norm?t1eve Uitleg lOOff.
(245) See eg the Llndeboom - Amsterdam case supra especially the 
note at 376-/; c Asser Handieiding tot de Beoefenina van het 
Nederlandsch Burgerlijk RechtT^erMntenissenrecht 6th ed by 
LEH Rutten (iwofle 15821 vofTI ftfr-3; nTHofmann Het 
Nederlands Verbintenlssenrecht Sth ed by SN Opstall (Groningen 
I55J77TTlRe~3r3-e ? T f -SsseF{Zwo)le 1968) 92, the unilateral 
act of the offeror is likened to the acceptance or rejection 
of an Inheritance, the acknowledgment of a child, a notice of 
default, etc.
(246) Contract #243-246.
The only possible basis for such a liability for damages Is, he 
suggests, 'an Implied condition 1n every offer that If 1t lapses by 
the death of the offeror, the person who accepts and executes the 
contract In Ignorance of the revocation* death or disability of the 
offeror shall not suffer any loss thereby'. He does not Indicate 
whether he considers that such a condition may be effectively 
stipulated unilaterally by the offeror or whether he considers that 
it is necessary to construe a contract between the offeror and the 
offeree to this effect.
Kahn*2471 similarly states:
'Mould our courts ... come to the relief of the offeree, who, 
not knowing of the death of the offeror, believes he has 
accepted and commences the execution of the putative contract? 
This has been a vexed question from the time of Baldus, who 
considered that an indemnity could be recovered from the estate. 
Wessels appears to conclude that such a claim does not exist in 
our law. It 1s difficult to find any basis for 1t In principle 
other than a tacit term in the original offer that this 
Indemnity will be paid. It would appear very doubtful 1f our 
courts would be astute to read such a term Into an offer,'
Kerr,*2481 on the other hand, takes the view that a right to 
indemnification should be admitted, although he does not suggest a 
basis for the right, while Christie*2491 suggests that it Is 
better to ?et the loss lie where it falls.
What conclusions should, then, be drawn in regard to the 
position 1n our law? The following analysis Is suggested, albeit 
with humility in view of the eminence of the jurists who have
(247) E Kahn 'Some Mysteries of Offer and Acceptance' (1955) 72 SALJ 
246 at 271. See also Hahlo S Kahn Laws 452.
(248) Contract 43.
(249) Contract 40.
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already expressed their views on the question. The weight of 
authority 1s, it Is thought, in favour of admitting an obligation on 
the part cf the offeror to Indemnify the offeree for his negative 
interest, on analogy with the position in relation to the sale of 
articles which are not legally saleable. This obligation is a 
natural incident of offers and, unless excluded, arises ex lege, r.ot 
ex contractu or ex delicto. Contract and delict are not the only 
sources of obligations in our law: obligations may arise from 
various other sources, such as unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio, 
etc; accordingly the recognition of a further category would not do 
violence to the structure of our l a w / 2S0*
If the approach that the obligation arises ex lege Is rejected, 
can it be argued that the obligation arises ex contractu? On this 
approach an offer would have to be seen as being composed of
2 offers: the principal offer to enter into the contract in question 
and a subsidiary offer to indemnify the offeree should the offer 
lapse because of the offeror's loss of capacity to act. The 
difficulty is how and when the subsidiary offer is accepted. Bearing 
In mind that the loss of capacity may occur before the offer is 
received, it would be necessary to hold either that acceptance of 
the subsidiary offer occurs automatically as soon as the offer 1s 
made or that the subsidiary offer does not lapse on the offeror's 
loss of capacity to act. To hold that the subsidiary offer is deemed 
to have been accepted as soon as it is made would, even allowing for 
the fact that it only entails advantages for the offeree, be'a 
ffctfon fnconsfstent wfeh the principles of our ?aw of contract, 
especially 1n view of the fact that the offeree would not even be 
aware of the contract until receipt of the offer.
The altarnatlve approach is more arguable, namely that the 
subsidiary offer does not lapse on the offeror's loss of capacity to
(250) Cf Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD
168 at 198-9 in regard to the source of a claim by a company 
against a director for secret profits.
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act. True, this would be Inconsistent with the rule that offers 
lapse on the offeror's loss of capacity to act, but ft has already 
been shown^25* 1 that this rule 1s not an Invariable one and 1s 
subject to an exception where the parties agree otherwise, as.1n the 
case of an option. And, once It 1s accepted that lapsing can be 
excluded by agreement, should It not be recognised that lapsing can 
be excluded by stipulation of the offeror?^2521 In other words, 
the rule that offers lapse on the offeror's loss of capacity to act 
would be a natural incident of offers but could be excluded by the 
offerot'.^2531 Such an approach would introduce a beneficial 
flexibility into our law, which would be lacking if there is an 
Invariable rule that offers lapse on the offeror's loss of capacity 
to act Irrespective of whether or not the offeror would wish such 
lapsing to occur. It Is not difficult to envisage cases where such 
flexibility would be beneficial: for example, tenderers often invest 
considerable sums of money in preparing tenders which must be lodged 
by a certain time to rank for consideration, and If such tenders 
were to be automatically Invalidated by a loss of capacity on the
{251) See 72-4 above.
(252) As Christie Contract says (at 39):
‘When the subjective approach to the formation of contracts 
prevailed, there could be no doubt about the effect of the 
death of the offeror or offeree - no contract could come 
into existence because there was no longer a possibility of 
consensus between the parties. Thus an offeree could not 
notify lils acceptance to the executor of the offeror, and 
an offeree's executor could not notify the estate's 
acceptance to the offeror. Now that our approach is more 
objective this reasoning will no longer suffice, nor will 
the rigidity of the rule. Why should an offer not be made 
in terms which, expressly or Impliedly, permit Its 
acceptance by the executor of the offeree or to the 
executor of the offeror?'
(253) Cf De Wet & Yeats' view at 72 n 118 above on the question of 
the lapsing of offers on the offeror's death.
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part of the tenderer even If the tenderer did not wish such lapsing 
to occur this would clearly not be in the Interests either of the 
tenderer's estate or of the offeree.
(2) Application of principles
(a) If an apparently regular cheque or other payment 
Instruction is fully effectual
If the view taken above^254* 1s upheld that it is a term of 
the bank customer contract that apparently regular cheques and other 
payment Instructions are fully effectual as between bank &nd 
customer until the bank becomes aware of the customer's loss of 
capacity to act the consequences will be as follows.
If a bank 1s unaware of a customer's loss of capacity -a cheque 
drawn or payment instruction given by the customer will function as :
«* a demand and payment direction If it Is drawn or given within 
the scope of a credit In the customer's account;
- the exercise of an option, a demand and a payment direction if 
it is drawn or given within the scope of overdraft facility;
- as an offer to borrow, demand and payment direction if it is 
drawn or given outside the scope of either such a credit or such 
an overdraft facility. ^25S*
It does not make a difference 1f the cheque was drawn or payment 
instruction was given before or after the loss of capacity or 
by the customer personally or by a representative on his behalf.
(254) See 76-91 above.
(255) See 21-4 above.
(2565 Cf 74-6 above.
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It follows that if the cheque is drawn or the payment 
instruction 1s given :
- within the scope of a credit 1n the customer's account, payment 
of the cheque or payment instruction will constitute a valid 
repayment on account of the bank's indebtedness to the customer;
« within th« scope of an overdraft facility, a contract of loan 
will come Into existence on exercise of the option, payment of 
the cheque or payment instruction will constitute a valid 
advance of the monies lent and the bank may recover the loan in 
accordance with Its terms together with the agreed interest;
- outside the scope of either such a credit or such an overdraft 
facility, a contract of loan will come Into existence 1 f the
■ ‘ bank accepts the offer to borrow, payment of the cheque or 
payment Instruction will constitute a valid advance of the 
mors'fes lent and the bank may recover the loan in accordance with 
Its terms together with the agreed Interest.
The bank will moreover be entitled to its charges.
Conversely, if the bank dishonours a cheque drawn or payment
Instruction given within the scope either of a credit in the
customer's account or of an overdraft facility, the bank will be in
breach of Its obligation to honour the cheque or payment instruction
and will be liable for such damages, 1f any, as the customer may 
{2571suffer as a result.
If the bank becomes aware before honouring or dishonouring the 
cheque or payment Instruction that the customer has ceased to have
(257) See 91-2.
capacity to act, the cheque or payment instruction will cease to be 
effectual and the bank's authority and, if applicable, duty to 
honour the cheque or payment instruction will terminate. If, 
however, the bank has already performed certain of the services to 
be performed pursuant to the cheque or payment instruction, the bank 
will be ent\cl.>d to the charges relating to those services if they 
are divisible or to a pro rata share of the total charges if they 
are not divisible, in accordance with the ordinary principles 
relating to ' w r v e n l n g  impossibility where performance has 
partially takeii . ;:e/258^
If the cheque or payment instruction 1s in favour of the 
customer hfmself, the additional question arises as to whether, even 
if the cheque or payment instruction 1 s fully effect .al, payment to 
the customer, as opposed to to his curator, Is effectual. This 
question has been considered above^259  ^ and the conclusion reached 
there is that the payment 1s effectual
(b) If a cheque or other payment instruction must be a valid
separate authority in U s  own right
If the view taken above^26^  is rejected that it is a term of 
the bank customer contract that apparently regular cheques and other 
payment instructions are fully1 effectual as between bank and
(258) Cf Boyd v Stuttaford & Co 1910 AO 101; De Wet & Yeats 
Kontraktereg T&F. 1
(259) See 94-7 above.
(260) The alternatives are that the bank is entitled to be 
indemnified for its negative interest or Shat it is limited to
such claims as. 1t may have based on unjust enrichment - ibid.
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customer until the bank becomes aware of the customer's loss of 
capacity to act and it Is held that a cheque or ot’ier payment 
Instruction must constitute a valid separate authority in its own 
right, it is necessary to determine firstly what the effect of the 
customer's loss of capacity is on each of the functions of the 
cheque or payment instruction and secondly if one function lapses 
vjhat the effect 1s on the other function or functions. Three 
situations require to be distinguished :
(1) Loss of capacity occurs before cheque or payment
- Instruction is issued
If the loss of capacity occurs before the cheque or payment 
instruction is issued, the ’cheque' or ‘payment instruction' 1s a 
nitl-lity and the bank has no duty or authority to honour it. If the 
bank in, fact does so, the bank's rights are, it Is considered, 
limited to such claims as it may have based on unjust 
enrichment.*262^
- Two possible qualifications where the customer's account is in 
credit cal? for consideration.
.. firstly, where the cheque or payment instruction is in favour of
cystossfr hisiself and payment is made to the customer in person 
3i« opposed to to his curator it Is also necessary to have regard to 
\'M question of what the position 1s of a debtor who pays his debt 
tc his creditor in Ignorance of the creditor's loss of capacity to
(2i>2) 9ut see (3) below (at 145-54): Excursus: A general rule that a 
person dealing with another in reliance on the other’s 
Continued capacity to act is entitled to be indemnified for 
his negative Interest?
(263) The qualifications do not arise if the customer's account is 
not in credit because they are both based on the payer being 
indebted to the payee which is not the case if the account.is 
in overdraft and the cheque or payment instruction , a 
nullity.
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act. This question is considered a b o v e ^ * ^  and it is suggested 
there that a rule should be recognised in our law entitling the 
debtor to be indemnified for his negative interest.
However, a further difficulty arises in the situation in 
question in that although the bank is indebted to the customer, if 
the cheque or payment instruction does not function as a demand and 
payment direction the debt is not due and payable ana the payee has 
not been determined. Nor does the bank have the right under the bank 
customer contract to elect at any time to pay a portion, or even the 
Whole of its indebtedness to the customer: it would first have to 
terminate the bank customer contract on due n o t i c e . T h e  
performance due by the bank is therefore neither ascertained nor due 
and payable and payment tendered by the bank to the customer could 
be rejected by the customer. Would a rule that a debtor is entitled 
to his negative interest if he pays his creditor in ignorance of the 
creditor's loss of capacity apply in these circumstances? The answer 
is, it is suggested, that despite the difficulties raised the rule 
would apply. Although the customer could have rejected the bank's 
tender of payment, had he not done so the payment would have 
constituted a va?fd payment on account of the bank's indebtedness to 
the customer, and it 1s thought that it is in accord with the 
equitable basis of the rule that it should a*>p1y wherever payment 
would have served to discharge an Indebtedness had the customer 
still had capacity to act.
Secondly, 1n the case of cheques and other payment instructions 
in favour of third parties, the third party may be a creditor of the 
customer and there is authority for the proposition that if one 
mak.es payment to one's creditor's creditor this will serve to 
discharge one's indebtedness to one's own creditor whether or not he
(264) See 94-7 above.
(265) Cf Joachimson v Swiss Banking Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110(CA) 
at 125 and~r^7; Cowen Nagotiable Instruments 418; JC Stassen 
‘uanfce en huJ Ufente' f y a V M O i /  at
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consented to 'the payment, if the payment has the effect that 'the 
creditor’s affair has been advantageously managed without his 
knowledge', although the precise scope of the rule is far from 
clear, as is the extent to which it may confer a greater right on 
the debtor than the ordinary principles of unjust enrichment.*256^
The position where the cheque is drawn and issued, or the 
payment instruction is given, not by the customer personally but by 
a representative on the customer's behalf has been considered 
above*21^  and it is unnecessary to repeat here what is said 
there. The conclusions reached were firstly that ff both the 
representative and the bank are unaware of the customer's loss of 
capacity the cheque or payment Instruction has the same effect as 1f 
it had been drawn and issued, or given, by the customer personally 
before his loss of capacity to act.*268^
The second conclusion reached was that if the bank is unaware 
of the customer's loss of capacity but the representative is aware 
of the loss the bank is limited to a claim for its negative 
interest. The effect of this would be that the bank would be
(266) Voet 46.3.7; Van der Linden 1.18.1; Pothier Obligations paras 
468 and 493; Resnlk v Lekhethoa 1950(3) SA 2b’3TT>‘"af'"i!660ff; 
C Pettigrew (i^t) Ltd v Cone Textiles (Pvt) Ltd t/a Darryn 
Textile Hills Ta / &  (37 sa bt>a (K) at s/zd-k; 'Hesse is 'Contract 
1  220?; fle Wet S Yeats Kontraktereo 234-5; Kerr contract 
301-2; 0£ Scholten's 'Payment to One s Creditor's Creditor' 
(1950) 67 SA1J 315; RS Welsh 1950 Annual Survey 85.
(267) See 97-109 above.
(268) The position in regard to such cheques drawn and payment 
instructions given before the customer's loss of capacity to 
act is dealt with at 137-45 below.
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entitled to recover the amount paid by 1t from the customer's estate 
and to set off this claim against any credit in the customer’s 
account, provided that set-off 1s not prevented for some extraneous 
r e a s o n . T h e  bank would not, however, be entitled to fts 
charges or, where applicable, to the agreed Interest, although i t  
would be entitled  to the charges and Interest, 1f any, that 1t could 
have earned elsewhere had 1t not paid the cheque or payment 
instruction. The bank would also not be liab le for damages for 
wrongful dishonour i f  i t  dishonoured the cheque or payment 
Instruction, even 1f 1t was unaware of the customer's loss of 
capacity.
(1j ) Loss of capacity occurs after cheque or payment instruction 
is  Issued but before i t  is  received by bank
Where the loss of capacity to act occurs after the cheque or 
payment instruction is issued but before i t  is received by the bank, 
i t  is  necessary to distinguish between cheques drawn and payment 
instructions given within the scope of a credit in the customer's 
account or of an overdraft fa c ility , on the one hand, and cheques 
drawn and payment Instructions given outside the scope of either 
such a cred it or such a fa c il ity , on the other. Cheques and payment 
instructions 1n the former category constitute the exercise by the 
customer of rights enjoyed by the customer under the bank customer 
relationship while cheques and payment instructions in the la tte r 
category constitute in the f ir s t  instance offers to borrow, and as 
w ill be shown the considerations applicable to the 2 categories are 
different.
(A) Customer's account 1n credit or overdraft fa c il ity  available
A cheque drawn or payment instruction given by a customer within 
the scope of a credit in the customer's account constitutes notice
(269) Cf 15 n 25 above.
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by the customer exercising the right to demand repayment of monies 
lent to the bank and the right to direct to whom payment is to be 
made.*2701 A cheque drawn or payiaent instruction given by a 
customer within the scope of an overdraft fa c il it y  constitutes 
notice exercising the right to borrow, the right to demand the 
advance of the monies lent and the right to direct to whom payment 
is  to be made.^2711
The f ir s t  question to arise 1s : When dees notice exercising a 
right under a contract take effect? D irect authority is  available in 
regard to notice exercising an option: such notice takes effect on
(272)communication to the addressee, unless otherwise agreed. 
Direct authority is , however, lacking on the position regarding 
notice making a demand or giving a payment direction, but in Swart v 
V o s W 273* i t  was held that notice exercising the right to cancel 
a contract sim ilarly takes effect on communication to the addressee 
unless otherwise agreed, and i t  is considered that the same 
principle applies by analogy to notice exercising any other right 
under a contract. I t  is  considered, moreover, that there is no basis 
for implying a term to the contrary^27**1 in the bank customer 
contract, such as that a cheque or other payment instruction takes 
effect on issue. Such a term would give rise  to the unacceptable 
anomaly that the bank would for a period - the length of which would
(270) See 21-2 above.
(271) Ibid.
(272) See eg Smelman v Volkerz 1954(4) SA 170(C) at 176E-F.
(273) 196!J(1) SA 100 (A) at 105E and 115.
(274) eg on analogy with contracts concluded through the post - see 
Cape Explosives Works Ltd v South African Oil and Fat 
Tn fe trles  Ltd is>zi ghd m4; KergeuYen Sealing and WhaHng Co 
LtcT v CIR 19^ 9 AD 487; but c f  He Wet~& Yeats KontraKtereg i'l
be subject to the whim of the holder - be subject to an obligation 
of which i t  was entirely unaware.
The second question to arise is  ; Is i t  necessary that the 
customer should continue to have capacity up to the time the cheque 
or payment instruction takes effect or does i t  suffice that he had 
capacity at the time of issuing the cheque or payment instruction? 
Direct authority on the point is  lacking and 2 competing 
considerations have, i t  is  suggested, to be weighed up In seeking 
the answer to the question-
F irs t ly , approaching the matter from a jurisprudential poii. • '-f 
view there is , i t  1s suggested, much to be said for the app> I 
that I t  is  necessary that a person performing a ju r is t ic  act, such 
as the giving of notice pursuant to a contract, should s t i l l  have 
capacity to act at the time the act takes effect. This is  obviously 
the time when the addressee must have capacity and i t  is ,  i t  is 
thought, more philosophically satisfying f ir s t ly  that the addressor 
should have capacity when the notice takes effect and secondly that 
the addressor and the addressee should have capacity at the same 
point in time.
On the other hand, practical convenience clearly favours, i t  is 
considered, the approach that the addressor nse(3 only have capacity 
to act at the time of despatching the notice. For example, i f  a 
landlord gives notice of termination of a lease he may enter into a 
new lease in respect of the premises before the notice is 
communicated to the tenant and the tenant may enter into a lease of 
new premises before he becomes aware of the landlord's loss of 
capacity, with the potential for serious prejudice to both parties 
i f  the notice is  invalid.
How 1s one to weigh up these conflicting considerations? The 
answer is , i t  is suggested, a lbeit with some diffidence, that the 
fa ir ly  vague philosophical notions mentioned above should give way
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to the hard facts of practical convenience,^275  ^ and that 
therefore i f  a customer ceases to have capacity to act after issuing 
a cheque or other payment instruction but before I t  is  received 
by^276 the bank the position w ill be the same as i f  the loss of 
capacity were only to occur after receipt by the bank, as dealt with 
b e l« .12771
I f  on the other hand the view is  taken that i t  is  necessary that 
a customer should have capacity to act not only on issuing a cheque 
or other payment instruction but also on receipt thereof by the 
bank, the position w il l  be the same as where the customer did not 
have capaci*' -t the time of issuing the cheque or payment 
tffstrweti ■ >. with above- *278^
(B) Customer's ,^bunt not in credit and no overdraft fa c ility  
available
A cheque drawn or payment instruction given outside the scope 
either of a credit In the customer's account or of an overdraft
{275) Cf the Cape Explosive Works case supra at 265 dealing with a 
sim ilar problem in "relation to ^ “ conclusion of contracts 
through the post. The philosophical d ifficu lties  can possibly 
be overcome by seeing the notice as conditional between 
despatch and receipt. On this approach the notice would on 
fulfilment of the condition date back to the time of despatch
- cf 361ff below.
(276) For present purposes the expressions 'receipt by1 and 
'communication to' the bank w ill be equated but i t  should be 
borne in mind that receipt and communication may not take 
place simultaneous^ and that i t  1s in fact communication that 
is  the relevant point in time.
(277) See 137-45 below.
(278) See 129-32 above.
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fa c il ity  constitutes 1n the f ir s t  Instance an offer to borro*/27^  
and as already pointed out^280* an offer lapses on the offeror's 
loss of capacity to act 1f the offer has not beers accepted prior to 
the loss of capacity. Moreover tho demand and payment direction 
functions of such a cheque or payment instruction are dependent upon 
acceptance of the offer to borrow so that I f  the offer lapses the 
other functions necessarily lapse too. I t  follows that acceptance of 
the offer Is  the c r it ica l time in determining the bank's position in 
regard to such a cheque or payment. Instruction. .
I t  does not necessarily follow, however! that i f  the bank 
purports to accept the offer and honours the cheque or payment 
instruction in ignorance of the customer's loss of capacity i t  w ill 
be limited to such claims as 1t may have based on unjust enrichment. 
This question is  dealt with above^28^  and the conclusion reached 
there is  that the better view is  that the bank is  entitled to be 
indemnified for its  negative interest 1e the bank is  entitled to 
recover the amount paid by i t  together with the interest ft  could 
nave earned elsewhere had 1t not honoured the cheque or payment 
instruction.
The position in regard to the bank's charges is , i t  is 
suggested, sim ilar. I f  the offer function of a cheque or other 
payment instruction does not fa ll away in its  entirety but s t i l l  
serves to afford the bank the right to its  negative fnterest, i t  fs 
suggested that the other functions should do likewise.
Where the cheque or payment instruction is  in favour of th« 
customer himself and payment is  made to the customer in person as 
opposed to to his curator, the bank w i l l ,  i t  is  suggested,
(279) See 20 and 23 above.
(280) See 72-4 above.
(281) See 109-126 above.
nevertheless be entitled to be indemnified for Its  negative Interest 
inasmuch as i t  Is  entitled to Its  negative interest both 1n Its
capacity as offeree^282  ^ and 1n U s  capacity as payer, 
this view is  Incorrect, the bank w in  be limited to such claims as 
1t  may have based on unjust enrichment.
(H i )  Loss of capacity occurs after cheque or payment instruction 
1s received by the bank but before i t  is  honoured or 
dishonoured
Where the loss of capacity to act occurs after the cheque or 
payment instruction 1s received by the bank but before i t  is 
honoured or dishonoured, I t  is again necessary to distinguish 
between cheques drawn and payment Instructions given within the 
scope of a credit In the customer's account or of an overdraft 
fa c il it y ,  on the one hand, and cheques drawn and payment 
Instructions given outside the scope of either such a credit or such 
an over/flraft fa c il ity , on the other.
(A) Customer's account in credit or overdraft fa c il it y  available
As already pointed ou t/284  ^ a cheque drawn or other payment 
Instruction given within the scope of a credit in the customer's 
account serves a dual function, namely a demand for repayment of a 
loan repayable on demand and a direction regarding to whom payment 
is  to be made. A cheque drawn or other payment instruction given 
within the scope of an overdraft fa c il ity  serves a trip le  function, 
namely the exercise of an option to borrow, a demand for the advance 
of the monies lent and a direction regarding to whom payment is to
. (283} I f
(282) See 109-126 above.
(283) Soe 94-7 above.
(284) See 21-2 above.
be made. A ll these functions take effect on receipt by the bank of 
the cheque or payment instruction ,^85  ^ but the question arises as 
to what the effect 1s on the cheque or payment Instruction I f  the 
customer ceases to have capacity to act before the bank honours or 
dishonours 1t.
In seeking the answer to this question i t  Is  necessary to recall 
that the bank customer relationship consists of a combination of a 
contract of mandate - the bank customer contract - and one or more 
contracts of loan from time to time,^®*^ and that the payment 
direction function relates to the mandate element of the 
relationship and the demand and exercise of an option functions to 
the loan element.^287^
The effect of a mandant's loss of capacity to act on a mandate 
has been dealt with above^2®8 * and the conclusion reached there is 
that the better view is  that the mandate only lapses o'* the 
mandatary's becoming aware of the loss of capacity and not on the 
loss it s e lf  1e the payment direction function of the cheque or 
payment instruction remains fu lly  effectual until the bank becomes 
aware of the customer's loss of capacity.
(285) See 133-4 above.
(286) See 6ff above.
(2S7) See 21-3 above.
(288) See 37-51 above.
(289) I f  this view of the effect of a mandant's loss of capacity 1s 
Incorrect, the alternatives are - ibid - that i f  the mandatary 
perforins the mandate 1n ignorance of the loss of capacity lie 
is entitled to be indemnified, although i t  is not clear 
whether the Indemnity would be for hf:v positive Interest or 
bts negative interest. I f  a mandatary Is  entitled to his 
positive Interest, the bank would have the same rights i t  
would have had had the customer not ceased to have cap^ ity 
but would not incur any l ia b i l i t y  for wrongful dishonour i f  i t  
dishonoured the cheque or payment instruction. I f  a mandatary 
is entitled to his negative interest only, the
{Footnote continued on next page)
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What Is  the effect on a demand of the demandant's loss of 
capacity? The answer is , I t  is consiuered, that a demand would not 
normally lapse after 1t had taken effect. There Is a dearth, of 
authority on the question but 1t Is  conslderd that on general 
principle after a legal act has taken effect I t  does not lapse i f  
the doer ceases to have capacity to act. There are exceptions, such 
as offers to contract, but these exceptions arise from their own 
special circumstances - such as the requirement that ther-e be 
consensus ad Idem at the same point In time, in the case of the 
conclusion of a contract - which are not applicable to demands. 
Moreover, to make an exception of demands and other analogous 
.notices would lead to serious anomalies. For example, I f  a landlord 
gives notice of termination of a lease he may enter into a new lease 
in respect of the premises, and the tenant may likewise enter Into a 
lease in respect of new premises; the anomalies that would arise i f  
the notice lapsed on the landlord's loss of capacity to act are 
manifest.
Sim ilarly, the exercise of the option to borrow would not 
normally lapse a fte r i t  had taken effect, i f  the customer ceases to 
have; capacity to act. A contract comes Into existence when the 
exerHse of the option takes effect and 1n general contracts do not
(2901lapse i f  either party ceases to hay* capacity to a c t. ' 1
(Footnote continued from previous page}
bank would be entitled to recover the amount paid by i t  from 
the customer's estate and to set off this claim against the 
credit In the customer's account, provided that set-off 1s not 
prevented for some extraneous reason. The bank would not, 
however, be entitled to its  agreed charges, but would Instead 
be entitled to such amount as 1t could have earned elsewhere 
had 1t not honoured the cheque or payment Instruction. Nor 
would U  be liab le  for damages for wrongful dishonour i f  I t  
dishonoured the cheque or payment Instruction.
(290} FHedlamter v Da Aar Municipality 1944 AD 79 at 93.
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What, however, is  the position In regard to the demand and
exercise of an option functions of a cheque or payment Instruction
i f  before honouring the cheque or payment Instruction the bank
becomes aware of the customer's loss of capacity with the result
that the payment direction function lapses? Are the demand and
exercise of an option functions so closely linked to the payment
direction function that I f  the la tte r  function lapses so do the
former functions, fe the functions are 1ndivisible? True, i f  the
payment direction function lapses this question is  of limited
practical significance, but i t  1s not entirely without significance:
for example, 1f the customer's account 1s In credit and the demand
1291)function does not lapse prescription w ill run, ' no further
demand w ill be necessary before the Institution of actlon^292  ^ and
set-off w ill operate 1f there is a reciprocal debt which 1s 
(293)sim ilarly due and payable.
(291) Section 12(1) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969, but see 
Malan B il ls  of Exchange § 328 n 150 who takes the view that 
prescription in any event commences to run in respect of a 
deposit as soon as 1t is  made ie even before demand. (Cowen 
Negotiable Instruments 419-420 takes the same view 1n relation 
to the Prescription Act 18 of 1943.) The correctness of this 
view is , however, doubted. The Prescription Act Is  designed to 
penalise a person who can enforce a claim by action but does 
not do so - Van Vuuren v Poshoff 1964 ' ! )  SA 395(T} at 401D - 
and i t  would-be an anomaly i f  a- customer were to be penalised 
for not Immediately reclaiming a deposit made by him when the 
very object of the bank customer contract is that the bank 
w ill hold the customer's funds until lie demands repayment.
(292) Herbstein 8 Van Wlnsen The C iv il Practice of the Superior 
Courts in South Africa 3rd ed byTdev van Wlnsen, J i^  EJaeen S 
AC C lllle rs  (tape Town 1979) 101* '
(293) Postmaster-General v Taute 1905 IS  582 at 590; Thorne & Anor 
ffR)" ';  The uovernment ia/3(4) SA 42(T) at 45F, confirmed• on 
apiieftf sub nom The Government v Thorne 8 Anor HNO 1974(2) SA 
1(A) a f w r : ------------------------------------
1*1.
The better view is , i t  is considered, that the payment 
direction, demand and exercise of an option functions are 
Indivisib le and accordingly that i f  the payment direction function 
lapses so do the other 2 functions. I f  the customer’s account is  in 
credit and the payment direction function lapses the payee is 
undetermined and the bank does not have the right under the bank 
customer contract to elect at any time to pay a portion, or even the 
whole, of its  indebtedness to the customer: 1t would f i r s t  have to 
terminate the bank customer contract on due notice.^94) 
Accordingly, i f  the demand were to stand despite the lapse of the 
payment direction, the bank would be under an obligation to make 
payment but would not know to whom payment should be made. Such an 
anomaly is  unacceptable and i t  is considered that i t  follows that i t  
is  im plicit in the bank customer contract that the demand function 
Rust lapse with the payment direction function.
{294} Cf Joachfmson v Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110{CA) at 
127: National Westminster Bank l t d _v— Halesowen Presswork and 
AssemSliesTO [W if l '1  A ll Ik  t>41 {hLTat bblfl’.
(295) Could I t  be argued that this reasoning has no application 
where the cheque or payment, instruction is in favour of the 
customer himself because i t  serves only one function, namely a 
demand, which does not. lapse? The answer is , i t  is  considered, 
in the negative. As already pointed out (at 8-9 above), the 
bank undertakes under the bank customer contract to render 
various services of which payment to a third party is  only 
one. )for example, the bank impliedly undertakes, i t  is 
considered, to remain open at certain hours, to have 
reasonable quantities of.cash readily available for immediate 
withdrawal, to allow the customer to specify what 
denominations of notes and coins he wants, to keep, and to 
furnish copies to the customer of, statements reflecting all 
transactions on the customer's account, etc. When, therefore, 
a customer Issues a cheque or payment Instruction In his own 
favour he is  not merely demanding repayment of a loan but is  
availing himself of these services; in other words the cheque 
or payment instruction relates both to the loan and mandate 
elements of the bank customer relationship.
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The same is , i t  is  thought, true of the exercise of an option 
function. I f  f t  were otherwise, the anomaly would arise that a 
contract of loan would come into existence in the amount of the 
cheque or paynten; instruction, but, due to the fact that the demand 
and payment direction functions had not taken effect, i t  would 
remain in the discretion of the customer whether or not. to demand 
the advance of the loan. Such a loan would in any event be largely 
indistifigatsbable from the option to borrow from which i t  arises; in 
fact, the grant of t,?!s overdraft fa c il ity  could, as already pointed 
out, it s e lf  ?’i3V<? be&n categorised as such a loan, but the
view taken was that i t  is  bettar categorised ac an option to borrow. 
In other words, the demand, payment directlesfc Exercise of an 
option functions are a ll ind ivisib le.
I f  the payment direction, demand and exercise of an option 
functions of a cheque or other payment instruction do not lapse 
until the bank becomes aware of the customer's loss of capacity i t  
follows that i f  a bank is unaware of the loss of capacity at the 
time of honouring a cheque or payment instruction, the payment w ill 
constitute:
- a valid  repayment on account of the bank's indebtedness to the 
customer where the customer's account is in credit;
- a valid  advance of monies lent where the account is  not in 
credit, and the bank w ill be entitled to recover the loan in 
accordance with its  terms, together with the agreed interest.
The bank w ill also be entitled to its  charges. Conversely, i f  the 
bank dishonoured the cheque or payment instruction despite being
(296) See 19-21 above.
(297) Subject to what is  said below i f  the payee > the customer
himself.
unaware of the customer's loss of capacity, the bank w ill be in 
breach of contract and w ill be liab le  for such damages, I f  any, as
(298)the customer way have suffered as a result.
I f  the bank becomes aware of the customer's loss of capacity 
before honouring the cheque or payment instruction the functions of 
the cheque uv payment instruction lapse and the bank has no duty or 
authority to honour 1t; accordingly, i f  the bank does In fact honour 
i t  the bank's rights w ill be limited to such rights as i t  may have 
based on unjust enrichment. I f ,  however, certain of the services to 
be rendered by the bank in connection with the cheque or other 
payment instruction have been rendered prior to the customer's loss 
of capacity the bank w ill be entitled to its  charges up to thfe time 
i t  becomes aware of the loss of capacity. The amount recoverable in 
respect of its  charges w ill be determinable in the same way as i f  
further performance had become impossible for any other reason: i f  
the services are d ivis ib le  the bank w ill be entitled to the charges 
relating to the services that have been rendered, but i f  the 
services are not d ivisib le the bank w ill be entitled to a pro rata 
share of the total charges.
Where the cheque or payment instruction is  in favour of the 
customer himself and payment is  made to the customer in person as 
opposed to to his curator i t  is also necessary to have regard to the 
question of what the position is of a debtor who pays his debt tc 
his creditor 1n ignorance of the creditor's loss of capacity to act. 
This question is  considered above^*^ and I t  Is  suggested there
143.
(298) On wrongful dishonour generally see Cowen Negotiable 
Instruments 394-415; Malan B i l ls  of Exchange # 326.
(299) Boyd v Stuttaford & Co 1910 AD 101; De Wet & Yeats 
Kontraktereg 159.
(300) See 94-7 above.
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that a rule should be recognised in our law entitling  the debtor to 
be Indemnified for his negative interest. I f  such a rule is 
recognised, the bank would be able to recover the amount paid by i t  
from the customer's estate and i f  the customer's account is  in 
credit to set o ff the right of recovery against the credit, provided 
that set-off is  not prevented for an extraneous r e a s o n . T h e  
bank would not, however, be entitled to Its  charges or, where the 
account is in overdraft, to the agreed interest, but would be 
entitled to recover the charges and interest i t  could have earned 
elsewhere had i t  not honoured the cheque or payment instruction. I f  
a rule entitling the payer to his negative interest is  not 
recognised the bank w ill be limited to such claims as i t  may have 
frased on unjust enrichment. Whether or not such a rule is 
recognised, the bank would not incur any l ia b il it y  for damages for 
wrongful dishonour i f  i t  refused payment to the customer.
{8} Customer's account not in credit and riO overdraft fa c ility
available
The position where a cheque is  drawn or a payment istruction is
given outside the scope either of a credit in the cusc jr 's  account
or of an overdraft fa c il ity  has already been dealt with above in
dealing with the position where the loss of capacity occurs after
the cheque is  drawn or payment instruction is  given but before i t  is
(302)received by the bank. However, where the loss of capacity 
occurs after receipt by the bank of the cheque or payment 
instruction the fuHfter possibility arises that the bank may have 
accepted the offer to borrow, but not have made payment, before the 
loss of capacity occurs. This possibility accordingly ca lls  for 
consideration.
(301) Cf 15 n 25 above.
(302} See 135-7 above.
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Generally, a contract comes into existence when the acceptance 
of the offer is  coimamicated to the offeror, bo the parties are 
free to agree that some other fact or circumstance w ill constitute 
acceptance.*303* In the context of the bank customer contract, i t  
is  considered that acceptance normally occurs when the banl< actually 
honours the cheque or payment Instruction, although acceptance may 
take place ea rlie r 1n certain circumstances eg where the customer 
obtains an advance commitment from the bank that 1t w ill honour the 
cheque or payment Instruction. Where this occurs the bank's position 
w i l l ,  1t 1s considered, be the same as where the cheque was drawn or 
the payment Instruction was given within the scope of an overdraft 
fa c il it y  as dealt with above.®304*
(3) Excursus: A general rule that a person dealing with another in 
reliance on the other's continued capacity to act 1s entitled to 
be Indemnified for his negatfve Interest?  '
(a) Preliminary
I t  has been seen that the problem of one person's acting to his 
prejudice 1n ignorance of another's loss of capacity to act arises 
in a variety of situations eg where a debtor pays his creditor in 
ignorance of the creditor's loss of capacity, where an offeree 
purports to accept an offer and performs his 'obligations' under the 
resulting 'contract' In ignorance of the offeror's loss of capacity, 
where a mandatary performs the mandate in Ignorance of the mandant's 
loss of capacity ( f f  the mandate lapses on the mandant's loss of 
capacity), where a person re lies in ignorance of the principal's 
loss of capacity on an act which a representative with ostensible
(303) See eg Bloom v The American Swiss Watch Co 1915 AD 100 at 
102-3; brlftwood Properties (Pt.v) Ltd v McLean 1971 (3) SA 
591(A) aFS97C'.
(304) see 137-44 above.
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authority purports to perform on the principal’s behalf, etc. The 
view has alreacly been taken^305  ^ that 1n each of these situations 
the prejudiced party is  entitled to be indemnified for his negative 
interest. The question may be asked, however, whether thera 1s not a 
more general rule that a prejudiced party 1s entitled  to be 
indemnified for his negative interest whenever he acts to his 
prejudice in reliance on another's continued capacity to act, and 
whether the cases where a right to indemnification is allowed should 
not rather be regarded as illustrations of the general^ rule than as 
separate rules applicable only 1n specific situations.*'’06^
The desirability of a more general rule entitling  a prejudiced 
party to Indemnification for his negative interest is , 1t is 
suggested, fa ir ly  clear. I t  is  generally not practicable for parties 
dealing with one another to verify one another's capacity at a ll 
relevant stages of their dealings - eg at the time of the offer, the 
acceptance, the performance of each obligation under the contract 
and the giving or receipt of any notice under the contract - and ff  
they were to endeavour to do so the free flow of trade would be 
severely hampered. And the law should rather seek to avoid than 
promote such a result.
True, 1t can be argued that in practice the risk w ill generally 
be run Irrespective of by whom I t  is borne, and the question from a 
practical point of view is  therefore rather who should bear the loss
(305) See 94-7, 109-126, 41-51 and 97-109 above.
(306) The practical significance of a right to indemnification for 
one's negative interest lie s  in the fact that i f  one Is 
entitled to be indemnified for one's negative Interest one is 
entitled to be placed in the same position one would have been 
in had one not acted as one did; 1n other words, one is 
entitled to recover one's expenses together with the pro fit 
one could have earned elsewhere. In the case of unjust 
enrichment, on the other hand, one's right of recovery 1s 
limited to the extent of the other party's enrichment.
i f  i t  occurs. However, even approached from this point of view i t  is 
suggested that the risk more proper)./ fa lls  on the estate of the 
party who ceases to have capacity to act. A legal representative is  
generally appointed to represent such a person, and the 
representative can take steps to notify persons with whom the person 
had dealings that the person has ceased to have capacity to act, 
thus avoiding or minimising any loss.^307  ^ The party who has 
retained capacity to act, on the other hand, is  in practice 
generally not able to monitor the other party's capacity to act from 
time to time, despite the fact that in theory he could do so and 
that therefore i t  would seem at f ir s t  sight equitable that he should 
bear the loss i f  fie does not do so. .
(b) Principal situations 1r. which rule would apply
The principal specific situations in which such a general rule 
would apply are examined in what follows, with special reference to 
the state of development of a specific rule covering each situation 
or, in the abserise of such a rule, with reference to the extent to 
which such a rule can be inferred covering the situation concerned 
by analogy with other situations where a rule has developed. As w ill 
be seen the common feature of a ll the situations is  tho reasonable 
reliance placed by the prejudiced party on the continued capacity to 
act of the other party.
(1) Offers
In the case of offers to contract I t  has already been pointed 
out(308) that the authorities are divided on whether the offeree
147.
(307) In practice, family, friends and business associates often 
perform the same function on an informal basis pending the 
appointment of a legal representative.
(308) See 109-26 above.
iis  entitled to be Indemnified for his loss i f  he purports to accept 
the of.-flr* and performs his ‘obligations' under the resulting 
'contract' 1n ignorance of -trie lapsing of the offer due to the 
offeror's loss of capacity to act, but the view taken was that the 
better view is that the offeree is  entitled to be indemnified for 
his negative interest.
On the other hand, i f  the offeror has ceased to have capacity to 
act before purporting to make the offer there would not seem to be 
any scope for the application of a rule entitling the offeree to his 
negative interest. The basis of the suggested rule 1s the reasonable 
reliance by the prejudiced party on the continued capacity to act of 
the other party, not on his having capacity both ab In it io  and 
thereafter. A possible exception would be where there has been a 
regular course of dealings between the parties, eg where a trader 
regularly orders goods from a supplier. I t  would not be practicable 
for the supplier to verify the trader's capacity to act before 
accepting and executing eich order, and i t  could therefore be argued 
that there is scope for the application of such a rule in this 
situation on the ground of the supplier's reasonable reliance on the 
continued capacity of the trader.
(11} Acceptance of offers
Although the acceptance of an offer fn general only takes effect 
on comnuinfcation to the offeror*309  ^ i t  is thought that i t  is  only 
necessary that the offeree should have capacity to act on despatch 
of the acceptance and not also on communication of the acceptance to 
the offeror.®310  ^ Should this view be wrong and should the offeror
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(309) See 145 above.
(310) Cf 134-5 above dealing s. alogous question 1n relation 
to notices exercising k -h ' contracts.
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perform his 'obligations' under the 'contract' 1n ignorance of the 
lapsing of the acceptance due to the offeree's loss of capacity 
before conrnunlcation to the offeror, the offeror should be entitled 
to his negative Interest on analogy with the position of an offeree 
as dealt with 1n the previous section.
Where the loss of capacity precedes the purported acceptance 
there would not seem to be any scope for  the application of such a 
rule, subject to the possible exception dealt with 1n the previous 
section where there has been a regular course of dealings.
( i i f ) Options
The exercise of an option, being a notice exercising a right 
under a contract, is  subject to the same considerations as are dealt 
with under (v) below.
( iv )  Performance of obligations
The position of a debtor who pays his creditor 1n ignorance of 
the creditor's loss of capacity has been dealt with above*3*1  ^ and 
the conclusion reached there is that a rule should be recognised in 
our law entitling such a debtor to be Indemnified for his negative 
interest* Moreover, i t  is considered that similar considerations 
would apply by analogy to tfc* performance of any other obligation.
(v) Notices exercising rights under contracts
I f  either party to a contract gives notice to the other party
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(311) See 94-7 above.
exercising any right^31*  ^ under the contract i t  is obviously 
necessary that both the addressor and the addressee should have 
capacity to act at the time the notice Is  given. In the case of the 
addressee this clearly means that he must have capacity at the time 
of receiving the notice. In the case of the addressor the position
(313iIs  less clear but the view has already been taken that he 
need only have capacity at the time of despatching the notice. 
However, whatever the true position, the possibility exists that 
either party may not have capacity at the required point in time and 
the other party may act to his prejudice in Ignorance of this fact. 
For example, a landlord, having given notice terminating or 
cancelling the lease, may re le t the premises in ignorance of the 
fact that the notice is  ineffectual because the 'tenant did not have 
capacity to act at the time of receiving the notice. Sim ilarly, the 
tenant may hire new premises in ignorance of the fact that the 
landlord lacked capacity at the/ time of givfng the js.
As pointed out in the previous section, toe, view has already
been taken^3141 that a debtor who performs his obligations in
ignorance.,of the- creditor's loss of- capacity to act is entitled to
be Indemnified for his negative interest, and i f  the performance of
an obligation is protected should not the exercise of a right be
similar1’!, protected by analogy? And i f  the addressor is  entitled to 
be prote iid  should not the addressee be too? .
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(312) eg notice terminating the wntract, notice cancelling the 
contract by reason of the other party's breach, notice 
exercising an election, etc.
(313) See 134-5 above.
(314) See 94-7 above. '
( v i )  Mandates
The position In regard to mandates has been considered in detail 
above*315  ^ and I t  Is  unnecessary to repeat here what is  said 
there. The conclusion reached was that in the absence of agreement 
to the contrary a mandate in fact only lapses on the mandatary's 
becoming aware of the mandant's loss of capacity, but that I f  this 
view is  wrong with the result that a mandate terminates on the 
mandant's loss of capacity and i f  the mandatary performs the mandate 
in Ignorance of the mandant's loss of capacity, he 1s entitled to be 
indemnified for his negative Interest. This would in any event apply 
where there is  an agreement that the mandate w ill terminate on the 
mandant's loss of capacity.
Sim ilarly, f f  the mandant perforins any of his obligations fn 
ignorance of the lapsing of the mandate due to the mandatary's loss
of capacity he should, i t  1s suggested, likewise be entitled to his 
negative Interest.
( v i i )  Other contracts which lapse on a party's loss of capacity
Mandates are not the only category of contract to lapse i f  a 
party ceases to have capacity to act: a ll contracts which are 
personal to the parties do likewise.*3*6  ^ What, then, 1s the 
position of the other party i f  he performs his 'obligations' under 
such a contract 1n Ignorance of the fact that the other party has 
ceased to have capacity to act and therefore the contract has 
lapsed? I t  is  suggested that 1f offerees, offerors, debtors.
(315} See 41-51 above.
(316) Frledlander y De Aar Municipality 1944 AD 79 at 93; R W Lee 4 
A ft HonoreThe SouffwU'rfcafTlaw of Obligations 2nd ed edited 
by E NewmanTTJKciJuold-Hasoh (Durban 1978) f t  117, 121 and
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creditors, and, especially, mandataries, have a right to 
Indemnification 1t would be d iff icu lt  to deny a sim ilar right to the 
party who performs his obligations under such circumstances.
(v111) Representation
A representative who performs a ju r is t ic  act on behalf of his 
principal in ignorance of the p rincipal's loss of capacity should, 
1t is  suggested, be entitled to the same rights as a 
mandatary;^"17* In fact he w ill often aHc be a mandatary.^1®*
The position of a third party who In ignorance of the 
principal's loss of capacity relies on a ju r is t ic  act performed by a 
representative on the principal's behalf has been dealt with in 
detail a b o v e . T h e  conclusions reached were that where both 
the representative and the third party are unaware of the loss of 
cap?,cits/ the third party is entitled to be indemnified for his 
positive interest and not merely his negative Interest. The reason 
for th is, however, is  that i t  1s necessary, 1n view of the 
representative's Implied warranty of authority, that the third party 
be Indemnified for his positive Interest in order to afford the 
representative a fu ll Indemnity for his negative Interest. Where, on 
the other hand, 1t 1s only the third party who is unaware of the 
principal's loss oF capacity he Is only entitled to his negative 
interest, and then only 1f the representative had ostensible 
authority to represent the principal ie i f  there is  a basis for the 
third party's reliance on the continued’ capacity to act of the 
principal.
(317) See 106-7 above.
(318) He may not always be eg he may be a guardian, an executor, etc
- see 97 n 170 above.
(319) See 97-109 above.
(c) Negligence in relation to absence of knowledge
In dealing with the position where a debtor pays his debt to the 
creditor in ignorance of the creditor's loss of capacity to 
a c t , ^ ^  mention was made of the requirement that, for the debtor 
to be Indemnified for his negative interest, he should not have been 
negligent. The negligence referred to 1s negligence in relation to 
the absence of knowledge of the creditor's loss of capacity to act; 
in other words, the debtor would not be entitled to be indemnified 
i f  he either knew or ought to have known of the creditor's loss of 
capacity.
This requirement of absence of negligence in relation to the 
absence of knowledge of the creditor's loss of capacity to act 
arises, i t  is considered, from the principle that no-one should 
benefit by his own wrongful conduct. I t  follows that the
requirement would not be limited to performance of obligations but 
would apply whenever indemnification is sought in terms of the 
general rule suggested in this section, or, i f  such a general rule 
is  rejected, then whenever Indemnification is  sought in terms of any 
of the specific rules referred to.
(d) flood fafth
Good faith is sometimes listed  as a requirement*"^^ but i t  is 
doubtful whether this means any more than absence of knowledge of 
the loss of capacity to act.
(320) See 94-7 above.
(321) Digest 50.17.134.1; W ille Principles 16-18.
(322) Voet 46.3.5 (payment by debtor); Pothier Mandate para 106 
(mandates); Hahlo 4 Kahn Laws 452 (offers).
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(e) Conclusion
The development of commerce from its  earliest beginnings has 
seen a steady movement away from transaction! concluded and 
fmplemented in person to transactions where personal contact may be 
infrequent or entirely absent. Moreover, the steadily increasing 
size of modern cormunities has resulted in members having less 
knowledge of what has befallen one another. The possibility 
therefore of a person acting to his prejudice in ignorance of 
another's loss of capacity to act is much increased, and the need 
for the law to accord sucn a person protection has increased apace. 
This need was apparently fe lt  both in Roman and Roman-Dutch times 
giving rise to the tentative development of the rules according 
protection to debtors, offerees and mandataries. This is  a healthy 
process of development of the law to meet the needs of the community 
and i t  is  to be hoped that our courts w ill pursue the process of 
development to its  logical conclusion by holding that there is a 
general rule of which the above cases are merely illustrations. 
However, whether the courts w ill be prepared to take such a step in 
the absence of legislation remains to be seen.*3231
(4) What constitutes notice of insanity, inability to manage one's
a ffa irs or prodigality?
(a) Preliminary
As pointed out above,*3241 insanity is a question of fact. 
'Certification ' serves only to transfer the onus of proof to the 
party denying insanity. Moreover, insanity is  often very d iff icu lt
(323) Cf the reluctance of the courts to recognise a general unjust 
enrfcftment actfon - Mortje & Anor v Pool HQ 1965 (3) SA 96(A); 
Joubert Law of South Africa vol 9 'Enrichment' by JG Lotz # 63.
(324) See 31-3 above. •
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to diagnose even for an expert possessed of a ll the facts. The 
position Is  further complicated by the fact that a person's 
condition may fluctuate between sanity and Insanity-' The position 
regarding inab ility  to manage one's a ffa irs 1s sim ilar, with the 
added problem that a person way be partia lly  able and partia lly  
unable to manage his a ffa irs . A prodigal, on the other hand, only 
loses his capacity to act when he is declared a p-odigal by the 
court. In the case of prodigality, therefore, the only question with 
which the prodigal's bank need concern It s e lf  is  whether or not such 
an order has been granted; i t  is  not necessary for the bank to make 
I t s  own assessment of the prodigal's mental state as i t  must do in 
the case of insanity and inab ility  to manage one's a ffa irs.
What is  the bank's position i f  i t  receives information 
indicating that a customer has become Insane or unable to manage his 
a ffa irs or has been declared a prodigal, but the information is  not 
conclusive or subsequently proves to be incorrect? Cowen, 
citing P a g e t/ ^ ^  says in relation to notice of a customer's 
death for the purposes of s 73 of the B i l ls  of Exchange Act:
‘Actual knowledge of the customer's death, however acquired, 
terminates the banker's authority; formal notice, though 
sufficient, 1s not necessary. On the other hanJ j mere rumour 
would be Insufficient for the banker to act uson, though he 
could not safely disregard any reliable in'forriation, for 
instance, an announcement in a responsible newspaper,1
The position is , however, more complex than this and ca lls  for an 
examination f ir s tly  of the question whether the bank must make
(325) Negotiable Instruments 417.
(326) Banking 6th ed (1961) at 259-60. The statement relied on does 
not appear in the 9th ed.
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further enquiry i f  i t  receives Information which is  not conclusive, 
and secondly of the question whether the bank w ill be entitled to 
any protection i f  i t  reasonably but wrongly concludes that the 
customer has or has not ceased to have capacity to act and i f  i t  
acts accordingly. These questions w ill be considered separately in 
what follows.
Consideration w ill also be given to the question of whether a 
bank w ill be deemed to have constructive notice of any order of 
court declaring a customer insane or incapable of managing his 
a ffa irs or a prodigal.
(b) Duty to make further enquiry
I f  a bank receives information, or observes behaviour, which 
causes i t  to suspect, or whiek w. hj l hiss a reasonable person to 
suspect, that a customer has cei <. i t,o -ve capacity to act, must 
the bank make further enquiry on f.. ; • -ihe forfeiture, i f  i t  does 
not do so, of the protection accorded to a bank i f  i t  honours a 
customer's cheques and other payment instructions without knowledge 
that the customer has ceased to have capacity to act?
The answer to this question lie s , i t  is considered, in the fact 
that the bank customer contract is a contract of mandate and that i t  
is a feature of mandates that the mandatary must act in the 
interests of the mandant pursuant to the mandatary's duty of the 
good f a f t f i .^ ^  I t  follows, f t  fs considered, that i f  the bank 
has cause to suspect that the customer has ceased to have capacity
{327) See eg Gaius 3.155; Van teeuwen Cf 1.4.24.8; Pothier Mandate 
Para S v Keller 1971(2) SA 79{A) at 44A-C; Kerr Agency 
134ff; Jou'bert Verteenwoordigi ngsreg 215ff.
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to act I t  must endeavour to establish whether or not this is in fact 
so, with a view to avoiding loss being suffered by the 
customer.*32®*
The same conclusion can, f t  fs considered, also be reached ■ on 
another basis.
The vfew has been taken above^329* that i t  is  a term of the 
bank customer contract tha* tpparently regular cheques and other 
payment instructions are fuHy effectual as between bank and 
customer until the bank becomes aware of the customer's loss of 
capacity, irrespective of whether or not the customer had capacity 
to act at the time of drawing the cheque or giving the payment 
instruction and of whether or not the customer continues to have 
capacity to act up to the time when the bank honours or dishonours 
the cheque or payment Instruction. The effect of this 
interpretation is to place the bank in a significantly better 
position than 1t would be in i f  a cheque or other payment 
instruction must constitute a separate authority, and i t  is 
considered that i t  is  im plicit in the ratio for the recognition of 
such a term that the bank must act reasonably to be entitled to the 
protection afforded by the term. And this duty to act reasonably 
would, i t  is  considered, extend to the making of further enquiries 
where the bank has reason to suspect that the customer may have 
ceased to have capacity to act.
What further enquiries the bank can -make wf?I depend on the 
circumstances. Where prodigality is  in question the court records 
can be inspected to ascertain whether or not an order declaring the 
customer a prodigal has been granted. The court records can also be 
inspected where insanity and inab ility  to manage one's a ffairs are
(328) Failure to do so could '-ell be construed as furthering its  own 
interests in lieu of the customer’s.
(329) See 76-91 above.
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in question but as already pointed out the existence or otherwise of 
an order of court is  not decisive of the issue. The bank w ill 
therefore need to make such further enquiries as discretion permits, 
the test being, i t  is considered, what enquiries a reasonable person 
would make in the circumstances.
(c) What is the bank's position i f  i t  reasonably but wrongly
concludes that a customer has, or does not have, capacity?
I t  may well happen that a bank reasonably but wrong!" concludes 
that a customer has or does not have capacity to act a\ivi that i t  
acts accordingly, honouring the customer's cheques and other payment 
instructions despite the fact that the customer has ceased to have 
capacity to act, or dishonouring the customer's cheques and other 
payment instructions despite the fact that the customer has not 
ceased to have capacity to act. The question accordingly arises as 
to whether the bank is  entitled to any protection by reason of the 
fact that i t  acted reasonably a lbe it wrongly.
I f  the bank reasonably but wrongly conduces that the customer 
has capacity to act, the answer to this question is , i t  is 
considered, that the bank w ill be in the same position i t  would have 
been in had i t  been entirely unaware of anything untoward in 
relation to the customer's capacity to act.
On the other hand, i f  the bank reasonably but wrongly cocludes
that the customer has ceased to have capacity to set and accordingly
dishonours the customer's cheques and other payment instructions,
the fact that the bank acted reasonably w ill not avail i t  as a
(3301defence to a claim for damages for wrongful dishonour.
{330} Except where the claim is  framed in delict - see generally 
Cowen Negotiable Instruments 394ff in regard to claims in 
contract and delict and the d iffering requirements for the 2 
categories of claims.
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(d) Constructive notice
Court records are available for public Inspection*331  ^ and the 
question accordingly arises as to whether constructive notice w ill 
be imputed to a bank of any order of court declaring a customer 
insane or incapable of managing his a ffa irs  or a prodigal.
An analogy can, i t  is  considered, be drawn between court records 
and the records of a deeds registry, which are likewise available 
for public inspection. A number of early cases*332  ^ held the 
registration of a deed in a deeds registry to constitute notice to 
the world of the deed's contents but 1n Frye's {Pty) ltd  v 
R1es*333  ^ the Appellate Division held:
‘ I t  is  quite clear, therefore, that registration is  Intended to 
protect the real rights of those persons in whose names such 
rights are registered 1n the Deeds Office. I t  is  obvious that 
the Deeds Office is  a ' source of information concerning such 
rights, but the real function of registration is the protection 
of the persons in whose names real rights have been registered. 
Such rights are maintainable against the whole world, but that 
does not mean that every person 1n the wor?d must be deemed to 
know the ownership of every real right registered at the Deeds 
Office . . . .
'The owner of a registered servitude 1s protected not because 
every person in the world must be deemed to have knowledge of 
the servitude but because registration has by law the same 
effect as the express notification to a ll the world would have.1
13311
(332) See eg Smith v F a rre lly 's  Trustee 1904 TS 949 at 961 in which 
i t  was said:
'One of the objects of registration is  to give notice to 
the world of the creation of the Interest, and thus to 
enable creditors to ascertain the facts and protect their 
own in terests.1
(333) 1957(3) SA 575(A) at 583E and 584H-585A.
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I t  Is  considered that f t  follows by analogy that the fact that court 
records are open for public Inspection does not mean that a ll the 
world w ill be deemed to have knowledge of the contents of such 
records, and i t  1s furthermore considered that there 1s no rule of 
law comparable to the one relating to registration in a deeds 
registry that the ava ilab ility  of court records for public 
Inspection has the same effect as express notification to all the 
world would have. Constructive notice w ill therefore not be imputed 
to the bank of an order of court concerning a customer.
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CHAPTER 4 - SEQUESTRATION AND WINDlNGjJP
Synopsis
As In the case of Insanity, a customer's change of status on 
being placed 1n sequestration or winding-up terminates the 
bank s mandate. But, unlike insanity in which the bank's mandate 
only terminates when 1t becomes aware of the Insanity, 
sequestration or winding-up establishes a concursus creditorum, 
the effect of which would, i f  unqualified, be to invalidate the 
honouring of any cheque or payment instruction after the 
sequestration or winding-up. The consequences of the 
establishment of a concursus have, however, been significantly 
modified by s 73(c) of "the B i l ls  of Exchange Act 1n the case of 
cheques and by s lZ  of the Insolvency Act in the case of other 
payment instructions. Moreover, no concursus is established I f  a 
conpany which is  able to pay its  debts is - placed in winding-up 
and the position In regard to such a company is therefore 
directly analogous to Insanity.
Section 73(c) of the B i l ls  of Exchange Act provides that the 
bank's duty" and authority to honour a customer's cheques 
terminate on receipt of notice of the customer having become 
insolvent. The section applies both to natural and to a r tif ic ia l 
persons. ‘Cheque* means cheque as defined 1n the Act. The 
section applies not only to cheques drawn before the 
sequestration or winding-up but also to cheques drawn 
thereafter. 'Having become insolvent1 refers to the placing of 
the customer in sequestration or w1nd1ng-up, not factual 
insolvency. In the case of a company, the section applies 
whether or not the company's inab ility  to pay its  debts was the 
ground upon which i t  was placed 1n winding-up and whether i t  was 
placed in compulsory or voluntary w1nd1ng-up. In the case of 
cheques in favour of the customer himself or its e lf , the section 
protect* the bank even i f  payment 1s made to the customer and 
not to the trustee or liquidator,
I f  the customer's account is in credit the effect of the section 
1s that payment of a cheque constitutes a valid pro tanto 
discharge of the bank's indebtedness to the customer and that 
the bank 1s entitled to its  charges and to set the charges off 
against any remaining credit in the customer's account. I f  the 
customer's account is 1n overdraft the effect of the section 1s 
that a contract of loan comes into existence and payment, of the 
cheque constitutes the advance of the monies lent. The bank can 
therefore prove a claim for the capital and the agreed Interest.
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I t  1s also entitled to Its  charges, and i f  i t  holds security its  
claim for the capita l, Interest and charges is  secured by the 
security-
Section 73(c) does not apply to payment Instructions other than 
cheques; however, the effect the establishment of a concursus 
would, i f  unqualified, have on such payment instructions Ts 
modified to a significant degree by s 22 of the Insolvency Act 
which protects the discharge of pre-sequestration debts made to 
the insolvent i f  the debtor was unaware of the sequestration. 
The section also applies to companies. A debt fa lls  within the 
section i f  the contract from which i t  arises was entered into 
before sequestration, and i t  is  not necessary that every fact 
which would have to be proved to establish a cause of action 
should have occurred before sequestration. Section 22 does not 
apply to the discharge of post-sequestration debts but i t  can be 
inferred from the wording of the section that the discharge of 
such debts made to the insolvent is  in .iny event not void. 
Section 22 also protects the discharge of debts made to third 
parties on the insolvent's instructions.
I t  follows that i f  in Ignorance of a customer's sequestration or 
winding-up the bank honours a payment instruction given within 
the scope of a credit in the customer's account, whether s w , 
credit existed at sequestration or winding-up or arose from 
deposits thereafter, the payment constitutes a pro tanto 
discharge of the bank’ s Indebtedness. The bank is , moreover, 
entitled to its  charges i f  the payment instruction was given 
before the sequestration or winding-up, but not f f  i t  was given 
thereafter, and to set o ff any charges to which i t  is  entitled 
against any remaining credit in the account.
I f  the payment instruction is given within the scope of an 
overdraft fa c ility  i t  is necessary to distinguish between 
payment instructions given before and after the sequestration or 
winding-up. In the former case payment pursuant to the payment 
instruction 1s valid under s 22 and the bank can prove a claim 
for the capital of the loan, the agreed interest and its  
charges. Moreover, i f  the bank holds security the claim is 
secured by the security. In the case of payment instructions 
given after sequestration or winding-up the insolvent or the 
ordinary organs of management of the company lack the capacity 
to exercise the option to borrow on behalf of the Insolvent 
estate or company and the estate or company 1s therefore not 
bound. However, the Insolvent, or the signatory in the case of a 
company, is  personally liable . •
I f  a payment Instruction Is given outside the scope of any 
credit or overdraft fa c il ity  1t Is  again necessary to 
distinguish between payment instructions given before and after
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the sequestration or winding-up. In the la tte r case, the 
insolvent or the ordinary organs of management of the company 
lack the caoa-ity to make an offer to borrow on behalf of the 
insolvent ec .* or the company and the estate or company is  not 
bound. Howeve-, the insolvent, or the signatory in the case of a 
company, w ill m* personally liab le . In the former case the 
insolvent or t^e ordinary organs of management of the company 
had the capacity to bind himself or company, as the case may be, 
at the time of giving the payment instruction but their capacity 
lapses on sequestration or winding-up and the offer lapses 
simultaneously. I t  follows that the bank cannot prove a claim 
against the insolvent estate or company for the loan. Nor can i t  
hold the insolvent or signatory personally liable . I t  is 
therefore limited to such claims as i t  may have based on unjust 
enrichment, although any claim i t  may have against the estate or 
the company on this basis w ill be preferent.
The bank's duty to honour a customer's payment instructions 
other than cheques terminates on the customer's sequestration or 
winding-up.
I t  is  also necessary to have regard to ss 348 and 341(2) of the 
Companies Act in the case of a company customer's payment 
instructions other than cheques. These sections are dealt with 
in Part I I  of the thesis.
I f  the bank receives information which is insufficient to 
conclude that the customer has been placed in sequestration or 
winding-up but which raises the suspicion that this has 
occurred, the bank is  under a duty to make further enquiry. I f  
the bank reasonably but wrongly concludes that the customer has 
not been placed in sequestration or winding-up, the bank w ill be 
in the same position i t  would have been 1n had i t  not received 
any Information at a l l .  I f  the bank reasonably but wrongly 
concludes that the customer has been placed in sequestration or 
winding-up this w ill not avail i t  as a defence to a claim for 
damages for wrongful dishonour except where the claim is  framed 
1n delict. Constructive notice of the sequestration or 
w1nding-up w ill not be imputed to the bank; 1n particular, 
constructive notice of a winding-up w ill not be imputed to the 
bank in accordance with the company law doctrine of constructive 
notice.
* * * * * * * *
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(1) Preliminary
A natural person*1 may be sequestrated by the court either on 
the application of a creditor*21 on the ground that he has 
comUteti an act of Insolvency,*31 or that he 1s in fact
(4)Insolvent, or on the voluntary surrender of his estate by the 
(51person himself. ' The effect of the sequestration order is to 
divest the person of his assets and to vest them in a trustee 
appointed to the person's estate.*61 The Insolvent is  not deprived 
of contractual capacity but he cannot bind the Insolvent e s ta te .^ 1
(1) The same applies to partnerships (s 1 of the Insolvency Act 24 
of 1936, definition of 'debtor'}, trusts (Magnum financial 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd (in  liquidation) v Summerly & A n o r~ W  
1 Sfe4( 1 ) $A~160(W)),~ other unincorporated bodies (Siivermafi~v 
S ilver Slipper Club 1932 TOP 355) and corporate bodies not 
Having’ a registered office or place of business in this 
country (Lawclaims (Ptv) Ltd v Rea ShlDo1n<j Co SA 1979 (4) SA 
745 (N)) a r /bOK-'^ T . ---------------ee—1------
(2) Section 9(1) of the Insolvency Act.
(3) Section 9(3) read with s 8 of the Insolvency Act.
(4) Section 9(3) of the Insolvency Act. A person 1s factually 
Insolvent for this purpose i f  his l ia b il it ie s  exceed his 
assets - see eg Ohlsson's Cape Breweries Ltd v Totten 1911 TPD 
48 at 50; MacKay v uahl SA ii>3(0) at 1968; Wal sh v 
Kruger 1965TZ7) afi 756TT) at 759D-E; Venter v Volkslias Ctcf 
T973T3*) SA 175{T) at 178H-179A. ----------------------
(5) Section 3(1) and (2) of the Insolvency Act.
(5) Section 20(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act. Before appointment of 
a provisional trustee the assets vest In the Master of the 
Supreme Cuurt.
(7) Section 23(2) of the Insolvency Act.
A corapany 8^1 may be placed in compulsory winding-up by the 
court i f  i t  is  unable to pay its  debts, ^  or i f  certain 
circumstances obtain in which i t  is deemed to be unable to pay its  
d e b t s , o r  i f  certain other circumstances obtain unrelated to 
in ab ility  to pay its  d e b t s . T h e  application to court may be 
made by. inter a lia , a member, a creditor, or the compary 
( ' 2)its e lf . A company may also be placed in voluntary winding-up 
by special resolution of the company, whether the company is able or 
unable to pay its  d e b t s . T h e  effect of the placing of the 
company in winding-up 1s to divest its  ordinary organs of management 
of the control of its  assets and the power to represent the company, 
and to vest such control and power in a liquidator.^141
(8) The same applies to other corporate bodies (s 337 of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973, definition of 'company'). The 
conpany or other corporate body roust have a registered office 
or place of business in this country fa iling  which i t  must be 
sequestrated under the Insolvency Act - see the lawclaiins case 
supra.
(9) Section 344(£) of the Companies Act read with s 345(I)(c ). A 
company is unable to pay its  debts for this purpose i f  T t is  
unable to meet current l ia b il it ie s  in the ordinary course - 
see eg In re H C Collison Ltd Ex p Collison (1906) 23 SC 721
(10) Section 344(f) of the Companies Act read with ss 345(l)(a) and
(b). "  "
(11) Section 344 (a_)-(e) and fjfcMh) of the Companies Act.
(12) Section 346 of the Companies Act.
(13) Section 349 of the Companies Act.
(14) Unlike in sequestration, the assets are not vested in the 
liquidator, only the control of the assets, unless the court 
otherwise orders - s 361. In the case of a w1nding-up by the 
court s 361(1) vests the control of the assets in the Master 
until the appointment of a provisional liquidator and in the 
case of a ll windingii-up s 361(2) vests the control fn the
(Footnote continued on next page)
Sequestration and winding-up, like  Insanity, terminate a 
mandate :
1. . .  when any change of status of the principal occurs, which 
includes the la tte r ’s Insolvency, the mandate 1s automatically 
terminated. A provisional judicia l management and a liquidation 
order would, fn ny view, have the sa»jie effect because that would 
bring about a change of status as envisaged by the authorities’
{per Potgieter JA in Goodricke & Son v Auto Protection Insurance Co 
ltd  (in  liquidation) ^ * ) .  The company 1rT question was unable to 
pay Its  debts but 1t 1s thought that i f  a judicia l management order 
terminates a mandate the same must be true of the winding-up of a 
company which is  able to pay the debts. The grant of a jud icia l 
management order does not establish a concursus creditorum. 
and the termination of the mandate must therefore flow from the fact 
that the ordinary organs of management of the company are divested
(footnote continued from previous page)
Master while the office of liquidator 1s vacant or he 1s 
unable to perform his duties. I t  clearly follows by 
implication, although the section Is in fact s ilen t on the 
point, that while there 1s a liquidator in office who is  able 
to perform his duties the control of the assets vests in him - 
Henochsberg Companies 636. In the case of voluntary 
windings-up, s expressly provides that the powers of
the directors cease as from the commencement of the 
winding-up, and although there fs no sim ilar provision in 
regard to companies, being wound up by the court i t  has 
nevertheless been held that the powers of the directors cease 
on the qrant of a windlno-uo order - Attorney-General v 
Blumenthal 1961{4) SA 313{T) at 314G-315ST~Volkskas"' B p F T  
Uarrenwoo?  ^ 1973(2) "5K 3B5TT) aE
(15) 1968 (1) SA 717(A) at 722H.
(16) See eg CCA L it t le  & Sons v Niven NO 1965(3) SA 517(RAD)at 
519D-S20F; Henochsberg on the Companies Act 3rd ed by A Milne 
et a l i i  (Durban 1975) 746.
of such management.*1^  The winding-up of a company which Is able 
t t  pay its  debts sim ilarly divests the ordinary organs of management 
of the company of the management,*18  ^ although 1t too does not, I t  
is  thought, establish a concursus.* 19^
I t  follows that the bank's mandate is  terminated by the 
customer's sequestration or winding-up. As in the case of insanity, 
however, the question arises as to whether such termination occurs 
immediately the customer is placed in sequestration or winding-up or 
only on the bank's becoming aware thereof. The answer is , I t  is  
considered, the same as in the case of Insanity insofar as the law 
relating to mandate 1s concerned, 1e the mandate only terminates 
when the mandatary becomes aware of the mandant’s loss of 
capacity;*20  ^ however, as w ill be shown below, this is  largely 
overridden by the principles of a concursus creditorum in the case 
of sequestration and of the winding-up of a company which is unable 
to pay its  debts. But 1n the case of the winding-up of a company 
which is  able to pay its  debts the position is  d irect 1y analogous to 
(211the position on insanity, accordingly, the rest of this
(17) Sections 429 and 430 of the Companies Act: Henochsberg 
Companies 755.
(18) See 16S o 14 above.
(19) Cf Ruskin NO v Amalgamated Minerals Ltd 1951(1) PH E15(W) at 
54-5:-------------- --------------- -—
(20) See 41-51 above. The parallel between Insanity on the one hand 
and sequestration and w1nd1ng-up on the other is  not, i t  Is 
considered, limited to the mandate element of the bank 
customer relationship, and 1f a customer is placed in 
sequestration or winding-up the effect on a ll aspects of the 
relationship, and hence on a ll the factions of a cheque drawn 
or other payment instruction given by the customer, w ill be 
similar to the effect i f  the customer becomes insane - eg i f  
the cheque or payment instruction constitutes an offer to 
borrow the offer w il l ,  i t  1s considered, lapse - see 207 n 133 
below.
(21) The same is  true of judicia l management.
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chapter w ill be devoted to examining the position 1n relation only 
to sequestration and to the winding-up of companies which are unable 
to pay their debts, and references to the winding-up of a company 
should be understood as references to the winding-up of such a 
company, unless otherwise Indicated.
The consequences of the establishment of a concursus creditorum
in the case of sequestration and of the winding-up of a company
which is unable So pay Its  debts are far-reaching. These
(221consequences are described 1n Walker v Syfret NO by Lord de 
V illie rs  CO as follows:*23*
'The effect of a winding-up order Is  to establish a concursus 
creditorum, and nothing can thereafter be allowed to be done by 
any of tVie creditors to a lte r the rights of the other creditors'
(24)and by innes J ,  as he then was, as follows :
‘The sequestration order crysta llises the insolvent's position; 
the hand of the law 1s la id  upon the estate, and at once the 
rights of the general body of creditors have to be taken Into 
consideration. Ho transaction can thereafter be entered Into 
with regard to estate matters by a single creditor to the 
prejudice of the general body. The claim of each creditor must 
be dealt with as i t  existed at the issue of the order.1' 25'
{22} 1911 AD 141.
(23) At 160,
(24) At 166.
(25) In the United States the bank's position in relation to 
cheques drawn before the customer's bankruptcy but honoured by 
the bank after the bankruptcy without knowledge of the 
bankruptcy came before the Supreme Court in Bank of Marin v 
England 365 US 99(1965) and the Supreme Court, reversing the 
CourFof Appeal, denied the trustee's claim to payment of the 
amounts paid out pursuant to the cheques concerned. After 
emphasising the inequity that would result i f  the trustee's 
claim were to be upheld the court held (a t 101-2 ! :
(Footnote continued on nsxt page)
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I t  is , moreover, not possible to contract out of these 
consequences.^26^
{Footnote continued from previous page)
‘The trustee succeeds only to such rights as the bankrupt 
possessed.. .absent knowledge or notice of the bankruptcy by 
the bank, the contract between the bank and the drawer 
remains unaffected by the bankruptcy and the right and duty 
of the bank to pay duly presented checks remain as before.1
This reasoning 1s critic ised  by FE Holahan 4 EC Fisch ‘Post 
Bankruptcy Payment of Checks: Bank of Marin v England' 28 i/niv 
of Pittsburgh Law Rev 579 {196^ 7) at 587 on the ground that 
w h iT eT tis  true that the trustee only steps into the shoes of 
the bankrupt this 1s only true to the extent that the Act does 
not provide otherwise. They accordingly agree with Harlan J  
who dissented (at 103ff) from the majority judgment on the 
ground that the wording of the Bankruptcy Act precluded the 
reasoning re lied  on by the majority. The same criticism  would, 
i t  is considered, be applicable 1f i t  were to be attempted to 
apply the majority's reasoning to the position under our law, 
inasmuch as the reasoning is irreconcilable with the 
principles of a concursus. In any event the structure of the 
Bankruptcy Act irPquest'fon is  too different from our Act for a 
decision under that Act to constitute more than the ‘very 
slightest persuasive authority1 in relation to our Act, 1n the 
words of Potgleter OA in Administrator, Natal v Magill, Grant 
& Nell (Pty) Ltd (in  iiquT5ation) 1969(11 SA bblUA) at b/ii-. 
(Potgleter JA was actually referring to decisions under the 
English Bankruptcy Act but the structure of the United States 
Act concerned is  equally different from the structure of our 
Act and decisions under the United States Act would therefore 
be of sim ilarly s light persuasive authority.) I t  may be noted 
that in the United States the matter has now become academic 
because s 542(c) of the Bankruptcy Act 11 USC expressly adopts 
the ruling in Bank of Marin v England. For the position in 
England see Paget Banking azff^
(26) Magi 11 ‘s case supra at 671-2 1n which the debtor had the 
contractual right (coupled with an Interest) to discharge his 
debt by payment to a third party, but the court held that he 
could no longer valid ly do so after establishment of the 
concursus. See further 201-3 below.
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There 1s, however, no general rule that contracts 1pso facto 
lapse on the sequestration or winding-up of one of the parties :
‘ ...there Is  nothing in the law of insolvency which affects 
uncompleted contracts in general; the contract is neither 
terminated nor modified nor in any other way altered by the 
insolvency of one of the parties (c f Uys and Another v Sam 
Friedman Ltd 1935 AO 165) except in one respect^ and” that is  
that, because of the supervening concursus, the trustee cannot 
be compelled by the other party to perform the contract. Put 
somewhat d ifferently, this means that the contract survives the 
insolvency and, save in the respect mentioned, the trustee steps 
into the insolvent's shoes. The rule that a trustee has a right 
of election whether or not to abide by the contract is no more 
than one aspect of the application of this legal principle 1 
have enunciated. In a manner of speaking, any party to an 
executory contract can "elect" whether to carry out his 
obligations or to repudiate the contract but, of course, should 
he wrongfully repudiate i t  the other party may be able to compel 
performance specifically; so too with a trustee, but with the 
one exception to which 1 have referred and that Is  that, i f  the 
trustee decides not to perform, the other party cannot, because 
of the concursus, compel performance by the trustee but must 
content "himself with a monetary claim either for performance or 
for damages for non-performance of the insolvent s contractual 
obligations, as the case may be1
(per Friedman J  in Smith & Anor v Parton NO^ h ,
I f  the broad consequences of a concursus as described by Lord 
de V lllie rs  CJ and Innes 0 in Walker v Syfret NO were to apply to 
the bank customer contract without qualification, the honouring of 
any cheque or other payment instruction after sequestration or
(27) 1980 (3) SA 724 (O&CLD) at 728H-/29C. See also Ward v Barrett 
WO i  Anor NO 1963(2} SA S46(A) at 552B-553B; Somchem "{P'ty) Ltd 
v >Je derated" Insurance Co Ltd & Anor 1983(4T_SA buy fc) a f 
615A-H; Porteus v Strydom 1984(g) SA 489(0 & CLD) at 492E - 
4950; but c f  CohenNO &~Tfthers v Verwoerdburg Town Council 
1983(1) SA 33TDD at d4/l£-Ci in which although the court 
refused an order for specific performance i t  appears to have 
considered that i t  was not absolutely debarred from doing so.
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winding-up would be void, whether the customer's account was In 
credit or In overdraft. Where the account was in credit, the 
honouring of the cheque or payment Instruction would disturb the 
concursus by reducing the assets available for distribution among 
the cred ito rs/281 and where the account was in overdraft, the 
honouring of the cheque or payment Instruction would disturb the 
concursus by Increasing the claims against the estate/291
These broad consequences of the establishment of a concursus 
have, however, been significantly modified by s 73(c_) of the B il ls  
of Exchange Act In the case of cheques and by s 22 of the Insolvency 
Act In the case of other payment Instructions. As the 2 sections are 
quite different, cheques and other payment instructions w ill be 
dealt wiln separately in what follows.
(28) A possible exception would be where payment is  made to a 
creditor who would in any event be paid In fu ll eg because his 
claim is  preferent. I t  is doubted, however, whether an. 
exception in fact exists in this situation because such a 
payment could nevertheless disturb the concursus in various 
other ways eg by removing the creditor’s claim "from the normal 
procedure for the examination of claims, by depriving the 
trustee or liquidator of liquid funds needed to continue the 
Insolvent's, or the company’s, business, by giving the 
creditor the advantage of payment in advance of the other 
creditors of the same class, etc.
(29) I t  1s also arguable that the concursus is  not disturbed 1n 
this situation 1f payment is made to a creditor with the 
result that the bank 1s sfisply substituted as a creditor in 
the same amount. Again, however, i t  1s doubted whether this 
argument holds good inasmuch as such a payment could sim ilarly 
disturb the concursus in various other ways eg by removing the 
creditor's claim from the normal procedure for the examination 
of claims, by substituting a secured claim for a concurrent 
claim i f  the bank holds security, by substituting more onerous 
terms and conditions eg i f  the bank's claim bears a higher 
rate of interest than the claim which was discharged by the 
payment, etc.
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Before proceeding, however, to this separate examination of the 
position regarding cheques and other payment Instructions ss 348 and 
341(2) of the Companies Act ca ll for mention. In the case of 
windings-up these sections have a potentially profound effect on a 
bank's position during the period between the presentation of the 
w1nd1ng-up application against a customer and the grant of the 
winding-up order, and Part I I  of this thesis is  devoted to an 
examination of these sections.
(2) Cheques - s 73(c) of the B i l ls  of Exchange Act
Sactiorf ?3<c_) of the B i l ls  of Exchange Act provides :
‘The duty(30) and authority of a banker to pay a cheque drawn 
on him by his customer are determined by :
(c) receipt of notice of the customer having become insolvent.'
The wording of the section, however, gives rise to a number of 
problems which w ill be examined in what follows.
(a) Applicability of s 73(c) to a r t if ic ia l persons
Section 73{c.) refers to the customer 'having become Insolvent1, 
and the question arises as to whether this Is  restricted to natural
(30) Although the section does not expressly so state, i t  is 
considered clear that the duty referred to is  the duty owed by 
the bank to Its  customer and not any duty i t  may owe to the 
holder, eg because the bank has guaranteed the cheque, and 
references in this chapter to a bank's duty to honour a 
customer's cheques and other payment Instructions sim ilarly 
refer to the duty owed to the customer.
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persons or whether I t  also applies to companies and other a r t if ic ia l 
persons.
Cowen^ 32  ^ assumes without discussion that s 73{£) does not 
apply to companies:
'The effect of liquidation and Judicial management proceedings 
on a banker's duty and authority to pay a company's cheques is 
obscure. I t  would seem that actual notice of a Hquldatiofl 
order, or of the commencement of voluntary wind1ng-up 
proceedings, or of a judicial management order, terminates the 
banker's duty and authority, but 1t is  not clear whether 
anything fa lling  short of such actual notice does so.'
I t  is considered, however, that the reference 1n s 73{£) to 
Insolvency is  in fact capable of referring not only to the 
sequestration of a natural person's estate but also to the 
winding-up of an a r t if ic ia l person which Is unable to pay Its  
debts. While i t  1s true that the word 'insolvent' is more 
commonly used to refer to a natural than an a r t if ic ia l  person, this 
1s not Invariably so and i t  is  not uncommon to refer to a body In
(31) I t  may be noted that the preamble of s 73 refers simply to the 
banker's 'customer' without drawing a distinction between 
natural and a r t if ic ia l persons and although i t  is  clear that 
sub-s(s) dealing with countermand applies to any customer, 
whethe? natural or a r t if ic ia l,  sufa-s(jb) deals with death and 
therefore by its  nature can only apply to natural persons. I t  
follows that no inference can be drawn from the wording of the 
preamble as to whether sub-s(c) refers to both natural and 
a r t if ic ia l persons or to natUraT persons only.
(32) Negotiable Instruments 418. Malan's view 1s not clear: B i l ls  
of f l a nge # 328 n 143.
(33) I t  should also be borne 1n mind that certain a r tif ic ia l 
persons are sequestrated under the Insolvency Act and not 
wound up under the Companies Act - nee 164 n 1 above.
winding-up as 'insolvent'. 3^^  Moreover, there is no apparent 
reason for distinguishing between sequestrations and windings-up: 
s 73(c) is  clearly designed to protect banks against the harshness 
of the position they would find themselves 1n i f  their honouring of 
cheques between the date of a customer's insolvency and their 
receiving notice thereof were to be invalid , and i t  is considered 
that there is no reason why this should apply in the case of 
sequestrations but not windings-up. I f ,  therefore, the word 
'insolvent' can reasonably be interpreted to include a r tif ic ia l 
persons the courts may be expected to do so.^35^
(b) Meaning of 'cheque'
'Cheque' Is  defined^36  ^ in the Act as a b ill of exchange drawn 
on a banker and payable on demand, and 'b il l  of exchange' is 
defined^37  ^ as an unconditional order in writing, addressed by one 
person to another, signed by the person giving i t ,  requiring the 
person to whom i t  Is addressed to pay on demand, or at a fixed or 
determinable future time, a sum certain in money to a specified 
person or his order, or to bearer.
(34) Cf Taylor & Steyn NNO v Koekemoor 1982(1) SA 374(T) at 3770-E. 
The Companies" Act, I t  may” be noted, does not use the term 
'insolvent' in relation to companies: i t  refers to companies 
which are unable to pay their debts - see eg s 33d.
(35) I f  this view is incorrect cheques drawn by a r t if ic ia l persons 
w ill be subject to the same considerations as payment 
instructions other than cheques as dealt with at 183ff below. 
No assistance Is to be gained from the English, Australian, 
Indian and Canadian Acts which do not contain provisions 
similar to s 73U).
(36) Section 1.
(37) Sections 1 and 2(1).
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I t  follows that a document that does not fu lf i l  the requirements 
of these definitions w ill not fa ll within the ambit of s 73(£) even 
1f  i t  1s drawn in a form which would ordinarily be called a cheque, 
eg a 'cheque' payable to 'cash or order'.*38* Conversely, a 
payment Instruction given In a form which would not normally be 
regarded as a cheque may nevertheless fu lf i l  the requirements of the 
definitions and hence fa ll within the ambit of s 73(c) eg a letter 
may be so framed that 1t constitutes a cheque.
(c ) Cheques drawn after sequestration or wind1ng-up
Section 73(c_) applies to cheques drawn by the customer. Does 
this lim it the application of the section to cheques drawn prior to 
the sequestration or winding-up or does the section also apply to 
cheques drawn thereafter?
In the case of sequestration, the answer to this question 
depends on whether the Insolvent estate or the Insolvent Is 
the 'customer' for the purpose of s 73{_c). As already pointed 
out,*39* on sequestration the insolvent is  divested of his assets 
which vest In the trustee. These assets under the control of the 
trustee comprise the insolvent estate and In a technical sense, 
therefore, the estate 1s the customer under the bank customer 
relationship. In a more ordinary sense, however, i t  is suggested 
that 'customer' more naturally refers to the Insolvent and that this 
1s the intention In s 73{c_). Section 73(c) Is  designed to protect 
banks which unwittingly honour cheques in ignorance of the 
customer's insolvency and banks are in the same jeopardy in relation 
to cheques drawn after Insolvency that they are in 1n relation to
(38) Cf Hiles v Venter h/a CH Venter Agencies 1983(4) SA 22{T); 
Christem s v Brahbers Boerdery lEdinsj I3pk 1983(4) SA 87{W); 
Cowen hegotiable instruments 72-4:
(39) See 164 above.
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cheques drawn before insolvency. Accordingly, the Interpretation 
should be favoured which best gives effect to the object of the 
section.***0'
In the case of windings-up, the company 1s not divested of Its  
assets - unless the court specifically so orders - but its  ordinary 
organs of management are deprived of the control of the assets, such 
control being vested In the liquidator who alone may represent the 
company.*41' Prlma facie, therefore, only a cheque drawn by the 
liquidator would be a cheque drawn by the company. However, i t  Is 
suggested that, as In the case of sequestration, 'customer' as used 
in s 73(c) should be Interpreted less technically, and that I t  
should be understood to refer to the customer as I t  existed prior to 
the w1nd1ng-up. In other words, a cheque drawn in a manner which 
would have bound the customer prior to the winding-up w ill be a 
cheque drawn by the customer for the purpose of s 73U).
(d) Meaning of 'having become Insolvent'
Section 73(c) refers to notice of the customer 'having become 
Insolvent'. Thus far I t  has been assumed that this refers to the 
placing of the customer 1n sequestration or w1nd1ng-up and not to 
the point 1n time at which the customer's lia b il it ie s  f ir s t  exceed 
his assets.*42  ^ Is  this assumption justified ?*43'
(40) A contrary argument would be that the section was not Intended 
to protect banks against the fraud that would generally be 
Inherent In a customer's drawing a cheque after sequestration 
or w1nd1ng-up.
(41) See 165 above.
(42) Or possibly, 1n the case of companies, to the point in time at 
. which the company becomes unable to meet current lia b il it ie s
in the ordinary course - cf 165 n 9 above.
(43) Cowen Negotiable Instruments 417 makes the same assumption 
without discussion. ' i““
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A number of factors point to the correctness of the assumption.
The law does not deprive a person of his capacity to act merely
(441because his l ia b il it ie s  exceed his assets, and i t  is 
considered unlikely that tSe legislature would have intended to 
partia lly  deprive him of his capacity to act by in effect preventing 
him from operating a bank account. The object of the section is not 
to deprive persons of rights as soon as their l ia b il it ie s  exceed 
their assets, but to protect banks which unwittingly continue to 
honour customer's cheques without knowledge that the customer has 
been placed in sequestration or winding-up. Moreover, the point in 
time at which a person becomes factually insolvent is seldom readily . 
ascertainable: the value of most assets fluctuates with market 
conditions; rights may be disputed; accounts receivable may not be 
recoverable; l ia b il it ie s  may be contingent; etc. Accordingly, i t  is 
considered unlikely that the legislature would have intended^^ 
the termination of a bank's duty and authority to depend on so 
uncertain a circumstance.^*^
(44) He may commit an offence under s 135{3)(aJ of the Insolvency 
Act i f  he contracts debts without any reasonable expectation 
of being able to discharge them, but this does not ipso facto 
invalidate the contract.
(45) The cardinal rule of Interpretation of statutes is , of course, 
to determine the Intention of the legislature from the 
language in context - see eg Norden & Anor NNO v Ohanki & 
Others 1974{4) SA 647(A) at 655B1 CTITsteyn lTie uttleg van 
'Heite *>th ed by S I £ van Tender et a l i i  fCape Town 1981/ 2ff. 
See too Lord Denning Discipline of the Law 9ff, Closing 
Chapter  93ff.
(46) Two corrollaries of the approach th ?t s 73(c) refers to legal 
and not factual Insolvency may be rioted, f i r s t ly ,  the bank's 
duty and authority may terminate in terms of s 73(£) even 
though the customer is  not factually insolvent, inasmuch as 
the definition of the acts of insolvency in s 0 of the 
Insolvency Act and of inab ility  to pay one's debts in s 345 of 
the Companies Act are wider than factual Insolvency. Secondly, 
the expression 'having become insolvent' in s 73(c) w ill have
(footnote continued on next page)
(e) Scope of the protection afforded by s 73(c)
Section 73(c) provides that a bank's duty and authority 
terminate on receipt by the bank of notice of the customer having 
become insolvent; in other words, the bank is entitled and, 1f 
applicable, obliged, to honour the customer's cheques until it  
receives notice of the customer's insolvency. The section, however, 
does not make i t  clear whether the bank has a ll the rights which 
would normally flow from honouring the customer's cheques. This 
gives rise to a number of d ifficu lties  which are examined in what 
follows.
( i ) Cheques in favour of the customer
I f  a cheque 1s drawn in favour of the customer himself, the 
authority conferred by the cheque is  to pay the customer, and in the 
normal course this would mean his legal representative i f  he has 
ceased to have capacity to act.
I f ,  then, the bank makes payment to the customer himself w ill 
the payment be protected by s 73(c)? The answer fs, i t  1s suggested, 
that the expression 'duty and authority1 1s wide enough to encompass 
payment to the customer himself, and that there are considerations 
which m ilitate fn favour of such an extended interpretation. The 
object, of the section is , as already pointed out, to protect a bank 
which unwittingly continues to honour a customer's cheques in 
Ignorance of the customer's Insolvency, and an Important aspect of 
tfc's object would be. frustrated i f  the expression 'duty and
(footnote continued from previous page)
different meanings in the case of natural persons and 
companies, in that the definitions of acts of Insolvency and 
Inab ility  to pay one's debts are different. However, I t  is 
considered that these anomalies are not of major significance 
and that they are insufficient to outweigh the considerations 
giving rise to the interpretation that s 73(c) refers to legal 
and not factual Insolvency.
authority' were to be given a narrow interpretation excluding 
protection for payments to the customer himself. I f ,  therefore, the 
expression 'duty and authority' can bear the wider meaning - as i t  
is considered i t  can - i t  should be accorded that meaning.
H i )  Customer's account in credit
I f  the customer's account 1s 1n credit the bank is  indebted to 
the customer and U  is considered clear that the effect of s 73(c_) 
is that the payment of a cheque to which the section applies w ill 
constitute a valid  repayment by the bank on account of Its  
Indebtedness to the customer.
Less clear, however, is  the position regarding the bank's 
charges for honouring the cheque. Two ^ues^ions arise: Is  the bank 
entitled to its  charges? And, i f  so*, is  i t  entitled to set the 
charges off against any remaining credit in ths account? The answer 
is . I t  is  suggested, that the section should be Interpreted as 
placing the bank in the same position i t  would have been in had the 
cheque been honoured prior to trie sequestration or winding-up ie  the 
bank 1s entitled to its  charges and the charges may be set o ff 
against the credit.
(47) I f  this view is incorrect the payment may nevertheless be 
protected by s 22 of the Insolvency Act - see 183ff below.
(48) I t  w ill be recalled that the view has already been taken - see 
15 n 25 above - that payment of a cheque constitutes a direct 
pro tanto discharge of the bank's indebtedness to the customer 
and- does not give rise to a claim for re-ltnbursement which 1s 
set-off against the indebtedness.
(49) I f  this broad approach to the effect of the section 1s 
rejected, the bank would, i t  1s considered, nevertheless; be 
entitled to prove a claim for Its  charges on the ground that 
a ll the requirements are met for the proof of such a claim. 
This follows from the fact that - as already pointed out at 
41-51 above - the bank's mandate, and hence the bank customer 
contract, do not lapse until the bank becomes aware of the
(footnote continued on next page)
(111) Customer's account In overdraft
I f  a customer's account is overdrawn, a cheque drawn by the 
customer serves a trip le  function: i f  1t is drawn within the scope 
of an overdraft fa c il it y  granted by the bank i t  1s the exercise of 
an option to borrow, a demand for the advance of monies lent and a 
direction regarding to whom payment is to be made; and i f  i t  is 
drawn outside the scope of an overdraft fa c ility , i t  is an offer to 
borrow, a demand for the advance of monies lent i f  the offer is  
accepted and a direction regarding to whons payment is  to be made. I t  
is  considered that the expression 'duty and authority' in s 73{c_) 
encompasses a ll of these functions and that therefore a contract of 
loan w ill come into existence and that payment of the cheque w ill 
constitute the advance of the monies lent. I t  follows, i t  Is 
considered, that the bank is  also entitled to the interest payable 
on the loan.
I f  the bank holds security from the customer for the customer's 
indebtedness w ill its  claim be secured by the security? Section 
73(_c) is  s ilent on this question but the view has already been 
taken*50* that the section should be interpreted as placfng the 
bank in the same position i t  would have been in had the cheque been 
honoured prior to the sequestration or winding-up ie the bank's 
claim w ill be secured.
The bank's right to I t s  charges has been dealt with in the 
previous section.
(footnote continued from previous page)
customer's sequestration or w1nd1ng-up; accordingly, i f  the 
bank's authority remains Intact in terms of s 73(c_) the 
performance by the bank of Its  obligations under its  mandate 
is  valid and a ll the requirements for the proof of a claim for 
Its  charges are present. This approach would, however, seem to 
fa ll short of enabling the bank to set off Its  claim against 
the credit.
(50) See the previous section.
( f )  Interrelationship between s 73(c) and ss 348 and 341(2) of the
Companies Act
What is  the position where s 73(c) and ss 348 and 341(2) of the 
Companies Act*50a  ^ are in conflict? The answer is, i t  is 
considered, that s 73(c) w ill take precedence in accordance with the 
principle that a specific statutory provision takes precedence over 
a general provision even where - as in the case of ss 348 and 341(2)
- the general provision occurs in a la te r enactment:
‘The general maxim is , generalia speclalibus non derogant. "When 
the Legislature has given attention to a separate subject and 
made provision for i t  the presumption is that a subsequent 
general enactment is  not intended to interfere with the special 
provision, unless i t  manifests that intention very c le a r ly .. .. "  
per lord H0BH0U5E delivering the judgment of the Priyy Council 
t n frarker v. Edger {[1898] A.C. at p. 75 4 ) . ' (S I )
This, however, only applies to the extent the sections are 
mutually inconsistent and 2 respects in which they could perhaps be 
construed as complementing one another ca ll for consideration.
f ir s t ly ,  i f  the bank receives notice that a winding-up 
application has been presented against a customer, w ill this 
constitute notice of the customer having become insolvent for the 
purpose of s 73(_c) In view of the fact that s 348 deems a winding-up 
to comnence on presentation of the application?*52  ^ The answer
(50a) 61 of 197?.
(51) R v Gwantshu 1931 EDI 29 at 31; see generally Steyn Uitleg
is3=i3r----  ----
(52) Cf M Megrah 4 PR Ryder Byles on B il ls  of Exchange 25th ed 
(London 1983) 272 who take tR i view that notice of 
presentation terminates the bank's duty and authority 
independently of a provision such as s 73(c), and Lord 
Kail sham Halsbury's Laws of England 4th ed (London 1973-) 
vol 3 'Banking1 164 n 11 where the view is  taken that notice 
of presentation terminates the bank's duty and authority to 
pay cheques in favour of third parties but not cheques in 
favour of the company its e lf . See further chapter 15 {at 
633ff) where the question is  considered in greater detail.
182.
1s» 1t 1s considered, 1n the negative. Section 348 only comes Into 
operation once a winding-up order has been granted. Until then the 
company is not 1n w1nd1ng-up and In fact a winding-up order may 
never be granted on the application:
1. . .  Parliament has antedated the operation of a winding-up by 
the Court, but without such a winding-up there is nothing to 
antedate. To hold the contrary would lead to manifest absurdity, 
in that the mere filin g  of an application for a winding-up 
order, however ill-founded or even vexatious, would ipso jure 
have the effect of a winding-up order'
(per Margo J  in Vermeulen & Anor v C C Bauermeister (Edtns) Bpk & 
Others*53' ) .
Secondly, should 1t be held - contrary to the view taken 
above*54' - that s 73(c) only applies to cheques drawn before the 
company is placed 1n winding-up, the question w ill arise as to 
whether the company 1s to be regarded as having been placed in 
w1nd1ng-up for this purpose on presentation of the winding-up 
application or on the grant of the order. The answer to this 
question depends upon the extent to which s 348 backdates the 
commencement of a winding-up. This question is considered in 
chapter 6*55* and the conclusion reached there is that the only 
function of s 348 1s to define the commencement of a winding-up for 
the purposes of s 341(2) and, probably, s 359(l)(b) of the Companies 
Act. I t  follows, i t  Is considered, that the directors are not deemed 
to have ceased to hold office on presentation of the w1nding-up 
application and that therefore cheques drawn between presentation of
(53} 1982(4) SA 159(T> at 1623.
(54) See 175-6 above.
(55) See 255ff below.
the winding-up application and the grant of the winding-up order 
would be cheques ‘drawn by the customer1 within the meaning of 
s 73(c).
(g) Onus of proof
Unlike s 22 of the Insolvency Act, s 73(c.) does not specify who 
bears the onus of proof in regard to the question of whether or not 
the bank had notice of the customer having become insolvent and the 
question of onus w ill therefore follow the ordinary rules of 
evidence.
(h) Discharge of the customer from sequestration or winding-up
Section 73(_c) provides that the bank's duty and authority 
terminate on receipt of notice of the customer having become 
insolvent, but i t  is  considered that the bank's duty and authority 
w ill nevertheless revive 1f the sequestration or w1nd1ng-up 1s 
discharged by the non-confirmation of a provisional order or the 
setting aside of a final order or otherwise and I f  the cheque has 
not already been dishonoured.®56^
(3) Other payment Instructions - s 22 of the Insolvency Act
Section 73(c) of the B i l ls  of Exchange Act does not apply to 
payment instructions given otherwise than by way of cheque, and the 
position in regard to termination of a bank's duty and authority to 
honour such payment instructions on the customer's sequestration or 
winding-up must accordingly be determined in the case of 
sequestration In the light of the provisions of the Insolvency Act,
183.
(56) Cf Simon v Jackson 1904 TS 116; W H Mars The law of Insolvency 
in South Africa by H £ Hockly 7th e3 by D F Waters & 
R 0 Jooste-(Cape Town 1980) # 24.5.
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and 1n the case of winding-up In the ligh t of the provisions of the 
Companies Act Including, 1n particular, s 339 which applies the 
provisions of the Insolvency Act mutatls mutandis 1n regard to any 
matter not specially provided for in the Companies A c t/ 571
The broad effect of a person's sequestration or w1nd1ng-up is, 
as already pointed ou t/581 to establish a concursus creditorum 
which crystallises the position of the Individual or compary* 
concerned. The claim of each creditor must be dealt with as 1t 
existed on sequestration or winding-up and no creditor may 
thereafter do anything which prejudices the other creditors. On the 
other hand, uncompleted contracts are 1n general - mandate is an 
exception - unaffected by the sequestration or winding-up of either 
party except that the other party cannot claim specific performance 
from the trustee or liquidator.
The general effect of the establishment of a concursus 
creditorum is , however, modified to a significant degree for present 
purposes s 22 of the Insolvency Act which provides :
’Every satisfaction 1n whole or in part of any obligation the 
fulfilment whereof was due or the cause of which arose before 
the sequestration of the creditor's estate shall, 1f made to the 
Insolvent after such sequestration, be void, unless the debtor 
proves that 1t was made in good faith and without knowledge of 
the sequestration.1
In seeking to determine the effect of the principles of a 
concursus creditorum, as modified by s 22, on a bank's duty and 
authority to honour a customer's payment instructions a number of 
questions arise which w ill bst considered 1n what follows.
(57) In the case of windings-up regard must also be had to ss 348 
and 341(2) of the Companies Act - see Part I I  of this thesis 
(at 226ff below).
(58) See 166-71 above.
1(a) Applicability of s 22 to windings-up
The Companies Act does not contain any provision comparable to 
s 22 of the Insolvency Act and the question accordingly arises 
whether s 22 applies to windings-up in accordance with s 339 of the 
Companies Act.
Section 339 provides :
‘ In the winding-up of a company unable to pay Its  debts the 
provisions of the law relating to insolvency shall, in so far as 
they are applicable, be applied mutatis mutandis in respect of 
any matter not specially provided for by this Act7‘
The opening words 'In  the winding-up of a company' are not entirely 
apposite to refer to a payment which 1s in a sense outside the 
winding-up. However, the payment affects the winding-up, eg by 
reducing the assets available for distribution, and i t  is considered 
that the word ‘ In ' is  susceptible of, and should be given, the 
meaning ‘ In connection w ith '. •
A more d ifficu lt  problem Is  that after winding-up the liquidator 
alone can valid ly represent the company.*59  ^ Accordingly, can a 
payment made otherwise than to the liquidator be said to constitute 
the 'satisfaction . . .  of any obligation . . .  made to the fnso?vent1 
as referred to in s 22? Generally, payments made to a company after 
winding-up w ill In practice have become part of the assets of the 
company and even i f  the monies have been paid out again this would 
not a lte r the fact that they did effectively become part of the 
assets of the company. Sim ilarly, where payment i s ■made to a third 
party in accordance with the directions of the 'company1, the 
payment w ill normally enure for the benefit of the company by
185.
(59) See 165 above.
c ;(
discharging an Indebtedness of the company. In these circumstances 
i t  is  considered that the payments can readily be said to have been 
made to the company, even though not made to the liquidator.
True, i t  w ill not always be possible to show that a payment did 
enure for the benefit of the company, eg where an erstwhile o ffic ia l 
of the company misappropriates the payment on receipt, but i t  is 
considered that s 22 should nevertheless be lib e ra lly  interpreted to 
cover such payments. Section 22 is designed to protect persons who 
unwittingly make payment or other performance to an insolvent in 
ignorance of the sequestration, and persons who unwittingly make 
payment or other performance to a company under winding-up In 
Ignorance of the winding-up are equally fn need of protection. 
Moreover, s 339 of the Companies Act in applying the provisions of 
the Insolvency Act to wind1ngs-up expressly provides that they be 
applied mutatis mutandis, and payment to the company as purportedly 
continuing to be managed by the former organs of management 1s the 
most closely analogous act to payment 'to  the insolvent'.
An analogous problem arose 1n In re Eros Films Ltd.^*^ 
Section 31 of the English Bankrupcy Act^11 permits the set-off of 
mutual debts provided that the person who claims the benefit of the 
section had no notice at the time of giving credit of an act of 
bankruptcy committed by the bankrupt. Acts of bankruptcy have a 
special significance under the Bankruptcy Act 1n that the bankruptcy 
is  deemed to have commenced at the time of the f ir s t  act of 
bankruptcy committed by the bankrupt during the 3 months preceding 
the receiving order, on which act the order is  based. 
Section 317 of the English Companies Act^63  ^ applies the
186.
{60} [1963] Ch 565.
(61) 1914.
(62) Section 37. 
{631 1948.
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provisions of the Bankruptcy Act to windings-up, but there Is no 
concept of an act of bankruptcy under the Companies Act which, like 
our Companies Act, deiems a winding-up to commence on presentation of 
the wind1ng-up application.*64' Under s l ( l ) ( f )  of the Bankruptcy 
Act I t  1s an act of bankruptcy i f  one file s  1n court a declaration 
of one's Inab ility  to pay one's debts or I f  one presents a 
bankruptcy petition against oneself. The company In question had 
passed a resolution to go into voluntary winding-up and did not 
therefore f i le  such a declaration or petition. However, 1t did send 
a notice In terms of s 293 to its  creditors convening a meeting of 
creditors to be held in conjunction with a meeting of members with a 
view to placing the company in voluntary w1nd1ng-up. Buckley 0 1n 
holding such notice to be equivalent to an act of bankruptcy for the 
purpose of s 31 of the Bankruptcy Act as applied to windings-up 
sa1d:<6S>
' I t  seems to me, therefore, that notice under section 293 does, 
In fact, amount to a declaration by the company of Its  inability 
to pay its  debts . . . .  i t  1s quite true that the notice is  not 
given in the manner Indicated in section 1{1), ( f )  of the 
Bankruptcy Act which relates to declaring In ab ility  to pay debts 
by means of a notice filed  1n the bankruptcy court. 
Nevertheless, I t  is a declaration made In the form prescribed by 
statute and bears an analogy to a notice filed  under the 
bankruptcy Act . . . .  1 would be most unwilling to come to the 
■ .inclusion that the final wo?'ds of section 31 of the Bankruptcy 
Act, 1914, ought to be treated as of no effect when the 
provisions of that section are applied in winding up, and I do 
not think that i t  is either necessary or right to reach that 
conclusion.1
(64) Section 229 of the English Act and s 348 ol the South African 
Act.
(65) At 574.
The same reasoning 1s, 1t 1s considered, applicable to the question 
of whether s 22 of the Insolvency Act applies to w1nd1ngs-up and 
leads to the conclusion that the section does apply.
Section 339 of the Companies Act applies the provisions of the 
Insolver,-* 'faws to the winding-up of companies which are unable to 
pay their debts. T h i s  does not mean that the company's 
Inab ility to pay its  debts nwst have been the ground on which ft  was 
placed in winding-up: s 339 w ill apply to the winding-up of a 
company wht ' unable to pay its  debts whether or not this was the 
ground rolled on and whether or not the company 1s placed in 
w1nd1ng-up by the court or voluntarily.*67^
What is  the position i f  a company which was able to pay Its 
debts at the commencement of the winding-up becomes unable to do so 
during the w1nd1ng-up, or vice versa, due, say, to fluctuation in 
the market value of the company's assets? Tn1s question arose In 
Taylor & Steyn NNO v Koeketnoer*6^  1n relation to s 415(1) of the 
Companies Act and in the course of considering the position in 
regard to various other sections of the Act which refer to companies 
which are unable to pay their debts, Margo J ,  1n delivering the 
judgment of the Full Bench, said :*6^
'Section 339 invokes the provisions of the law relating to 
insolvency in the winding-up of a company unable to pay its  
debts. That is  clearly applicable to a company which, though
188.
(66) See 165 n 9 above regarding what constitutes Inab ility  to pay 
one's debts, but c f 303ff below.
(67) In re Hardwood Timber Co Ltd (in liquidation.) 1932 NPD 170; 
Earl Motors (Pty) Ltd v Estany & Co (Pty) ltd  1963 (2) SA 
SOT(E) at 236B-D;"Tayior & Steyn nm v Koekcimoer 1982 (1) SA 
374<T) at 376F-G. --------  ------ - ---------
(63) Supra.
(69) At 378B-C.
able to pay its  debts at the commencement of the wfndfrtg-up, 
la ter becomes unable to do so, for example, because the value of 
its  assets has dropped meanwhile. I f  the insolvency law were not 
applied by s 339 to such a situation, there would be no other 
provisions to govern those aspects of tte winding-up which are 
wholly dependent on the Insolvency A ct.1' 713'
(b) Weaning of 'any obligation...the cause of which arose before the 
sequestration'
Section 22 refers to the satisfaction of ‘any obligation . . .  the 
cause of which arose before the sequestration1. The cause of a 
contractual obligation in this context is , i t  is considered, the 
contract its e lf  and not every fact that the claimant would have to 
prove to establish a cause of a c t i o n . F o r  example, i f  the 
insolvent had granted a loan repayable on demand and demand had not 
been made prior to sequestration he would have had an incomplete 
cause of action on sequestration but the obligation to repay the 
loan would s t i l l  have been one the cause of which arose before 
sequestration within the meaning of 3 2 2 .^ ^
Obligations owed to the insolvent are assets in his estate and 
the object of s 22 is  in the f ir s t  instance to preserve such assets 
for the creditors, subject only to protection of debtors who in 
ignorance of the sequestration discharge their debts to the 
insolvent instead of to his trustee. The view is , moreover, taken
-k________
{70} This decision is critic ised  below at 303-11 in relation to 
s 341(2) but i t  is thought i t  is correct in relation to s 22.
(7\) iJut cf Jones v ftaad 1940 CPD 376 at 378 where the opposite 
conclusion was reached in relation to the expression 'cause of 
in a different statute.
(72) I t  does not matter that the demand 1s only made after the 
. Insolvent has ceased to be entitled to make the demand, 
because even in the absence of a valid  demand payment made to 
and accepted by a lender discharges the loan. Payment to the 
insolvent therefore constitutes the satisfaction of an 
obligation the cause of which arose before the sequestration. '
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